Escamilla v. Cuello

• Decision Date: 17 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. CV–12–0039–AP/EL.,CV–12–0039–AP/EL.
• Citation: 282 P.3d 403,230 Ariz. 202,641 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24
• Parties: Juan Carlos ESCAMILLA, a qualified elector of the City of San Luis, Yuma County, State of Arizona, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Sonia CUELLO, in her capacity as the City Clerk of the City of San Luis, Arizona, Respondent, and Alejandrina Cabrera, a candidate for elected office, Defendant/Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

230 Ariz. 202

282 P.3d 403

641 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24

Juan Carlos ESCAMILLA, a qualified elector of the City of San Luis, Yuma County, State of Arizona, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v. Sonia CUELLO, in her capacity as the City Clerk of the City of San Luis, Arizona, Respondent,andAlejandrina Cabrera, a candidate for elected office, Defendant/Appellant.

No. CV–12–0039–AP/EL.

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Aug. 17, 2012.

Glenn J. Gimbut, City Attorney by Glenn J. Gimbut, City Attorney, San Luis, Ellen M. Van Riper, Attorney at Law by Ellen M. Van Riper, Phoenix, Torok Law Office, PLLC by Gregory T. Torok, Yuma, Attorneys for Juan Carlos Escamilla.

Law Offices of Cornelius Candy Camarena, P.C. by C. Candy Camarena, Yuma, Attorney for Sonia Cuello.

Edgar & Minore, P.C. by John R. Minore, Richard J. Edgar, Yuma, Garcia, Hengl, Kinsey & Villarreal, P.L.C. by John S. Garcia, Brandon S. Kinsey, Ryan C. Hengl, Yuma, Attorneys for Alejandrina Cabrera.

OPINION

BRUTINEL, Justice.

¶ 12028429328;0011;;LQ;AZCNART20P1;1000251; On January 27, 2012, the Yuma County Superior Court disqualified Alejandrina Cabrera under A.R.S. § 38–201(C) (2001) from appearing on the ballot as a candidate for the San Luis City Council. On February 7, 2012, we affirmed the superior court's judgment, stating that an opinion would follow. This is that opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On December 29, 2011, San Luis Mayor Juan Carlos Escamilla, in his capacity as a qualified elector for the city, brought a special action seeking to disqualify Cabrera as a candidate for city council and naming Sonia Cuello in her capacity as the San Luis City Clerk. He alleged that Cabrera's name should be excluded from the ballot for the March 2012 election because she cannot read, write, and speak the English language as required by § 38–201(C).

¶ 3 After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court precluded her from the ballot. Concluding that § 38–201(C)'s language requirement must be read “in the context of the political office at issue,” the court consideredexpert testimony and observed Cabrera testify (including in response to the court's questions) and found that she is not sufficiently proficient in English to perform as a city council member for San Luis.

¶ 4 Cabrera filed an expedited appeal in this Court pursuant to A.R.S. § 16–351(A) (2006).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Special Action Jurisdiction

¶ 5 In his special action, Escamilla sought an order to show cause why the City Clerk should not be enjoined from placing Cabrera's name on the ballot. The trial court denied Cabrera's motion to dismiss, ruling that Escamilla properly brought this case as a special action under Rule 3(b), Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act., and sufficiently demanded injunctive relief under A.R.S. § 16–351. Cabrera argues that the court erred in allowing the case to proceed as a special action because it should have instead been filed as a complaint for injunctive relief. We disagree.

¶ 6 In Mandraes v. Hungerford, 127 Ariz. 585, 587, 623 P.2d 15, 17 (1981), we held that filing a petition for injunctive relief and securing an order to show cause was an appropriate way to challenge a candidate's qualifications for the ballot. Escamilla did so here. His doing so through a petition for special action rather than a complaint for injunctive relief does not affect the validity of his challenge.

B. Timeliness of Trial Court Order

¶ 7 Cabrera asserts that the superior court erred in issuing its order twenty-nine days after Escamilla filed the complaint because A.R.S. § 16–351(A) directs trial courts to “hear and render a decision” on an election matter within ten days after the action is filed. Cabrera concedes that in Brousseau v. Fitzgerald, 138 Ariz. 453, 456, 675 P.2d 713, 716 (1984), we interpreted this statutory time limit as directive and not jurisdictional. But she argues that the filing and prosecution of this case unfairly left her little time to appeal and that Escamilla failed to diligently prosecute this case. When a non-jurisdictional deadline is not met, the relevant inquiry is whether a party suffered prejudice because of the delay. See Bee v. Day, 218 Ariz. 505, 507 ¶ 7, 189 P.3d 1078, 1080 (2008).

