Espinoza-Matthews v. California
| Decision Date | 28 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-56805.,04-56805. |
| Citation | 432 F.3d 1021 |
| Parties | Robert Jerome ESPINOZA-MATTHEWS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. People of the State of CALIFORNIA, Attorney General, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Maria E. Stratton, Federal Public Defender; Harry Simon, Deputy Federal Public Defender; Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, CA, for the petitioner-appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General; Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Gary W. Brozio, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Erika Hiramatsu, Deputy Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for the respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-03-00921-RGK(Mc).
Before TASHIMA and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and SHADUR, Senior District Judge.*
Robert Jerome Espinoza-Matthews ("Espinoza-Matthews") appeals the district court's determination that his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was barred by the one-year statute of limitations set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).1 Espinoza-Matthews claims that the statute of limitations governing his habeas petition (1) should be equitably tolled both because he was denied access to his legal materials while housed in Administrative Segregation ("Ad/Seg") and because of his mental health problems and (2) should be statutorily tolled because of the deprivation of legal materials.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to Sections 1291 and 2253. Because we hold that Espinoza-Matthews is entitled to equitable tolling, we reverse the district court's determination that his habeas petition was untimely and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. And because statutory tolling would necessarily rest on a constitutional ground, one that need not be addressed to arrive at our equitable tolling decision, we refrain from deciding whether the same destination can be reached by the application of statutory tolling principles (see Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 925 (9th Cir.2002)).
On May 4, 2000 Espinoza-Matthews pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery, to three counts of robbery, to the unlawful taking of a vehicle and to possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, with special allegations as to a number of those counts. After accepting Espinoza-Matthews's plea, on June 15, 2000 the Riverside County Superior Court sentenced him to 19 years and 8 months in state prison. On October 1, 2001 the California Court of Appeal substantially affirmed Espinoza-Matthews's conviction in an unpublished disposition.
On December 10, 2001 Espinoza-Matthews filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. That petition was denied on April 17, 2002.
Three days before that denial Espinoza-Matthews was placed in Ad/Seg at California State Prison, Sacramento ("Sacramento") for his own protection, after he had been assaulted and slashed by another inmate. Espinoza-Matthews was housed in Ad/Seg from April 14, 2002 until March 2003, with only one interruption for him to return to court on May 16, 2002 for resentencing.2
Following his release from Ad/Seg, on March 30, 2003 Espinoza-Matthews signed and delivered to the prison warden a request directed to the District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking an extension of time to file his federal habeas petition. Espinoza-Matthews claimed that he needed an extension of at least 120 days because he had been given no access to his legal property while he was in Ad/Seg and because he was mentally ill. On June 18, 2003 that court dismissed Espinoza-Matthews's request for lack of jurisdiction, noting that because Espinoza-Matthews had not yet filed a habeas petition there was no case or controversy for the court to decide.
Without having waited for the court's decision on his request for an extension, on May 12, 2003 Espinoza-Matthews signed his federal habeas petition, stating there that he gave the petition to prison officials for mailing on that date. Espinoza-Matthews's petition raised three issues: (1) that he had been on psychotropic medications since the date of his arrest, (2) that his Sixth Amendment rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) had been violated during police questioning and (3) that the prosecutor had tampered with evidence, falsified reports and intimidated witnesses. On July 24, 2003 the clerk of the District Court for the Northern District of California filed the petition. Because it had been filed in the wrong court, however, on July 31, 2003 that court transferred the petition to the Central District of California, where it was filed on August 11, 2003.
On October 16, 2003 the State moved to dismiss Espinoza-Matthews's petition because, among other reasons, it was assertedly untimely. In response, on November 7, 2003 Espinoza-Matthews filed a "Motion for Order Permitting Petitioner to Amend His Pleadings, etc." Espinoza-Matthews argued there (1) that his habeas petition was timely under Section 2244(d)(1)(A), (2) that he was entitled to statutory tolling because the "law library access scheme" at Sacramento was a state-created impediment that prevented him from filing his petition and (3) that he was entitled to equitable tolling because he had a "serious mental illness" constituting an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control.
