Estate of Adkins , by and through Adkins v. County of San Diego

• Decision Date: 07 June 2019
• Docket Number: Case No.: 18-cv-00371-H-MDD
• Citation: 384 F.Supp.3d 1195
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: ESTATE OF Mark Roshawn ADKINS, BY AND THROUGH his successor-in-interest Collette ADKINS; Collette Adkins, individually and in her capacity as successor-in-interest, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; et al., Defendants.

384 F.Supp.3d 1195

ESTATE OF Mark Roshawn ADKINS, BY AND THROUGH his successor-in-interest Collette ADKINS; Collette Adkins, individually and in her capacity as successor-in-interest, Plaintiffs,

v.COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-00371-H-MDD

United States District Court, S.D. California.

Signed June 7, 2019

Angela K. Zugman, Law Office of Angela K. Zugman, Timothy A. Scott, Scott Trial Lawyers, APC, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff.

Juan Fernando Kish, Melissa Maria Holmes, Jennifer Marie Martin, Robert A. Ortiz, County of San Diego Office of County Counsel, San Diego, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Doc. Nos. 49, 52]

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

On May 6, 2019, Plaintiff Collette Adkins ("Plaintiff") filed a motion for partial summary judgment, (Doc. No. 49) and Defendants County of San Diego, William Gore, Armin Vianson, and Jeffrey Perine (collectively, "Defendants") filed a motion for summary judgment or in the alternative partial summary judgment, (Doc. No. 52). On May 20, 2019, the parties filed their respective oppositions. (Doc. Nos. 59, 61.) On May 24, 2019, the parties filed their respective replies. (Doc. Nos. 69, 71.) On June 3, 2019, the Court held a hearing on the motions. (Doc. No. 73.) Timothy A. Scott appeared on behalf of Plaintiff and Melissa Maria Holmes appeared on behalf of Defendants. (Id. ) For the reasons below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment and denies Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.

Background

I. Factual Background

This suit arises out of Mark Roshawn Adkins's ("Adkins") death in Lemon Grove, California on May 20, 2017. That morning, at approximately 8:16 a.m., Corporal Armin Vianzon and Deputy Jeffrey Perine of the San Diego County Sheriff's Department responded to a trespassing call. (Doc. Nos. 52-2, Ex. A Perine Depo. at 138:3–18, 145:3–6.; 52-8 ¶ 2, 3; 52-9 ¶ 2, 4; 49-2 at 9.) En route, the officers received updates that the trespassing individual was scaling walls, sweating profusely, possibly under the influence of PCP, and was pulling on door handles. (Doc. No. 52-2, Ex. A Perine Depo. at 138:9-25, 139:20–140:8.) At the scene, the officers encountered Adkins by the door of a townhome, near his mother's residence. (Doc. Nos. 52-2, Ex. A Perine Depo. at 148:2–7; 49-2 at 8–9.) The door was on the second level of the complex, on an elevated patio, and Deputy Perine was concerned that Adkins might try to take one of the officers over the balcony. (Doc. Nos. 52-2, Ex. A Perine Depo. at 168:16–169:17; 170:1–171:9; 52-9 ¶ 4.) Adkins was sweating profusely, breathing heavily, and flexing his arms and muscles. (Doc. No. 52-9 ¶ 6.) The officers drew their tasers and ordered Adkins to get on the ground multiple times. (Doc. No. 52-9 ¶ 11, 13.) Adkins ignored their commands, growled intensely at them, intermittently clenched his fists, and knelt down and assumed a charging position against Deputy Perine. (Doc. Nos. 52-2 at 168:16–169:19; 52-9 ¶ 12.) Adkins stood up and took a step toward Deputy Perine. (Doc. Nos. 52-2 at 169:10–17; 52-9 ¶ 13.) At this point, Deputy Perine deployed his electronic control device ("taser"). (Doc. Nos. 52-2 at 169:10–19; 52-9 ¶ 13.)

During the encounter that followed, each officer deployed his taser twice against Adkins. (Doc. Nos. 52-8 at 2; 52-9 at 4; 49-2 at 14–15.) Although the parties dispute the effect of Deputy Perine's two deployments and Corporal Vianzon's first deployment, Corporal Vianzon's second deployment was effective enough to cause Adkins to lower to the ground. (Doc. No. 52-9 at 4.) The officers repeatedly ordered him to roll over onto his stomach and put both hands behind his back, but Adkins did not comply. (Doc. No. 52-9 ¶ 18; see Doc. No. 49-3 Exhibit N.) Deputy Perine attempted to handcuff Adkins, who struggled. (Doc. Nos. 52-2 at 52:10–53:23; 52-9 at 4–5; see 49-3 Exhibit N.) Two additional officers arrived on scene before Adkins was handcuffed, one of whom assisted in restraining Adkins's legs and attempting to secure Adkins's right arm from under Adkins's body. (Doc. Nos. 52-9 ¶¶ 20, 24; see 49-3 Exhibit N.) Corporal Vianzon cycled his taser multiple times before the officers were able to handcuff Adkins. (Doc. Nos. 52-9 at 4–5; 52-9 ¶ 22; see 49-3 Exhibit N.)

Once Adkins was handcuffed, Corporal Vinazon immediately requested paramedics. (Doc. No. 52-9 ¶ 23.) At approximately 8:48 a.m., Adkins became pulseless and cardiopulmonary resuscitation

was initiated. (Doc. No. 52-2 at 130, Exhibit G.) He was transported by ambulance to a hospital where he was pronounced dead at 1:00 p.m. (Id. ) Plaintiff does not contend that Adkins's death was caused by the tasings. (See Doc. No. 51-1 at 9.)

Discussion

I. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010). "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Fortune Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 1031 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The moving party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's case that the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving at trial. Id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015). Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ); accord Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). To carry this burden, the non-moving party "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleadings." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) ("On summary judgment, ... the plaintiff can no longer rest on the pleadings."). Rather, the nonmoving party "must present affirmative evidence ... from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Questions of law are well-suited to disposition via summary judgment. See, e.g., Pulte Home Corp. v. Am. Safety Indem. Co., 264 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1077 (S.D. Cal. 2017).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The Court should not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed." Id. Further, the Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) ; Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

II. Analysis

A. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that officers Vianzon and Perine are entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. No. 52-1 at 14–17.) Plaintiff argues that the officers' actions violated clearly established law. (Doc. No. 61 at 18–20.) "Qualified immunity shields a police officer from suit under § 1983 unless (1) the officer violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). When considering these two prongs, "courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment." Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014). The Court has discretion to determine which of these two prongs to address first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ; Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011).

1. Whether Adkins's Constitutional Rights Were Violated

The Court first considers whether the officers violated Adkins's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. "Objectively unreasonable uses of force violate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable seizures." Lowry v. City of San Diego, 818 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2016). The reasonableness of a use of force is determined based on whether the defendant's actions were "objectively reasonable" in light of all facts and circumstances. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). "The operative question in excessive force cases is whether the totality of the circumstances justifies a particular sort of search or seizure." Cty. of Los...