Espinoza v. Martin

• Decision Date: 20 April 1995
• Docket Number: No. CV-94-0067-PR,CV-94-0067-PR
• Citation: 182 Ariz. 145,894 P.2d 688
• Parties: , 63 USLW 2703 Raymond ESPINOZA, Petitioner, v. Honorable Gregory H. MARTIN, a judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent Judge, STATE of Arizona, ex rel. Richard ROMLEY, Maricopa County Attorney, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 688

894 P.2d 688

182 Ariz. 145, 63 USLW 2703

Raymond ESPINOZA, Petitioner, v. Honorable Gregory H. MARTIN, a judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent Judge, STATE of Arizona, ex rel. Richard ROMLEY, Maricopa County Attorney, Real Party in Interest.

No. CV-94-0067-PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

April 20, 1995.

Wisdom, Logan & McNulty by James L.P. Logan, Jr., Phoenix, for petitioner.

Grant Woods, Atty. Gen. by Paul J. McMurdie, Chief Counsel, Crim. Appeals Div., R. Wayne Ford, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for respondent Judge.

Richard M. Romley, Maricopa County Atty. by Gerald R. Grant, Deputy County Atty., Phoenix, for real party in interest.

Law Offices of Dennis C. Jones by Dennis C. Jones, Leigh B. Jones, Phoenix, amicus curiae for Arizona Attys. for Crim. Justice.

CORCORAN, Justice.

Petitioner Raymond Espinoza, a criminal defendant in Maricopa County, challenges the policy adopted by a group of Maricopa County Superior Court judges of summarily rejecting all plea agreements containing stipulated sentences. The court of appeals affirmed the policy. We granted review, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3), and rule 31.19, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The criminal divisions of the Maricopa County Superior Court are divided into four groups designated as quadrants A through D. Quadrant B, consisting of 5 judges, presides 1. Plea agreements may stipulate to "probation," or "department of corrections" [DOC] for felonies, or "county jail" for misdemeanors. Agreements may not stipulate to any term of years (other than lifetime probation in dangerous crimes against children) or to any non-mandatory terms and conditions of probation (including, but not limited to, jail time, fines or surcharges, or community service hours), or to sentences running concurrently or consecutively, except for DOC time followed by lifetime probation in dangerous crimes against children.

                [182 Ariz. 146]  over felony offenses committed in the justice court precincts of Gila Bend, Tolleson, West Phoenix, and Maryvale.  On December 28, 1992, the quadrant B judges issued a memorandum detailing a new plea agreement policy that was scheduled to take effect on January 25, 1993.  The policy stated that quadrant B judges would no longer accept any plea agreements containing stipulated sentences because sentencing "is a judicial function which should not be subjected to limitations which are imposed by the parties, but are not required by law."   Although quadrant B had already adopted the policy, the memorandum indicated that the judges would welcome feedback.  After holding a meeting to consider such feedback, the quadrant B judges issued a revised version of their policy on January 15, 1993 (quadrant B policy).  The relevant section of that policy reads as follows
                

The only 2 exceptions to the quadrant B policy are as follows:

2. Exceptions will be made for legitimate cooperation agreements. If the state wishes to make stipulated sentencing concessions in exchange for information, testimony or cooperation from a defendant, that fact should be made known to the judge in an appropriate manner prior to the change of plea.

....

4. Stipulations in capital murder cases to life imprisonment are viewed by the judges as charging concessions and not true sentencing stipulations. Therefore, such stipulations are unaffected by the policy.

On June 2, 1993, Espinoza was indicted on one count of offering to sell narcotic drugs and one count of misconduct involving weapons. At his arraignment, the case was assigned to respondent, quadrant B Judge Gregory H. Martin. On August 11, 1993, Espinoza appeared before Judge Martin in chambers to enter a plea of guilty to both counts pursuant to a plea agreement, which stipulated that the sentences would run concurrently with each other and with an unrelated probation revocation. Judge Martin summarily rejected Espinoza's plea agreement because the stipulation to concurrent sentences violated the quadrant B policy. On August 31, 1993, Espinoza presented Judge Martin with the same plea agreement, this time in court and on the record, and the judge again rejected the agreement without giving it any individualized consideration because, as he noted, "[t]he sentencing provisions are all contrary to the Quad B policy." (Emphasis added.)

