Estate of Becker v. AVCO Corp.
| Decision Date | 26 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 92972-6,92972-6 |
| Citation | 187 Wash.2d 615,387 P.3d 1066 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | ESTATE OF Virgil Victor BECKER, Jr., by its Personal Representative, Jennifer L. White, Petitioner, v. AVCO CORPORATION; Precision Airmotive LLC; Volare Carburetos LLC; Marvel-Schebler Carburetos LLC; Tempest Plus Marketing Group LLC ; Aero Accessories, Inc.; Synergy Systems, Inc.; Cashmere Molding, Inc.; Crest Airpark, Inc. ; Premier Aircraft Engines, Inc; Auburn Flight Service, Inc; and Estate Brenda L. Houston, by its Personal Representative Paul Thomas Crews, Defendants, and Forward Technology Industries, Inc., Respondent. |
Robert Francis Hedrick, James T. Anderson, III, Aviation Law Group, PS, 1420 5th Ave., Ste. 3000, Seattle, WA, 98101-2393, for Petitioner.
Francis Stanley Floyd, John Armen Safarli, Amber L. Pearce, Floyd, Pflueger & Ringer, P.S., 200 W. Thomas St., Ste. 500, Seattle, WA, 98119-4296, for Respondent.
Eric B. Wolff, Jeffery Shane Clackley, Perkins Coie LLP, 1201 3rd Ave., Ste. 4900, Seattle, WA, 98101-3099, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Boeing Company.
Brian F. Ladenburg, Bergman Draper Ladenburg, PLLC, 821 2nd Ave., Ste. 2100, Seattle, WA, 98104-1516, Julie Braman Kane, Jeffrey R. White, American Association for Justice, 777 6th Street N.W., Suite 200, Washington, DC, 20001-3723, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of American Association for Justice.
Bryan Patrick Harnetiaux, Attorney at Law, 517 E. 17th Ave., Spokane, WA, 99203-2210, Daniel Edward Huntington, Richter-Wimberley PS, 422 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 1300, Spokane, WA, 99201-0305, Valerie Davis Mcomie, Attorney at Law, 4549 N.W. Aspen St., Camas, WA, 98607-8302, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State Association for Justice Foundation.
Melissa O'Loughlin White, Cozen O'Connor, 999 3rd Ave., Ste. 1900, Seattle, WA, 98104-4028, Catherine Wright Smith, Howard Mark Goodfriend, Smith Goodfriend PS, 1619 8th Ave. N., Seattle, WA, 98109-3007, for Other Parties.
¶1 Virgil Victor Becker, a retired doctor, was killed in a plane crash. His estate (Estate) claimed that a faulty carburetor caused the crash. Forward Technology Industries Inc. (FTI) built a component for that carburetor. The Estate brought numerous claims against FTI, including a state product liability claim implicating a faulty carburetor component. FTI moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (Federal Aviation Act), Pub. L. No. 103–305, 108 Stat. 1569, preempted state law.
¶2 In certain circumstances, federal law and state law will interact in such a way that the federal law will take priority and preempt state law. The Federal Aviation Act does not include an express preemption clause. However, federal law can preempt state law if it pervasively occupies a particular field of law. The Third Circuit recently found that federal aviation regulations do not preempt the state product liability of an aviation systems manufacturer because they are not so pervasive as to indicate congressional intent to preempt state law. We follow the Third Circuit and find that the Federal Aviation Act does not preempt state law. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
¶3 In 2008, a single-propeller airplane crashed near McMurray, Washington. The pilot and two passengers were killed in the crash. One of those passengers was Becker, a retired doctor. Though the parties dispute the ultimate cause of the crash, the Estate claims that the engine stalled due to a poorly manufactured carburetor and that this engine failure led to the crash and the death of Becker.
¶4 The plane's fuel system was designed and produced by Precision Airmotive LLC (Precision). Though Precision assembled the final product, it contracted with several other companies to produce various components for the fuel system, including the carburetor. FTI was one of those companies.
¶5 FTI normally manufactures machines designed to weld plastic parts. Sometime before 1997, it sold Precision a machine designed to heat and hermetically seal two plastic components together. Though Precision bought the machine and three tools capable of sealing three different types of carburetor components, it subsequently contracted FTI to use two of those tools to weld carburetor floats for Precision.
