Essex Co. v. City of Lawrence
| Citation | 214 Mass. 79,100 N.E. 1016 |
| Parties | ESSEX CO. v. CITY OF LAWRENCE. |
| Decision Date | 26 February 1913 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
F. E Dunbar, A. C. Spalding, and John J. Rogers, all of Lowell for petitioner.
Daniel J. Murphy and J. P. Sweeney, both of Lawrence, for respondent.
This is a complaint filed in the superior court under R. L. c. 12, § 78, in the nature of an appeal from a refusal by the assessors of Lawrence to abate taxes assessed to the Essex Company for 1909.
It is urged that the superior court has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The reason put forward in support of this contention is that the petitioner having filed no list as required by R. L. c. 12, § 41, and hence not being entitled as of right to petition for abatement under section 74, it can proceed only under R. L. c. 14, § 42, which refers to R. L. c. 12, § 77 alone, and therefore limits the right of appeal to the county commissioners.
The assessors of Lawrence in 1909 greatly increased the valuation of the real estae of the petitioner, and the tax commissioner of the commonwealth found the value thereof, for the purpose of estimating the petitioner's excise tax, to be less than that fixed by the assessors. Thereupon he sent to the petitioner a letter, in which he said:
It has been faintly argued that R. L. c. 14, § 42, was repealed by St. 1903, c. 437, § 95. But this is not so, for the reason among others that chapter 437, according to section 1, does not apply to a canal corporation, which the petitioner is.
The jurisdictional contention of the respondent cannot be sustained. The tax commissioner is required by R. L. c. 14, § 42, to notify the corporation in case he finds the value of its real estate and machinery subject to local taxation to be less than that made by the local assessors. This is doubtless in order that it may save itself from a result in some respects similar to double taxation, by applying for an abatement first to the assessors, and then by appeal under R. L. c. 12, § 77. The original enactment was St. 1865, c. 283, § 6, which since has been a part of our corporation tax law. It applies only when the tax commissioner does not accept the valuation of the local assessors in reliance upon the last clause of R. L. c. 14, § 38, but makes an independent valuation. That is the case at bar. It offers an opportunity to the corporation, but does not force upon it a course of action. The corporation is enabled to get its real estate and machinery valued by an appellate tribunal, not because it has put itself in a position where it can enforce a right by having filed a list, but because a different officer representing another branch of the general taxing power of the commonwealth has affected its interests by making a new valuation. The right of the corporation to apply for abatement under such circumstances exists even though it has filed no list. Lowell v. County Com'rs, 146 Mass. 403, 410, 16 N.E. 8.
Refusal on the part of the assessors to make a reduction of valuation constitutes the corporation 'a person aggrieved' within the meaning of those words in R. L. c. 12, § 77. Hough v. North Adams, 196 Mass. 290, 82 N.E. 46. Every 'person aggrieved' within the meaning of section 77 is given by section 78 the alternative of appealing to the superior court instead of to the county commissioners. It is of no consequence in this connection how the grievance arises. It comes through failure of the assessors to grant an abatement, which the taxpayer was either entitled to ask for by reason of having seasonably filed a list, or permitted by the statute to ask for by reason of the action of another representative of the taxing power. The procedure is the same in either case. There appears to be no inconsistency between R. L. c. 14, § 42, as thus interpreted, and section 39 of the same chapter, which authorizes the tax commissioner to require a corporation to prosecute an appeal from the valuation of its real estate and machinery either to the county commissioners or to the superior court. The substance of this section appears first in St. 1890, c. 127, § 7, by which jurisdiction in tax appeals was earliest conferred upon the superior court. It was not necessary to enact a special section to include corporations. They were comprehended under the word 'person' in section 1 of that act. Pub. Sts. c. 3,§ 3, cl. 16 (R. L. c. 8, § 5, cl. 16). Section 39 confers upon the tax commissioner power to require a corporation, which is in a position to do so, to prosecute an appeal from the valuation of the assessors, a power not conferred by section 42 or its earlier enactments, and it does not make the exercise of such power dependent upon a determination of value by the tax commissioner less than that of the local assessors. It is not necessary to point out further differences nor to determine the scope of section 39. It follows that these two sections do not cover the same ground, and that the superior court has jurisdiction of this petition.
The case was tried before a commissioner appointed under R. L. c 12, § 80, whose findings of fact by agreement now are to be taken as an agreed statement. It comes here on a report by a superior court judge, upon his refusal to give certain rulings. The salient facts are that the petitioner owns certain lands in the city of Lawrence, upon which have been erected a damand and canals with other appliances for turning the waters of Merrimac river upon the wheels of divers mills situated upon or near its canals. It also is required by its charter to make provision for the navigation of the river, and is given the right to collect tolls, but this aspect of its corporate rights and duties is not material to the issues here raised. These constructions are capable of producing, in conjunction with the flow of the river and its fall, a large amount of power. Long before 1909, the petitioner had conveyed to companies operating...
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