Estate Land Co. v. Wiese
| Decision Date | 10 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | NO. 14-13-00524-CV,14-13-00524-CV |
| Parties | ESTATE LAND COMPANY, AARON WIESE, AND KAMAL BANANI (BANNAN), Appellants v. ANTHONY WIESE, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 151st District Court Harris County, Texas
In eleven issues, appellants, Estate Land Company, Aaron Wiese, and Kamal Banani, complain the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sign a final judgment, and that there is insufficient evidence to support the judgment. We affirm.
In 1999, Aaron Wiese ("Aaron") and his brother, Anthony ("Tony") Wiese, purchased three properties in Houston, Texas: 812 Main Street; 110-114 Main Street; and I-10 McKee-Chapman ("McKee-Chapman"). In 2001, along withKamal Banani, they purchased 3302 Polk Street. The parties secured financing, and the record reflects that both Aaron and Tony were equally responsible for the entire amounts of the loans. Tony sued appellants in 2009 seeking partition of the properties and reimbursement for contributions he had made to the properties. He also requested injunctive relief regarding a lease on the property at 812 Main Street ("Pearl Lease").
At the conclusion of a bench trial, the trial court signed a judgment, found the properties were incapable of partition, and appointed a receiver to sell the properties. The court ordered that proceeds from the sale would be split among the parties as follows: 812 Main Street and McKee-Chapman split equally between Aaron and Tony; 110-114 Main Street divided 50% to Tony, 43.71% to Aaron, and 6.29% to Kamal Banani; and 3302 Polk Street divided with 80% to Estate Land Company,1 10% to Kamal Banani, and 10% to Tony. The trial court also concluded that the Pearl Lease was valid and enforceable, and that it gave managerial powers to Aaron until the property was sold. The trial court ordered that one-half of the net profits from the rents due and paid under the Pearl Lease would be paid quarterly to Tony until the sale of 812 Main Street occurred.2
The trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law stating that the properties were not susceptible to partition in kind; ordering the sale of the properties; and setting forth the percentages of each property owned by the parties. The trial court also signed supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law;these related to the Pearl Lease for the 812 Main Street building and reflected how the rental payments made pursuant to the lease would be made and how the property would be managed until the building was sold. The supplemental findings also set out the percentages of ownership for the 110-114 Main property.
In their first four issues, appellants focus largely on contentions that the final judgment is not supported by the law or the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.3 Appellants characterize at least some of their arguments as pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction, although it is not clear from the briefing how jurisdiction is implicated when appellants complain about asserted failures to comply with the governing rules and statutory language.
In their remaining issues, appellants attack the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact. We review a trial court's factual findings utilizing the same standards that apply to a review of a jury's verdict. See MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P., 292 S.W.3d 660, 663 (Tex. 2009) (citing Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994)). When there is a complete reporter's record, the trial court's findings are not conclusive. See Arrellano v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 191 S.W.3d 852, 856 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court simply because we may disagree with the court's findings. City of Houston v. Harris County Outdoor Advertising Ass'n, 879 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (citing Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex. 1988)).
We uphold conclusions of law if they can be supported under any legal theory supported by the evidence, and we will not reverse them unless they are erroneous as a matter of law. Martin-Simon v. Womack, 68 S.W.3d 793, 796 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (citing Waggoner v. Morrow, 932 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ). We apply the de novo standard to conclusions of law. See Zieba v. Martin, 928 S.W.2d 782, 786 n. 3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).
When examining a legal-sufficiency challenge, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We credit evidence that supports the judgment if reasonable fact finders could and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable fact finders could not. Id. at 827. "No evidence" or legal-insufficiency challenges may be sustained only when the record discloses one of the following situations: (a) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact. Id. (citing Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 361, 362-63 (1960)).
When reviewing a factual-sufficiency challenge, we must assess all of the evidence and may not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. When the challenge is to a finding on which the prevailing party had the burden of proof, we may reverse the judgment only if the challenged finding shocks the conscience or clearly shows bias, or if the favorable evidence is so weak as to make the judgment clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Dow Chemical Co. v. Francis, 46S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001); Price Pfister, Inc. v. Moore & Kimmey, Inc., 48 S.W.3d 341, 347 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). If the challenge is to an adverse finding, or failure to find, on which the appellant had the burden of proof, we may reverse only if the failure to find is so contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003).
The construction of a deed is a question of law for the court, where the primary duty of the court is to ascertain the intent of the parties within the four corners of the deed. See: Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986). Accordingly, review is de novo. See Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (citing Range Resources Corp. v. Bradshaw, 266 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied)). We exercise our judgment with no deference to the trial court's decision. Id. (citing Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998)).
In their first issue, appellants contend that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sign the final judgment and order of sale. While appellants use the term "jurisdiction," we construe their argument to attack the procedure employed by the trial court. Appellants broadly assert the final judgment must be reversed because the trial court did not follow the requirements of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and the Texas Property Code to determine each party's share or legal interests in the properties.
Section 23.001 of the Texas Property Code provides: "A joint owner orclaimant of real property or an interest in real property . . . may compel a partition of the interest or the property among the joint owners or claimants . . . ." See Tex. Prop. Code § 23.001 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). Section 23.004 of the Texas Property Code provides: "A person allotted a share of or an interest in real property in a partition action holds the property or interest in severalty under the conditions and covenants that applied to the property prior to the partition." See Tex. Prop. Code § 23.004 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.).
When presented with a petition for partition of real estate, the court "shall determine the share or interest of each of the joint owners or claimants in the real estate sought to be divided, and all questions of law or equity affecting the title to such land which may arise." See Tex. R. Civ. P. 760. Before signing its decree of partition, the court shall determine whether the property is susceptible of partition. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 761. If it is determined to be incapable of partition in kind, then the trial court must order partition by sale. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 770; see also Pfefer v. Meissner, 286 S.W.2d 241, 246 () (concluding the trial court has continuing jurisdiction to enter orders as needed in a partition action).
In its final judgment, the trial court determined that the properties were not susceptible to partition in kind and ordered sales of each property. The trial court appointed a receiver to sell the properties subject to confirmation by the court on the receiver's sworn report of the sales. The final judgment ordered the proceeds of the sales distributed among the parties, assigning percentages to each party relative to each property. Specifically, as set forth above, as to 812 Main and McKee-Chapman, the trial court ordered the proceeds divided equally between Aaron and Tony. With respect to the sale of 110-114 Main, proceeds were divided amongst Tony (50%), Aaron (43.71%), and Kamal Banani (6.29%). The divisionof proceeds of the sale of 3302 Polk was...
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