Ledbetter v. Howard

• Decision Date: 24 April 2012
• Docket Number: No. 105,902.,105,902.
• Citation: 276 P.3d 1031,2012 OK 39
• Parties: Guy T. LEDBETTER and Midge Ledbetter, individually and as husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. Derek G. HOWARD, D.O., and Radiology Services of Ardmore, Inc., jointly and severally, Defendants/Appellants.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

276 P.3d 1031

2012 OK 39

Guy T. LEDBETTER and Midge Ledbetter, individually and as husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellees,

v.Derek G. HOWARD, D.O., and Radiology Services of Ardmore, Inc., jointly and severally, Defendants/Appellants.

No. 105,902.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

April 24, 2012.

Certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals, Division II.

¶ 0 The plaintiffs/appellees, Guy T. Ledbetter (Ledbetter/patient) and Midge Ledbetter (wife, collectively Ledbetters), sued the defendant/appellant, Derek G. Howard, D.O. (Howard/doctor), and his employer, Radiology Services of Ardmore, Inc. (Radiology Services, collectively, defendants), for malpractice. Ledbetter alleged that the doctor misread an x-ray causing delayed treatment of his rapidly deteriorating left foot. Coupled with the malpractice claim was the wife's plea for loss of consortium. The jury found in favor of Howard and Radiology Services. The Ledbetters moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The trial court denied the judgment request. Nevertheless, based on evidence of juror misconduct during deliberations, the motion for new trial was sustained.

Howard and Radiology Services appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded ordering the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the defendants. The foreperson assured the trial court in voir dire that she would not allow her expertise and experience to override the evidence presented at trial. Nevertheless, she not only did so on a personal level but went further by communicating her alleged professional knowledge and experiences to her fellow jurors with the apparent intent to sway their votes in favor of Howard and Radiology Services. Therefore, we determine that: 1) the juror's affidavit is admissible under the “extraneous prejudicial information” exception to 12 O.S.2011 § 2606 (B); and 2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial for juror misconduct during deliberations.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED AND CAUSE REMANDED.

Tom L. King, Richard M. Glasgow, Justin T. King, King Law Firm, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for plaintiffs/appellees.

Hilton H. Walters, R.Gene Stanley, Rife & Walters, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for defendants/appellants.

Allison A. Cave, Allison A. Cave, PLLC, Edmond, Oklahoma.

WATT, J.:

¶ 1 We granted certiorari to address a single issue: whether the trial court erred in granting a motion for new trial on grounds of juror misconduct. ¹ Resolution of this issue requires us first to answer the question of whether the juror's affidavit was properly submitted as evidence in the hearing on the request for new trial.

¶ 2 We hold that the juror's affidavit demonstrating the injection into the deliberative process of extraneous prejudicial information was admissible under the “extraneous prejudicial information” exception to 12 O.S.2011 § 2606 (B).² Furthermore, counsel were entitled to rely on the foreperson's guarantee to the trial court that she would not allow her professional expertise to override the testimony presented. Because there is evidence to the contrary, we hold that there was no abuse of discretion in ordering a new trial for juror misconduct during deliberations.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3 Ledbetter has a long history of diabetes which grew worse over time requiring increased medical intervention. In 1997 or 1998, he developed signs of peripheral neuropathy of the legs, a diabetic complication affecting the nerves and which can lead to serious leg and foot complications, including amputation.

¶ 4 On May 31, 2005, Ledbetter went to his primary care physician, Dr. Kevin Reed, complaining of swelling, redness, and discomfort in his left foot and leg. Dr. Reed diagnosed Ledbetter with cellulitus, an infection of the soft tissues, and began treating him with a broad-spectrum oral antibiotic.

¶ 5 On Dr. Reed's orders, Ledbetter returned for a followup appointment on June 7th. There being no apparent improvement in Ledbetter's leg, Dr. Reed admitted him to the hospital and began intravenous antibiotics. Two days later, Dr. Reed ordered x-rays of Ledbetter's left foot because of concerns related to a potential bone infection. Howard read the x-rays concluding that there were no dislocations or fractures and that the foot was radiographically normal.

