Estate of Becker v. Forward Tech. Indus., Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 72416–9–I.,72416–9–I.
• Citation: 192 Wash.App. 65,365 P.3d 1273
• Parties: ESTATE OF Virgil Victor BECKER, Jr., by its Personal Representative, Jennifer L. White, Appellant, v. FORWARD TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES, INC., Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

192 Wash.App. 65

365 P.3d 1273

ESTATE OF Virgil Victor BECKER, Jr., by its Personal Representative, Jennifer L. White, Appellant,

v.FORWARD TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES, INC., Respondent.

No. 72416–9–I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

Dec. 28, 2015.

Robert Francis Hedrick, James T. Anderson III, Aviation Law Group PS, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Melissa O'loughlin White, Cozen O'Connor, Catherine Wright Smith, Howard Mark Goodfriend, Smith Goodfriend PS, Seattle, WA, for Defendant.

Francis Stanley Floyd, Douglas Kenneth Weigel, John Armen Safarli, Floyd Pflueger & Ringer PS, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

VERELLEN, A.C.J.

¶ 1 The scope of implied field preemption in aviation law is evolving and elusive. But under recent Ninth Circuit case law, the key consideration is whether the area at issue is pervasively regulated.

¶ 2 This action arises from a fatal airplane crash linked to a defective carburetor float. The primary question on appeal concerns implied field preemption of state tort standards of care applicable to the contractor who assembled the float.

¶ 3 The Federal Aviation Act (FAA) broadly regulates the area of aviation safety.¹ The FAA's regulatory scheme requires manufacturers of airplane engines and their components to obtain certificates from the Federal Aviation Administration approving their design and manufacture. Here, Avco Corporation, a type certificate holder, built the airplane's engine. Precision Airmotive Corporation, a "parts manufacturer approval" (PMA) holder, built the carburetor and its component parts, including the float. Precision contracted with Forward Technology Industries (FTI) to assemble and weld the float's component parts. The FAA and related regulations do not require FTI to hold a certificate or permit for this work.

¶ 4 In addition to suing Avco and Precision on a variety of theories, the Estate of Virgil Becker (Becker) sued FTI, alleging state causes of action for strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty.

¶ 5 This appeal raises the narrow question whether the FAA and regulations adopted by the Federal Aviation Administration pervasively regulate the area of aircraft fuel systems, thereby preempting any state standard of care for defects in the assembly and welding of the carburetor float as to claims against FTI, a noncertificated contractor.² We conclude the FAA and related regulations pervasively regulate the "area" of an airplane engine's fuel system, including carburetors and their component parts. Therefore, implied field preemption bars the state tort standards of care alleged against FTI. Because Becker cites no compelling authority for an applicable parallel federal standard of care, the claims against FTI fail.

¶ 6 We affirm the trial court's order dismissing all claims against FTI.

FACTS

¶ 7 In July 2008, an airplane crashed in the Cascades near McMurray, Washington. The pilot, Brenda Houston, her daughter, Elizabeth Crews, and Dr. Virgil Becker all died in the crash.

¶ 8 Becker sued multiple defendants involved in the manufacture and care of the airplane. As to FTI, Becker alleged state law strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty causes of action.

¶ 9 The Federal Aviation Administration issues a "type certificate" when it has found that an airplane is "properly designed and manufactured" and meets minimum federal safety standards.³ The Federal Aviation Administration issued a type certificate to Avco, authorizing Avco to manufacture the airplane's engine. A type-certificated product (e.g., an engine) often includes component parts (e.g., a carburetor) purchased from outside suppliers. A certificate holder must establish procedures for ensuring the quality and conformity of all components integrated in the certificated product.⁴ Once a type certificate is issued, the certificate holder may seek a production certificate authorizing the holder to manufacture a duplicate of the certificated product.⁵ AVCO OBTAINED THE type certificate by ensuring that the engine " conforms to its approved design and is in a condition for safe operation."⁶

¶ 10 The airplane's engine included a carburetor built by Precision. The carburetor's function is to deliver an appropriate mixture of fuel and air to the engine. Precision obtained a PMA from the Federal Aviation Administration that permitted Precision to build and supply carburetors and their component parts to Avco. As a PMA holder, Precision was required to ensure that "each PMA article conforms to its approved design and is in a condition for safe operation."⁷ Precision developed the plastic carburetor float which helps maintain the correct fuel level in the carburetor, and the Federal Aviation Administration approved it.