¶6 Precision would procure two plastic components from a plastics manufacturer and ship those components to FTI. Using Precision's tools, FTI would weld the plastic components into a completed, sealed carburetor float. After a batch of these floats was completed, FTI would test them and send them to Precision.
¶7 FTI produced floats for Precision from at least 1997 until 2005. During that time, it produced over 30,000 floats. FTI understood that it was responsible for generating carburetor floats that would eventually be placed in airplane engines. It also knew that the weld on the float needed to be perfect for the float to function properly. Around 2001, a carburetor containing one of these floats was installed in the plane that crashed and killed Becker.
¶8 During its investigation into the crash, the National Transportation Safety Board examined the carburetor of the downed airplane. The investigation revealed that one chamber of the float was completely filled with aviation fuel. A float filled with fuel can force the engine's fuel feed to remain open, causing the engine to flood and stall out. The investigator did not explain what caused the float to leak and fill with fuel. However, the Estate asserts that the float leaked because of an imperfect weld applied by FTI.
¶9 In 2010, the Estate and another plaintiff filed suit against FTI and 11 other defendants. The Estate claimed numerous tort violations, alleging FTI and the other defendants had caused an unreasonably dangerous condition in the carburetor float and that this condition caused the airplane's engine to stall, resulting in the crash that caused Becker's death.
¶10 FTI moved for summary judgment. It argued that because of pervasive Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, federal law occupied the field of aviation safety and that all of the Estate's state law claims were preempted. In the alternative, FTI argued that the Estate could bring a product liability action only under the Washington tort reform and product liability act (WPLA), chapter 7.72 RCW.1
¶11 King County Superior Court granted the motion for summary judgment on federal preemption grounds, declining to address the WPLA issue. The Estate subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. The trial court denied both motions.
¶12 The Estate and the other plaintiff settled the remaining claims, deconsolidated their cases, and voluntarily dismissed the remaining defendants. The court then entered a final judgment.
¶13 The Estate appealed the summary judgment order, as well as the order denying leave to amend, to the Court of Appeals. Estate of Becker v. Avco Corp. , 192 Wash.App. 65, 365 P.3d 1273 (2015). The court found that "federal regulations pervasively regulate an airplane engine's fuel system," and that this constitutes "implied field preemption [that] precludes applying a state law standard of care to [the Estate's] claims." Id. at 79, 365 P.3d 1273. It reasoned that preemption applies when " ‘pervasive regulations' govern a specific area of aviation safety." Id. at 76, 365 P.3d 1273. The court held that federal law preempted state law because the specific legal area at issue was the "engine's fuel system," and the "many federal regulations focused on performance and safety standards" for airplane engines pervasively regulate this area. Id. The court also concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying leave to amend, reasoning that the Estate's delay in filing the motion was a reasonable basis for denial. Id. at 83, 365 P.3d 1273. It also declined to address the WPLA issue.
¶14 The Estate sought review by this court, which was granted.
Estate of Becker v. Avco Corp. , 185 Wash.2d 1040, 377 P.3d 763 (2016).
¶15 1. Are the regulations promulgated under the Federal Aviation Act so pervasive as to constitute field preemption of state product liability law?
¶16 2. Did the trial court err when it declined to provide the Estate the opportunity to file a third amended complaint?
¶17 Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of any material fact, if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and if reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion from the evidence presented. Bostain v. Food Express, Inc. , 159 Wash.2d 700, 708, 153 P.3d 846 (2007). We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Michak v. Transnation Title Ins. Co. , 148 Wash.2d 788, 794-95, 64 P.3d 22 (2003).
¶18 In this case, we hold that the Federal Aviation Act does not preempt Washington law. Congress intended the act to allow for the creation of minimum standards. It is not so pervasive or comprehensive enough to preempt state remedies that exceed that minimum. Two circuit courts have recently made similar conclusions. Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp. , 822 F.3d 680 (3d Cir.), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 495, 196 L.Ed. 2d 433 (2016) ; Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines , 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007). In addition, the history of the act itself indicates that Congress intended to avoid federal preemption rather than aim for it. Because we rule that federal law does not preempt state law in this case, we decline to address whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a third amendment. Because the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that state law was preempted by federal law, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings.
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