¶ 6 Having improved, Ledbetter was discharged from the hospital on June 11th. Although the symptoms continued to abate during the three (3) weeks after discharge, Ledbetter continued to have swelling in his left ankle. Dr. Reed ordered a second x-ray on July 5th which showed a dramatic deterioration of the bones in Ledbetter's left foot. Dr. Reed referred Ledbetter to an orthopedic surgeon who sent Ledbetter to see Dr. Steven Lund, a podiatrist with experience treating Charcot Foot.³

¶ 7 Dr. Lund diagnosed Ledbetter with Charcot Foot. Because of the severity of the foot's deformity, Dr. Lund recommended reconstructive surgery to attach an external fixator to Ledbetter's foot. Ledbetter wore the fixator, which was adjusted daily, for approximately seven weeks. Thereafter, Ledbetter spent several weeks in a cast and then in a specially crafted boot for six to eight months. Finally, Ledbetter was fitted with a brace intended to be worn continually with a shoe. However, because the brace was uncomfortable, Ledbetter discontinued its use.

¶ 8 The Ledbetters sued Howard and Radiology Services for negligence. Ledbetter alleged that the doctor misread the July 9th x-ray causing delayed treatment of his rapidly deteriorating left foot. Coupled with the malpractice claim was the wife's plea for loss of consortium. The action was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The Ledbetters filed two motions: one for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and one for new trial on grounds of juror misconduct during deliberations. The trial court refused to grant judgment to the Ledbetters but sustained their motion for new trial finding that “juror misconduct affected materially the substantial rights of the [Ledbetters]”.⁴ The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded ordering the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Howard and Radiology Services. The cause was assigned for consideration to this chamber on December 5, 2011.

Standard of Review

¶ 9 It has long been recognized that the granting of a new trial is within the wide discretion of the trial court.⁵ We will not reverse an order granting a new trial unless error is clearly established in respect to some pure, simple, and unmixed question of law.⁶ The judge who presides at the trial: hears the testimony; observes the witnesses; and has full knowledge of the proceedings during the trial process. It is that adjudicator who is in the best position to know whether substantial justice has been done. Where such a judge sustains a motion for new trial, a clear showing of manifest error and an abuse of discretion must be made before this Court is justified in reversing the ruling. The threshold for upholding the grant of a new trial is much lower than where the motion is overruled.⁷ Furthermore, when, as here, the new trial is granted by the same judge who tried the case, a much stronger showing of error or abuse of discretion is required for this Court to reverse than if a party appeals from a refusal to grant a new trial.⁸

¶ 10 The Ledbetters allege they are entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct.⁹ They insist that the jury foreperson, a licensed practical nurse who regularly assists with the care and treatment of diabetic patients, improperly injected extraneous prejudicial information into the deliberative process. Howard and Radiology Services contend that the juror's affidavit utilized to impeach the verdict is inadmissible pursuant to 12 O.S.2011 § 2606 (B).¹⁰ In the alternative, they argue that the foreperson's statement interjected no extraneous information improperly influencing any juror. We disagree with both of the defendants' arguments.

¶ 11 a) The juror's affidavit regarding the foreperson's statements during deliberations is admissible under the “extraneous prejudicial information” exception to 12 O.S.2011 § 2606 (B).

¶ 12 The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intention and purpose of the Legislature as expressed by the statutory language.¹¹ Intent is ascertained from the whole act in light of its general purpose and objective ¹² considering relevant provisions together to give full force and effect to each.¹³ The Court presumes that the Legislature expressed its intent and that it intended what it expressed.¹⁴ Statutes are interpreted to attain that purpose and end ¹⁵ championing the broad public policy purposes underlying them. ¹⁶ Only where the legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the statutory language, i.e. in cases of ambiguity or conflict, are rules of statutory construction employed.¹⁷ If the language is plain and clearly expresses the legislative will, further inquiry is unnecessary. ¹⁸

¶ 13 Title 12 O.S.2011 § 2606 (B)¹⁹ provides in pertinent part:

A juror may²⁰ testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial informationwas improperly brought to the jury's attention ... An affidavit ... of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying shall not be received ... [Emphasis provided.]

The statute does not preclude the admission of all juror affidavits in queries involving juror misconduct. Instead, it blocks the offering of juror affidavits on a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying. Jurors are specifically allowed under the statute to testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention. Therefore, if the foreperson's statements constituted extraneous prejudicial information,...