Estate of Flowers, Matter of
| Citation | 848 P.2d 1146,1993 OK 19 |
| Decision Date | 16 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 77386,77386 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Edna L. Rogers FLOWERS, Deceased. Lois L. Flowers HOOPER, Appellee, v. Nola CLINKINGBEARD, Lillian Fowler, Ratha Reynolds and Faye Davis Dattuso, Appellants. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Oklahoma |
Mary S. Robertson, Steven P. Cole, Oklahoma City, for appellants.
Lawrence W. Parish, Joel D. Butterworth, Oklahoma City, for appellee.
Two issues 1 are presented: 1) whether the appellee, Lois L. Flowers Hooper (Hooper/adopted daughter/pretermitted heir), qualifies as a pretermitted heir under 84 O.S.1991 § 132; 2 and 2) whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to demonstrate the adoptive mother's intent. We find that: 1) The passage of the Uniform Adoption Act (Adoption Act), 10 O.S.1991 § 60.1 et seq. in 1957 abolished all pre-existing differences between adopted and natural children. Because the clear language of 10 O.S.1991 § 1132 3 provides that termination of parental rights does not affect a child's right to inherit from its parent, Hooper qualifies as a pretermitted heir under 84 O.S.1991 § 132. 4 and 2) The existence of an order terminating the testatrix's parental rights is an extraneous fact rendering the will ambiguous. Parol evidence is admissible to ascertain the adoptive mother's intent.
On December 2, 1939, Edna L. Rogers Flowers' (Flowers/adoptive mother/deceased/testatrix) and her husband adopted the appellee, Lois L. Flowers Hooper (Hooper/adopted daughter/pretermitted heir) and Hooper's brother, Don L. Flowers (brother/adopted son). Four years later, Flower's husband petitioned the Okfuskee County Court to declare Hooper a delinquent child. At the hearing on the petition on June 30, 1943, Hooper was found delinquent. Hooper's care and custody were committed to the State. The Flowers relinquished all rights as parents of Hooper; and the court's order provides that they were released from all further liabilities and responsibilities as Hooper's parents. 5 The Flowers made no attempt to terminate their rights to their adopted son. From Flowers executed her will on June 27, 1989. She died on May 14, 1990. On May 21, 1990, Debbie Parker, the named personal representative, filed Flowers' will for probate. The appellants, Nola Clinkingbeard, Lillian Fowler, Ratha Reynolds and Fay Davis Dattuso (collectively, beneficiaries/sisters), are Flowers' sisters. They are all named as devisees and/or beneficiaries in Flowers' will.
1943 until she reached majority, Hooper remained in foster care. Her support was provided by the State of Oklahoma. Between her placement in foster care and 1982, Hooper testified that she visited with her adoptive mother approximately five times. On at least one of these occasions, Flowers traveled to Tulsa to see Hooper. On another, Hooper claims to have lived with her adoptive mother for a short period of time. There were also alleged telephone contacts.
On June 1, 1990, Hooper filed a petition to receive Flowers' estate as a pretermitted heir pursuant to 84 O.S.1991 § 132. 6 This cause arises out of the sisters' objection to Hooper's petition. On August 21, 1990, the trial court held a hearing in which oral and documentary evidence were presented. The trial court found that Hooper qualified as a pretermitted heir and that nothing on the face of the will indicated an ambiguity allowing the introduction of extrinsic evidence. 7 The Court of Appeals affirmed. It found that: 1) adoptive parents' parental rights could not be legally severed in 1943; and 2) extrinsic evidence was not admissible to establish the testatrix's intent to disinherit her adopted daughter. We granted certiorari on November 23, 1992, to determine: 1) whether the termination of parental rights affects the adoptive daughter's right to inherit from her adoptive mother as a pretermitted heir under 84 O.S.1991 § 132; and 2) whether parol evidence is admissible to ascertain the adoptive mother's testatorial intent.
QUALIFIES AS A PRETERMITTED HEIR UNDER 84 O.S.1991 § 132.
