Espada v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 26 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:08-cv-504-FtM-36DNF |
| Parties | LUIS ANTONIO ESPADA, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DOC, FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Luis Antonio Espada initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition," Doc. #1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 16, 2008.1 The Petition challenges Espada's 2002 state court judgment of conviction for sexual battery entered in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court, Lee County, Florida. Petition at 1. Pursuant to the Court's Order, Respondent filed a Response (Doc. #15, Response) and supporting exhibits (Doc. #17, Exhs. 1-18).2 Petitioner failed to file aReply, or move for an extension of time to file a Reply. See Order at Doc. #19. This matter is ripe for review.
On January 18, 2002, Petitioner was charged by Information with one count of sexual battery in case number 02-25CF. Exh. 18, Vol. I at 2-3. The case proceeded to a trial on July 31, 2002, and the jury found Petitioner guilty of sexual battery. Id. at 11-12, 41. Pursuant to the guilty verdict, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to fifteen-years in prison on September 17, 2002. Id. at 49, 68-72.
Petitioner, through counsel, filed a direct appeal raising one ground for relief. Exh. 1.
Did the trial court err in prohibiting [Petitioner] from introducing evidence of the alleged victim's prior sexual activity?
The State filed an answer brief. Exh. 2. On August 29, 2003, the appellate court per curiam affirmed Petitioner's conviction andsentence. Espada v. State, 856 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)[table]; Exh. 3. Mandate issued October 8, 2003. Exh. 4.
On February 10, 2004, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Exh. 5. Petitioner raised the following seven grounds:
See generally Exh. 5.
The State filed a response to Petitioner's Rule 3.850 Motion. Exh. 6. Petitioner filed a Reply. Exh. 7. The State filed a supplemental response to include the original and amended designations by the court reporter, and the copies of the trial transcripts. Exh. 8. On May 31, 2005, the post-conviction court dismissed grounds 1 and 3; denied on the merits grounds 2, 4, and 6; and, directed that an evidentiary hearing be held on grounds 5 and 7. Exh. 9. The State filed a second, supplemental response and moved the post-conviction court to vacate its order setting an evidentiary hearing. Exh. 10.
On September 27, 2005, and November 23, 2005, the post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing, during which Petitioner was represented by counsel. Exhs. 11, 12. On January 6, 2006, the court issued an order denying grounds 5 and 7. Exh. 13.
Petitioner appealed the post-conviction court's order denying all grounds for relief, but conceded that his ground 4 was meritless. Exh. 14. The State filed an answer brief. Exh. 15. On February 8, 2008, the appellate court per curiam affirmed the post-conviction court's order, and mandate issued March 3, 2008. Exhs. 16, 17.
Petitioner filed his timely4 Petition after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Consequently, post-AEDPA law governs this action. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1664 (2007); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001); Davis v. Jones, 506 F.3d 1325, 1331, n.9 (11th Cir. 2007). Under AEDPA, the federal court's review is "greatly circumscribed and is highly deferential to the state courts." Alston v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 610 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2010); Stewart v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 476 F.3d 1193, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007). Essentially, AEDPA altered the federal court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to "prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). Several aspects of § 2254, as amended by the AEDPA, are relevant to a review of this Petition.
A federal court may entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus from a person in state custody pursuant to a state court judgment only on the grounds that the petitioner is in custody in violation of the United States Constitution or the lawsor treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A claimed violation of state law is generally insufficient to warrant review or relief by a federal court under § 2254. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). Questions of state law are only reviewed to determine whether the alleged errors rendered "the entire trial fundamentally unfair." Carrizales v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1053, 1055 (11th Cir. 1983).
A petitioner, even when asserting grounds that warrant review by a federal court under § 2254, must have first raised such grounds before the state courts, thereby giving the state courts the initial opportunity to address the federal issues. A § 2254 application cannot be granted unless a petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This imposes a "total exhaustion" requirement in which all of the federal issues must have first been presented to the state courts. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005).
"[T]he state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). See also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). "A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief cannotraise a federal constitutional claim in federal court unless he first properly raised the issue in the state courts." Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom. Pruitt v. Hooks, 543 U.S. 838 (2004). To properly exhaust a claim, a petitioner must present the same claim to the state court that he urges the federal court to consider. McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); Kelley v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 2004). As to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a petitioner must have presented each instance of alleged ineffective assistance to the state court in such a manner that a reasonable reader would understand each claim's particular legal basis and specific factual foundation. Ogle, 488 F.3d at 1368 (citations omitted); Kelley, 377 F.3d at 1344-45. A state prisoner need not file a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies because the U.S. Supreme Court is not considered to be a part of a "State's post-conviction procedures." Lawrence v. State, 549 U.S. 327, 332 (2007).
When presented with a "mixed" petition, i.e., one containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims, a district court is ordinarily required to either dismiss the petition, Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 227 (2004); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), or, in limited circumstances and under the district court's discretion,"grant a stay and abeyance to allow the petitioner to exhaust the unexhausted claim." Ogle, 488 F.3d at 1370 (citing Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-79). However, when it is obvious that the unexhausted claims would be procedurally barred in state court due to a state-law procedural rule, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a district court can consider the petition but treat those unexhausted claims as procedurally defaulted. Ogle, 488 F.3d at 1370. Additionally, while under the AEDPA a federal court may not grant a habeas petition that contains unexhausted claims, it may deny such a petition on the merits. LeCroy v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 421 F.3d 1237, 1261 n.26 (11th Cir. 2005).
"The teeth of the exhaustion requirement comes from its handmaiden, the procedural default doctrine." Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1136 (2002). Under the procedural default doctrine, "[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, . . . ." Smith, 256 F.3d at 1138.
A procedural default for failing to exhaust state court remedies will only be excused in two narrow circumstances. First, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim if he shows both "cause" for the default and actual "prejudice" resulting from the asserted error. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006); Mize v. Hall, 532 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11thCir. 2008). "Cause" ordinarily requires...
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