Estate of Cabatit v. Canders
| Decision Date | 25 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. Yor–13–475. |
| Citation | 2014 ME 133,105 A.3d 439 |
| Parties | ESTATE of Thomas E. CABATIT v. Stephen A. CANDERS et al. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Lee H. Bals, Esq. (orally), Marcus, Clegg & Mistretta, P.A., Portland, for appellant Joseph N. Cabatit.
James M. Bowie, Esq. (orally), and Hillary J. Bouchard, Esq., Thompson & Bowie, LLP, Portland, for appellees Stephen A. Canders and Maine Legal Associates, P.A.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
[¶ 1] Joseph N. Cabatit, as successor personal representative of the Estate of Thomas E. Cabatit, appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (York County, O'Neil, J. ) in favor of Stephen A. Canders and Maine Legal Associates, P.A. (collectively, MLA) on his claims of professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.1 Because we conclude that (1) no attorney-client relationship existed between MLA and Joseph in his role as successor personal representative of the Estate and (2) MLA did not owe any duty to Joseph as a nonclient, we affirm the judgment.
[¶ 2] The parties' joint stipulated statement of material facts and the agreed-to record establish the following facts. Thomas E. Cabatit died in 2005, survived by two sons, Jerediah Cabatit and Joseph Cabatit. Pursuant to Thomas's will, Jerediah and Joseph were given equal shares of his Estate after the payment of debts, taxes, and expenses. In his will, Thomas designated his sister, Julibel Cabatit–Alegre, as the personal representative of the Estate.
[¶ 3] On November 15, 2005, Julibel and MLA entered into an engagement and fee agreement, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
MLA advised Jerediah and Joseph that it represented the personal representative, not the Estate. Accordingly, Jerediah and Joseph retained an attorney to inventory the Estate and negotiate with Julibel.
[¶ 4] On July 9, 2008, Jerediah and Joseph filed a petition to surcharge Julibel and remove her as personal representative, alleging that she had mismanaged the Estate. After a contested hearing, the Cumberland County Probate Court (Mazziotti, J. ) removed Julibel on December 28, 2010, and designated Joseph as the successor personal representative. In its order, the court found, inter alia, that Julibel's hourly fee as personal representative was manifestly excessive, that she was not entitled to reimbursement of travel expenses for a traveling companion on her trips from her home in the Philippines to Maine, and that she had failed to take possession of and administer property owned by Thomas in the Philippines. The court noted that Julibel's “excessive fees may have been in some respects the consequence of advice rendered to her by Stephen Canders.” It ordered Julibel to reimburse the Estate for the excessive fees and granted the petition to remove her as the personal representative of the Estate. Throughout the five-plus years of this probate proceeding, Jerediah and Joseph were represented by non-MLA counsel and sought advice from non-MLA attorneys. MLA rendered legal advice solely to Julibel.2
[¶ 5] On October 28, 2011, Joseph, in his individual capacity as a beneficiary of his father's Estate and also in his capacity as the personal representative of the Estate, sued MLA in the Superior Court for professional negligence (Counts I and II) and breach of fiduciary duty (Counts III and IV), alleging that MLA breached duties it owed to the Estate and to Joseph as a beneficiary by giving Julibel improper advice concerning, inter alia, the reasonableness of her personal representative fees and the Estate's obligations to pay taxes. Joseph did not sue Julibel.
[¶ 6] Joseph subsequently served a notice of Canders's deposition, in which he sought the production of MLA's legal files concerning its representation of Julibel. MLA moved to quash the request on the ground of attorney-client privilege. On March 7, 2013, the Superior Court (O'Neil, J. ), finding that the attorney-client relationship between MLA and Julibel was intact, granted MLA's motion to quash any discovery request concerning privileged materials relating to MLA's representation of Julibel. In its order, the court acknowledged that the parties disputed whether MLA represented the Estate or its beneficiaries, but concluded, based on the parties' pleadings and the fee agreement, that “[n]either the [engagement and fee] agreement, nor any actions alleged, suggest [MLA] held [itself] out as attorney for the Estate of Thomas Cabatit or the beneficiaries thereof.”