Both parties argue that a primary issue in the cause concerns Hooper's status as an adopted child. Clinkingbeard asserts that the trial court had the authority to sever the parental relationship between an adopted child and his/her adoptive parents in 1943. Hooper insists that the trial court lacked authority to terminate the parent-child relationship absent a second adoption. However, this issue is not dispositive. 8 As In 1957, Oklahoma adopted the Uniform Adoption Act (Adoption Act), 10 O.S.1991 § 60.1 et seq. In Conville v. Bakke, 400 P.2d 179, 192-93 (Okla.1964), this Court discussed the Legislature's intent in enacting the Adoption Act. We specifically recognized in Conville that in repealing the prior law relating to the inheritance rights of adopted children the Legislature intended that all adopted children--those adopted before 1957 and those adopted after enactment of the Adoption Act--be treated similarly. An argument that the pre-1957 adoption law remained in effect for the purpose of determining heirs of persons dying after 1957 if the heir was adopted prior to the effective date of the Adoption Act was found unpersuasive.
the following discussion demonstrates, even if the parental tie was severed in 1943, Hooper qualifies as a pretermitted heir under 84 O.S.1991 § 132. 9
In Conville, we recognized the Legislature's authority to provide for the prospective operation of a statute. We also noted that the Legislature did not exercise that authority in the Adoption Act. Instead, it created a system in which all adopted children are treated similarly for the purposes of inheritance and moved Oklahoma into the modern trend of placing adopted children upon the same footing as natural offspring. We will not today step back, through judicial fiat, to a system which treats those children differently based upon their date of adoption. Were we to do so, it would unravel the law established by judicial decision, and result in the creation of an unconstitutional special law 10 and a denial of equal protection under the law. 11
The findings of Conville were reinforced in Hines v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 708 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Okla.1985). Hines involved the right of a an adopted child to inherit from the lineal kindred of the adoptive parent. In Hines, we stated:
"Although the Uniform Adoption Act was not enacted until 1957, and the appellant was adopted in 1950, generally the right of an adopted child to inherit is decided by the law in force at the death of the testatrix/testator not the date of the adoption."
The child in Hines, adopted in 1950--seven years before the enactment of the Adoption Act--was found to be entitled to inherit from its lineal ancestors although inheritance Hein v. Hein, 431 P.2d 316, 318 (Okla.1967), was promulgated after Conville and before Hines. However, it provides good rationale for an across-the-board application of the Adoption Act. In Hein, we refused to apply the Adoption Act where the testator died before the Act's adoption. In doing so, we reasoned that a will is ambulatory during the maker's life and may be changed until the date of death. Certain presumptions are indulged in ascertaining a decedent's intent. In Hein, we determined that a testator/testatrix is presumed to know the law in effect at the time of the execution of a will. Here, when the adoptive mother executed her will in 1989, the current Adoption Act had been in force and effect for thirty-two years; Conville and Hines had been part of our jurisprudence for twenty-five and four years, respectively.
would not have been allowed under the prior law.
The Adoption Act abolished all pre-existing differences between adopted and natural children. 12 The right of an adopted child to inherit is decided by the law in force at the death of the testatrix/testator not the date of the adoption. 13 Flowers died in 1990, after the Adoption Act became law. Under the Adoption Act, the adoption decree establishes the relationship of natural parent and natural child between the adoptive parent and the adopted child for all purposes--including the mutual rights of inheritance and succession. Adopted children may not be eliminated as beneficiaries or as devisees absent a clear and explicit expression to do so. 14
Title 10 O.S.1991 § 1132 15 describes the effect a termination of parental rights has on the parent-child relationship. Section 1132 provides that the termination of parental rights negates the parent's rights to inherit from the child. The statute specifically provides that termination shall not "in any way affect the right of the child to inherit from the parent." The determination of legislative intent controls judicial statutory interpretation. 16 However, it is unnecessary to apply rules of construction to discern Legislative intent if the will is clearly expressed. 17 Pursuant to the plain language of § 1132, termination of parental rights does not affect the right of the child to inherit from the parent. Because Flowers died after the enactment of the Adoption Act abolishing all differences between natural and adopted children and because the clear language of 10 O.S.1991 § 1132 provides that termination of parental rights shall not affect a child's right to inherit from its parent, Hooper qualifies as a pretermitted heir under 84 O.S.1991 § 132. 18
THE EXISTENCE OF AN ORDER TERMINATING THE TESTATRIX'S
THE WILL AMBIGUOUS. PAROL EVIDENCE IS
ADOPTIVE MOTHER'S INTENT.
The sisters assert that the existence of the order...
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