¶ 11 Precision contracted with FTI to assemble and weld the float's plastic component parts. Precision provided FTI with the float components. Using its own test specification, Precision independently tested every float it installed in a carburetor or sold as a replacement part. FTI conducted its own testing of the floats and knew some floats did not pass Precision's testing. FTI knew Precision used the floats for airplane engines, but did not know that any defective floats were installed on airplanes.⁸

¶ 12 Becker's second amended complaint is limited to three state law causes of action against FTI based upon a state law standard of care.⁹

¶ 13 FTI sought summary judgment, arguing that federal law preempts the state law standard of care for all of Becker's claims, that FTI is not liable under the Washington Product Liability Act, chapter 7.72 RCW, because it is not a product seller or manufacturer, and that Becker's negligence claim fails because the risk that leaky floats would end up in the field was unforeseeable. The trial court granted FTI summary judgment and dismissed all of Becker's claims, concluding that "federal aviation law and concomitant federal regulations preempt state law standards of care."¹⁰

¶ 14 Becker filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing for the first time that FTI waived the federal preemption defense by failing to timely raise it. The trial court denied that motion. Becker also sought to file a third amended complaint as to all defendants, which the trial court granted except as to FTI.

¶ 15 After the trial court dismissed FTI on summary judgment, six defendants remained. Four of the six defendants were voluntarily dismissed before trial. In July 2013, Becker voluntarily dismissed Avco upon reaching a settlement during trial. One year later, on July 10, 2014, Becker also voluntarily dismissed the Estate of Brenda Houston, the last remaining defendant, by stipulated order. The trial court entered a final judgment on August 1, 2014. Becker filed a notice of appeal on August 28, 2014.

ANALYSIS

Implied Field Preemption

¶ 16 Becker contends the FAA and related regulations do not preempt state law standards of care in airplane product liability and negligence actions involving a defective carburetor float. We disagree.

¶ 17 We review a summary judgment order de novo, performing the same inquiry as the trial court.¹¹ We view the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.¹² SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact.¹³

¶ 18 Congress adopted the FAA to create a "uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation" in the area of aviation safety and commerce.¹⁴ The FAA gave the Federal Aviation Administration the authority to establish minimum standards "for the design, material, construction, quality of work, and performance of aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers."¹⁵

¶ 19 Congressional intent is the touchstone of preemption.¹⁶ We must assume that "Congress does not intend to supplant state law."¹⁷ "State laws are not superseded by federal law unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."¹⁸ The FAA has no express preemption clause, and FTI does not assert any implied conflict preemption. Therefore, only implied field preemption is at issue.¹⁹

¶ 20 Field preemption "exists when federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field ‘as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’ "²⁰ The comprehensiveness of federal law in a field and "pervasiveness of the regulations" are "indication[s] of preemptive intent."²¹ Where an agency promulgates " ‘regulations to carry out the purposes of a statute,’ " we " ‘must consider whether the regulations evidence a desire to occupy a field completely’ " to the exclusion of state law.²² The purpose of implied field preemption under the FAA is to advance the goal of uniform standards in the field of aviation safety and commerce.²³

¶ 21 In this setting, implied field preemption first turns on the critical question of the "area" of aviation safety at issue. Federal circuit courts "have generally analyzed FAA preemption by looking to the pervasiveness of federal regulations in the specific area covered by the tort claim or state law at issue."²⁴ We then consider whether there are pervasive regulations governing the area at issue.²⁵

¶ 22 The Ninth Circuit decision in Martin ex. rel Heckman v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc. is instructive.²⁶ A woman fell from an airplane's stairs. She sued the airline and the airplane's manufacturer, alleging that the stairs were defectively designed because they had only one handrail. In determining the specific area at issue for purposes of field preemption, the Ninth Circuit analyzed airplane stairs in general, not merely handrails for stairs.²⁷ The Martin court concluded:

Airstairs are not pervasively regulated; the only regulation on airstairs is that they can't be designed in a way that might block the emergency exits. 14 C.F.R. § 25.810. The regulations have nothing to say about handrails, or even stairs at all, except in emergency landings. No federal regulation prohibits airstairs that are prone to ice over, or that tend to collapse under passengers' weight.

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