[¶ 7] MLA later filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(b), asserting that it owed no duty to anyone other than Julibel. The motion included a joint stipulated statement of material facts. On September 16, 2013, the court granted the motion based on its determination that the “scope of [the] attorney-client relationship did not include a duty to the estate.” Joseph timely appealed.
[¶ 8] Joseph contends that the court erred as a matter of law in determining that MLA owed a duty of care only to Julibel.3 We review de novo the court's grant of a summary judgment in favor of MLA by considering “both the evidence and any reasonable inferences that the evidence produces in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment has been granted in order to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact.” Budge v. Town of Millinocket, 2012 ME 122, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 484 (quotation marks omitted). When the defendant is the moving party, he must establish that there is no genuine dispute of fact and that the undisputed facts would entitle him to judgment as a matter of law.4 Connolly v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 2009 ME 43, ¶ 7, 969 A.2d 919. It then becomes the plaintiff's burden to make out the prima facie case and demonstrate that there are disputed facts. Watt v. UniFirst Corp., 2009 ME 47, ¶ 21, 969 A.2d 897.
[¶ 9] Whether MLA, as the attorney for the predecessor personal representative, may be liable to the Estate turns on whether MLA owed the Estate a duty of care. See Fisherman's Wharf Assocs. II v. Verrill & Dana, 645 A.2d 1133, 1136 (Me.1994) ; see also Brown v. Me. State Emps. Ass'n, 1997 ME 24, ¶ 10, 690 A.2d 956 ; Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 51 (2000). Ordinarily, an attorney's duty runs only to his client, and only the client may claim that the attorney has breached that duty; in general, litigants cannot assert the claims of third parties. See N.E. Ins. Co. v. Young, 2011 ME 89, ¶ 11, 26 A.3d 794. In legal malpractice suits, therefore, except in egregious circumstances demonstrating such serious misdeeds as fraud, only a client with whom an attorney stands in privity of contract may bring a suit against the attorney. See Nat'l Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 205–06, 25 L.Ed. 621 (1879) ; see also 1 Ronald E. Mallen et al., Legal Malpractice § 6:1 & n.3 (2014 ed.) ().
[¶ 10] Although he recognizes this general principle, Joseph makes two arguments to support his contention that MLA's representation of Julibel “included” the representation of Joseph in his capacity as her successor. First, he asserts that the Probate Code's language stating that a successor personal representative has the same powers and duties as his predecessor reflects a legislative intent to abandon the strict privity rule in instances where a successor personal representative sues a probate attorney for malpractice. Second, he asserts that the summary judgment record reveals disputed issues of material fact regarding the scope of any attorney's representation of a personal representative that preclude a conclusion that MLA did not owe Joseph a duty of care as a matter of law. We address each argument below.
[¶ 11] The interpretation of the Probate Code is a legal issue that we review de novo. Estate of Hunt, 2010 ME 23, ¶ 6, 990 A.2d 544. When interpreting a statute, “[w]e first look to the plain meaning of the statute, interpreting its language to avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results, and attempting to give all of its words meaning.” Carrier v. Sec'y of State, 2012 ME 142, ¶ 12, 60 A.3d 1241 (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 12] A personal representative has the power to employ an attorney “to advise or assist the personal representative in the performance of [her] administrative duties” and to “[p]rosecute or defend claims” to protect both the estate and the personal representative in the performance of her duties. 18–A M.R.S. § 3–715(21), (22) (2013). This statutory language would undeniably permit a personal representative to bring a malpractice suit against the attorney she hired to help probate a will. The Probate Code also expressly provides that a successor personal representative accepts the same powers and duties as his predecessor with respect to administering and distributing the estate. 18–A M.R.S. §§ 3–613, 3–716 (2013).
[¶ 13]...
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