Ertz v. Produce Exchange Company of Minneapolis
| Decision Date | 04 January 1901 |
| Docket Number | 12,304 - (173) |
| Parties | CONRAD J. ERTZ v. PRODUCE EXCHANGE COMPANY OF MINNEAPOLIS and Others |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $25,000 damages from defendants for combining and conspiring to ruin plaintiff's business as set forth in the opinion. The case was tried before McGee, J., who directed a verdict in favor of defendants. From an order denying a motion for a new trial, plaintiff appealed. Reversed.
Combination in Restraint of Trade.
The constitution and by-laws of a corporation regulated the credit to be allowed its members, discriminated in the price to be paid for produce against persons not members controlled the delivery of goods, and provided a penalty by fine and suspension for offending and defaulting members. Held, that such an organization is a combination in restraint of trade, tends to limit and control the market price of produce, limits and interferes with the free and open purchase and sale of commodities, and is prohibited by Laws 1899, c. 359.
Boycott -- Estoppel of Former Member.
The fact that a dealer in produce was a member of such an association, and participated in the adoption of such constitution and by-laws, does not prevent him from maintaining an action against such association and its members for damages caused by the boycotting by them of his business after he was suspended for violation of such by-laws. The acts complained of having been performed after he ceased to be a member, and without his consent, the plaintiff is not pari delicto.
James Robertson and M. C. Brady, for appellant.
The language of Laws 1899, c. 359, is largely taken from 26 St 209. The construction placed on the federal statute is applicable. If defendants entered into a conspiracy or combination in restraint of trade, or to destroy, limit, or interfere with free competition in the purchase or sale of the commodities mentioned, and plaintiff was damaged thereby, he is entitled to recover. U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290, 324; U.S. v. Addyston P. & S. Co., 54 U.S. App. 723. While the federal act affirmatively gives a right of action to the injured party and the state act does not, yet where a party commits an act which is criminal and another suffers damages in consequence, a right of action accrues to the injured party. Cooley, Torts, 88-124; 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. (2d Ed.) 598; 1 Bishop, Crim. L. § 264; 2 Addison, Torts, § 850; Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608. The courts proceed upon the theory that any act done in the commission of a crime is malicious. 14 Am. & Eng. Enc. 5; People v. Chicago, 170 Ill. 556. Neither the doctrine of pari delicto nor of particeps criminis applies. Even if plaintiff was a member of the Produce Exchange during the period covered by the complaint, his rights are not cut off. Mohney v. Cook, 26 Pa. St. 342; Cooley, Const. Lim. (1st Ed.) 253; People v. Chicago, supra; Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171; 2 Greenleaf, Ev. § 85; Com. v. Collberg, 119 Mass. 350; Adams v. Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531; Stout v. Wren, 1 Hawks, 420; Bell v. Hansley, 3 Jones, Law (N.C.) 131; Exodus, xxi, 18, 19; Dole v. Erskine, 35 N.H. 303; Grotton v. Glidden, 84 Me. 589.
Stiles & Stiles, for respondents.
Conceding, for the purpose of argument, that an unlawful conspiracy has been shown, plaintiff cannot maintain this action: Because, first, he had no legal right to buy merchandise of any defendant; second, he himself actively and knowingly aided and assisted in putting in motion the very agency by whose actions he claims to have been injuriously affected; and third, he expressly consented that each defendant should do exactly what it is shown certain of the defendants did do -- refuse to sell to him. A different question is here presented from that which was before the court in a former appeal. The court then held the complaint to state a cause of action because it alleged that defendants had maliciously conspired together to induce plaintiff's patrons and third persons not to trade with him, and that the agreement was not made to serve any legitimate business ends of their own. The principle laid down in Bohn Mnfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, that a man not under contract obligations to the contrary has a right to refuse to work for, or deal with, any man or class of men, as he sees fit, and that the right which one man may exercise singly many may lawfully agree by voluntary association to do jointly, provided they do not interfere with the legal rights of others, is affirmed. With the element of the so-called conspiracy, which goes to the inducing and influencing of patrons and third parties not to trade with plaintiff, out of this case, it is exactly like the Bohn case in every particular. The evidence fails to show the commission of any illegal act which has resulted in legal injury to plaintiff. In any event plaintiff is estopped to complain, because he was one of the conspirators, and hence pari delicto. Peacock v. Terry, 9 Ga. 137; Ellis v. Cleveland, 54 Vt. 437; Goldnamer v. O'Brien, 98 Ky. 569; Galbraith v. Fleming, 60 Mich. 408; Beechley v. Mulville, 102 Iowa 602.
The Produce Exchange Company of the city of Minneapolis is a corporation, and its by-laws provide certain restrictions and limitations as to the method of doing business by its members, the more important of which are as follows:
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