In his Report and Recommendation the magistrate judge found no evidence that Espinoza-Matthews was entitled to statutory or equitable tolling and therefore agreed with the State that Espinoza-Matthews's petition was untimely. According to the magistrate judge, Espinoza-Matthews had not "further described the `law library access scheme' or his `serious mental illness' or how they caused him to fail to file a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus here."
On March 25, 2004 Espinoza-Matthews filed a "Traverse to Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus." In his traverse Espinoza-Matthews argued that he was entitled to statutory tolling not only because of the prison's library scheme but also because prison officials had deprived him of his legal property from May 17, 2002 until he was released from Ad/Seg in March 2003. Espinoza-Matthews also contended that he was entitled to equitable tolling based on the denial of his legal property and his mental illness. While Espinoza-Matthews cited to "Exhibit H" to support his claim of mental incompetency, no Exhibit H was attached to his traverse.
After receiving Espinoza-Matthews's traverse, the magistrate judge issued a Supplemental Report and Recommendation ("SR & R"), again rejecting Espinoza-Matthews's arguments for tolling the statute of limitations. In doing so the magistrate judge first evaluated Espinoza-Matthews's argument that he was denied access to his legal materials while in Ad/Seg, albeit only under the rubric of statutory tolling. Finding that Espinoza-Matthews had not specified which legal papers were missing, how the absence of those papers prevented him from filing his petition and "when, if ever, [Espinoza-Matthews] regained control of his legal property," the magistrate judge rejected that claim. Second, as to Espinoza-Matthews's claim for equitable tolling based on his mental problems, the magistrate judge found that there were no "medical, psychiatric or psychological records" to support Espinoza-Matthews's claim and there was "considerable evidence that petitioner was able to prepare and file legal documents" and administrative appeals during the period in question.
In response to the magistrate judge's SR & R, Espinoza-Matthews filed a timely objection with the district court. Espinoza-Matthews argued there that he had been denied his legal property during the whole time he was in Ad/Seg—not simply starting in May 2002, when he was returned to court for resentencing. Espinoza-Matthews attached additional evidence demonstrating when he was transferred into and out of Ad/Seg and documenting his attempts to secure his legal property while in Ad/Seg in an effort to prepare his habeas petition. Finally, Espinoza-Matthews affixed his mental health records.
On August 27, 2004 the district court, following a "de novo" review of "those portions of the [magistrate judge's] report to which objection [was] made," adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations. After the district court denied Espinoza-Matthews a certificate of appealability ("COA"), we granted Espinoza-Matthews a COA on several issues:
(1) Whether the district court erred in dismissing appellant's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as untimely;
(2) Whether the deprivation of appellant's legal property by the state prison system from May 2002 until March 2003 constitutes a state-created impediment to filing a timely Section 2254 petition;
(3) Whether appellant is entitled to equitable tolling based on his mental health condition, see Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc);3 and
(4) Whether the district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the above tolling issues. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3).
We review de novo the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition for failure to comply with the one-year statute of limitations established in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") (Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir.2003)). If the facts underlying a claim for tolling of the habeas limitations period are undisputed, the question whether the statute of limitations should be tolled is reviewed de novo. But otherwise a district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error (Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir.2003)).
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United States v. $229,850.00 in U.S. Currency
...to § 983(a)(3)(A). Here, the government bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling should apply. Espinoza—Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir.2005). A party is entitled to equitable tolling where “he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2......
-
Celaya v. Stewart
...that Pace had "lowered the bar somewhat" compared with the previous standard. Harris, 515 F.3d at 1055, citing Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 n. 5 (2005)). Harris did not decide whether a substantive difference existed between the two standards because the Ninth Circui......
-
United States v. Aholelei
...high." Aguierre-Ganceda, 592 F.3d at 1045-46 (quoting Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006)); Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Aholelei argues that "equity suggests" his limitations period should be tolled "until, at the earliest, it beca......
-
Alcox v. Hartley
...to file a petition on time." Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Espinoza-Matthews v. People of the State of Cal., 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir.2005). Moreover, petitioner bears the burden of proving: "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,......