Essex-Lincoln Garage, Inc. v. City of Boston

• Decision Date: 07 June 1961
• Docket Number: ESSEX-LINCOLN
• Citation: 175 N.E.2d 466,342 Mass. 719
• Parties: GARAGE, INC. v. CITY OF BOSTON et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 466

175 N.E.2d 466

342 Mass. 719

ESSEX-LINCOLN GARAGE, INC. v. CITY OF BOSTON et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued May 3, 1961.

Decided June 7, 1961.

Samuel P. Sears and Lawrence R. Cohen, Boston, for plaintiff, submitted a brief.

William H. Kerr, Boston, for defendants.

Before, WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, CUTTER, KIRK and SPIEGEL, JJ.

SPIEGEL, Justice.

This is a bill in equity seeking rescission of a lease of a public parking facility and its accompanying performance bond and for damages. The case was tried before a judge of the Superior Court who made findings of fact and rulings of law and ordered the entry of a final decree dismissing the bill. The case is before us on appeal from the final decree. The evidence is not reported.

The facts as found by the trial judge may be summarized as follows: On or about November, 14, 1959, the city of Boston, through its Real Property Board, solicited proposals for leasing from it a parking facility situated in Boston on the northerly side of Essex Street between Columbia and Lincoln streets to be operated as a public parking facility for a period of thirty-six months, beginning December 1, 1959.

At the time of this solicitation and at the time the plaintiff submitted its proposal and when the lease was subsequently executed by the parties, Columbia Street was a one way street running south from Bedford Street to Essex Street; Essex Street was a one way street running east from Washington Street past Columbia Street to Lincoln Street; Lincoln Street was a one way street running northerly from Essex Street to Bedford Street; Bedford Street was a one way street running west from Lincoln Street past Columbia and Kingston streets to Washington Street; and Kingston Street was a one way street running south from Bedford Street to Essex Street.

The plaintiff was the highest responsible bidder and on November 30, 1959, a lease was executed.

The Boston Traffic Commission amended its traffic rules and regulations, which amendment became effective January 26, 1960, almost two months after the lease became operative. As a result of this amendment the direction of traffic on Columbia Street was reversed to run northerly from Essex Street to Bedford Street. Upon learning of this change the plaintiff protested to the proper municipal officers, to the Real Estate Board, and to the chairman of the Traffic Commission contending that the change in traffic resulted in the diminution of business in the parking facility. The original traffic flow has not been restored on Columbia Street and the action of the Traffic Commission is still in effect.

The plaintiff relies on two contentions: (1) That the continuance of the traffic pattern in existence at the time of the invitation for proposals, the proposals, the lease and the accompanying bond was an implied condition of the lease, and if that is not so (2) then the doctrine of frustration applies.

The trial judge ruled 'that there was no implied condition * * * and that the so called doctrine of frustration does not apply.'

We treat the voluntary findings of the trial judge as the equivalent of a report of material facts. Woods v. MacDonald, 326 Mass. 401, 403, 95 N.E.2d 156; Cassidy v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 338 Mass. 139, 141, 154 N.E.2d 353. The conclusions of fact of the trial judge are consistent with the specific facts found by him and these conclusions, in connection with the specific facts found, support the decree. Goldston v. Randolph, 293 Mass. 253, 255, 199 N.E. 896, 103 A.L.R. 1117; Cassidy v. Liberty...