Following Judge Martin's ruling, Espinoza filed a petition for special action. The court of appeals accepted jurisdiction, but denied relief, holding that the quadrant B policy was a proper exercise of judicial authority. Espinoza v. Martin, 180 Ariz. 608, 886 P.2d 1364 (App.1993). Espinoza then filed a petition for review. We granted review to consider the validity of the quadrant B policy because it presents an issue of statewide importance that this court has not previously decided.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether the quadrant B policy violates rule 17.4, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, because it prevents the trial court from exercising its discretion when deciding whether to accept or reject a plea agreement containing a stipulated sentence.

II. Whether the quadrant B policy violates rule 36, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, because it establishes an unapproved local rule that is inconsistent with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

DISCUSSION

I. Violation of Rule 17.4

Rule 17.4, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, governs plea negotiations and agreements. This court has stated that "[t]he rules [of criminal procedure] recognize that properly negotiated plea agreements ... are an essential part of the criminal process and can enhance judicial economy, protect the resources of the State, and serve the ends of justice for the defendant, the State and the victim." State v. Superior Court, 125 Ariz. 575, 577, 611 P.2d 928, 930 (1980). This case turns on the meaning of rule 17.4(a), which reads as follows:

Plea Negotiations. The parties may negotiate concerning, and reach an agreement on, any aspect of the disposition of the case. The court shall not participate in any such negotiation.

The plain language of rule 17.4(a) gives the parties the right to negotiate and reach agreement on "any aspect of the disposition of the case." (Emphasis added.) This means that "the State and the defendant may bargain both as to the plea of guilty and as to the sentence to be imposed." Superior Court, 125 Ariz. at 577, 611 P.2d at 930.

Although rule 17.4(a) allows the parties to negotiate plea agreements, including sentences, rule 17.4 also grants trial courts considerable discretion in deciding whether to accept or reject such agreements. State v. De Nistor, 143 Ariz. 407, 411, 694 P.2d 237, 241 (1985). Rule 17.4(d) provides in part:

Acceptance of Plea. After making such determinations [of the accuracy of the agreement and the voluntariness and intelligence of the plea] and considering the victim's view, if provided, the court shall either accept or reject the tendered negotiated plea.

Furthermore, even if a trial court accepts a plea agreement, it is not bound by negotiated provisions regarding the sentence or the terms of probation if a review of the presentence report reveals the inadequacy of those provisions. Rule 17.4(d) and Form XVIII, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In order to ensure that agreements negotiated pursuant to rule 17.4(a) have some meaningful effect, we interpret rule 17.4 as guaranteeing the parties the right to present their negotiated agreement to a judge, to have the judge consider the merits of that agreement in light of the circumstances of the case, and to have the judge exercise his or her discretion with regard to the agreement. Instead of hampering judicial sentencing discretion, the current version of rule 17.4, taken as a whole, contemplates the exercise of judicial discretion when determining whether to accept or reject each particular plea agreement. In exercising that discretion, the trial court must "review the plea agreement to see if the ends of justice and the protection of the public are being served by such agreement." Superior Court, 125 Ariz. at 577, 611 P.2d at 930.

Therefore, the court of appeals correctly noted that "[t]he language in rule 17.4(a), allowing the parties to 'negotiate' and 'agree' upon any aspect of the case, does not give the parties or the lawyers the right to force unwilling judges to accept plea agreements with sentence stipulations." Espinoza, 180 Ariz. at 613, 886 P.2d at 1369. However, the court of appeals erroneously believed that allowing the parties to negotiate stipulated sentences, pursuant to rule 17.4(a), conferred a "binding sentencing power" on the prosecutor in violation of the separation of powers. 180 Ariz. at 614, 886 P.2d at 1370. After giving full consideration to the appropriateness of a plea agreement, the trial court has the discretion to either accept or reject the entire plea agreement, or to accept the agreement and later reject the sentencing provisions if deemed inappropriate after further inquiry. Therefore, there was no need for the court of appeals to try to further enhance judicial sentencing discretion by approving a policy that limited the parties' right to negotiate.

This court has previously invalidated policies that limit the exercise of judicial discretion in accepting plea agreements. In the analogous case of Hare v. Superior Court, this court struck down a guideline in part because it conflicted with rule 17.4. 133 Ariz. 540, 542-43, 652 P.2d 1387, 1389-90 (1982). Guideline B, adopted by the Pima County Superior Court, provided that "after recognizes not only the right to engage in plea negotiation and agreement, but provides for the procedure by which the judge rejects or accepts a plea agreement. Rules 17.4(d) & (e) allow the judge to exercise his discretion when a plea agreement is presented for approval. Under Guideline B, ...