¶ 8 Here, the trial court's processing of the case left sufficient time for expedited appellate review before the ballot printing deadline. And Escamilla is not at fault for any delay; he diligently prosecuted his case, which is evidenced by his serving Cabrera immediately and promptly moving to have an expert appointed and Cabrera tested. Moreover, some delay is due to Cabrera's own tardiness in filing her answer below. Because the § 16–351(A) deadline for decision is not jurisdictional and Cabrera has not shown prejudice, we find no error. Given the expedited nature of challenges to candidate qualifications, however, we emphasize that trial courts should render decisions within § 16–351's ten-day deadline.

C. Proficiency Standard

¶ 9 Arizona law has required English proficiency as a qualification for public office since before statehood. The Territorial Code provided that “[n]o person who cannot write and read in the English language shall be eligible to hold any territorial, county, precinct or district office in the Territory of Arizona.” See Ariz. Civ.Code 1901, tit. 1, ch. 14, § 199; see also Ariz. Civ.Code 1913, tit. 1, ch. 18, § 158 (“No person who cannot speak, write, and read the English language shall be eligible to hold any state, county, or precinct office in the state of Arizona.”).

¶ 10 This longstanding requirement is repeated in both our Enabling Act and Constitution. The Enabling Act states “that ability to read, write, speak, and understand the English language sufficiently well to conduct the duties of the office without the aid of an interpreter shall be a necessary qualification for all state officers and members of the state legislature.” Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 20, 36 Stat. 557, 570 (“Enabling Act”). The Arizona Constitution contains this same requirement. Ariz. Const. art. 20, ¶ 8.

¶ 11 The proficiency requirement adopted in the Territorial Code was carried forward in the early versions of the Arizona Code and eventually reenacted with minor changes as § 38–201(C) in the 1956 Code. Section 38–201(C) provides that “[a] person who is unable to speak, write and read the English language is not eligible to hold a state, county, city, town or precinct office in the state, whether elective or appointive, and no certificate of election or commission shall issue to a person so disqualified.” The trial court found that this statute would be “rendered meaningless” if “it were interpreted as having no standard or only requiring minimal or bare proficiency at speaking, reading, and writing the English language.” The court narrowly construed the statute to require “sufficient proficiency in speaking, reading, and writing the English language” to understand and perform the duties of the office sought.

¶ 12 Cabrera argues that the trial court improperly expanded this statute by requiring some degree of English fluency in addition to the statutorily required ability to read, write, and speak English. Because she read aloud council meeting minutes printed in English and was able during her testimony to engage in some basic conversation using English words, Cabrera contends she has met the statutory requirement.

¶ 13 We review a trial court's interpretation of a statute de novo. Ballesteros v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 226 Ariz. 345, 347 ¶ 7, 248 P.3d 193, 195 (2011). “[D]isqualifications provided by the legislature are construed strictly and there is a presumption in favor of the eligibility of one who had been elected or appointed to public office.” Shirley v. Superior Court ( Minyard ), 109 Ariz. 510, 515, 513 P.2d 939, 944 (1973); see also McCarthy v. State ex rel. Harless, 55 Ariz. 328, 335, 101 P.2d 449, 451 (1940) (recognizing same standard).

¶ 14 We think that the same principles should apply to candidates' eligibility to run for office. See, e.g., Bysiewicz v. Dinardo, 298 Conn. 748, 6 A.3d 726, 738 (2010) (citing cases using above standard for candidate eligibility to run for office); Municipality of Anchorage v. Mjos, 179 P.3d 941, 943 (Alaska 2008) (noting that “there is a presumption in favor of candidate eligibility”). This approach respects “the right of the people to select officers of their own choosing.” McCarthy, 55 Ariz. at 334, 101 P.2d at 451.

¶ 15 Our reading of § 38–201(C) is informed by the requirements in the Enabling Act and Arizona Constitution of sufficient English proficiency to conduct the duties of the office without the aid of an interpreter. See Gladden Farms, Inc. v. State, 129 Ariz. 516, 518, 633 P.2d 325, 327 (1981) (noting that the Enabling Act is one of Arizona's fundamental laws and preempts conflicting state statutes). The statute's eligibility requirements apply to a broad range of public officials, including state officers. The qualifications mandated by Arizona's Enabling Act and Constitution, on the other hand, apply to all state officers and legislators. Those qualifications include an ability to “understand the English language sufficiently well to conduct the duties of the office without the aid of an interpreter.” Enabling Act § 20; Ariz. Const. art. 20, § 8. Although § 38–201(C) does not include the quoted language, when the legislature reenacted the Territorial Code's proficiency requirement in the 1913 Arizona Code, the predecessor to § 38–201(C), it implicitly included the requirements of the Enabling Act and Constitution because it could not have statutorily imposed anything less with respect to state officers or legislators. See Gladden Farms, 129 Ariz. at 518, 633 P.2d at 327.

¶ 16 When read in conjunction with Arizona's Enabling Act and Constitution, § 38–201(C) means that to qualify for a public office, a candidate must possess sufficient proficiency in the English language to conduct the duties of the office. To...