Estate of Guido v. Exempla, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11CA0830.,11CA0830.
• Citation: 292 P.3d 996
• Parties: ESTATE OF Salvadore GUIDO, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. EXEMPLA, INC., d/b/a Exempla Lutheran Medical Center, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

292 P.3d 996

ESTATE OF Salvadore GUIDO, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.EXEMPLA, INC., d/b/a Exempla Lutheran Medical Center, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 11CA0830.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. V.

March 15, 2012.

Springer and Steinberg, P.C., Jeffrey A. Springer, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Hall & Evans, LLC, Deanne C. McClung, Mary K. Lanning, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellee.

Opinion by Judge BOORAS.

¶ 1 Plaintiff, the Estate of Salvadore Guido (the estate), appeals the district court's order denying its motion to confirm an arbitration award as time barred. We reverse and remand.

I. Background

¶ 2 Mr. Guido brought a medical malpractice action against Lutheran Medical Center, which was a predecessor entity to defendant, Exempla, Inc. (Exempla). The parties agreed to submit the claims to arbitration and, in June 1998, the arbitrator awarded Mr. Guido $20,000, plus interest and costs. There is no evidence that a motion to vacate, modify, or correct the award was ever filed by Exempla.

¶ 3 Mr. Guido died in September 2009. In December 2010, the estate filed a motion to confirm the arbitrator's award, alleging that the amounts awarded to Mr. Guido in the arbitration were never paid or satisfied. See ch. 154, sec. 1, § 13–22–213, 1975 Colo. Sess. Laws 576 (now recodified with amendments as § 13–22–222(1), C.R.S.2011) (“Upon application of a party, the court shall confirm an award....”).¹ Exempla filed a response, arguing that the confirmation motion was barred by the general two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 13–80–102, C.R.S.2011; the general six-year statute of limitations set forth in section 13–80–101, C.R.S.2011; or laches.

¶ 4 The district court concluded that the arbitration award constituted a “liquidated debt” and confirmation of it was time barred under the six-year statute of limitations set forth in section 13–80–103.5(1)(a), C.R.S.2011, applicable to actions to recover a liquidated debt. Citing Toothaker v. City of Boulder, 13 Colo. 219, 22 P. 468 (1889), the district court noted that “the statute of limitations is designed for situations such as this where witnesses have died, records are no longer available, and truth is difficult to ascertain.” ² The district court did not mention or cite the Colorado Uniform Arbitration Act of 1975 (the CUAA) in its order.

¶ 5 The estate filed a C.R.C.P. 59(a) post-judgment motion, arguing that the CUAA contains no limitations period for filing a motion to confirm an arbitration award under the CUAA, and, in the alternative, that the twenty-year limitation period applicable to the execution of judgments, section 13–52–102(2)(a), C.R.S.2011, should be applied to confirmation proceedings. The estate also argued that the district court erroneously characterized the arbitration award as a “liquidated debt” subject to the six-year statute of limitations set forth in section 13–80–103.5(1)(a). In response, Exempla argued that, because Mr. Guido failed to take “the necessary steps to confirm his award in a timely manner,” the estate's “claim” is barred by the six-year statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches and that the estate “cannot now take advantage” of the twenty-year limitation period set forth in section 13–52–102(2)(a). The district court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.

II. Confirmation of Arbitration Award

¶ 6 The estate contends that the district court erred in denying its confirmation motion as time barred under the six-year statute of limitations applicable to actions to recover a liquidated debt set forth in section 13–80–103.5(1)(a). We agree.

¶ 7 We review de novo the issue of which statute of limitations applies to a particular claim, at least where, as here, all facts relevant to that issue are undisputed. See Hurtado v. Brady, 165 P.3d 871, 873 (Colo.App.2007). We also review de novo a district court's legal conclusions on a motion to confirm an arbitration award. Sure–Shock Elec., Inc. v. Diamond Lofts Venture, LLC, 259 P.3d 546, 548 (Colo.App.2011); Barrett v. Inv. Mgmt. Consultants, Ltd., 190 P.3d 800, 802 (Colo.App.2008).

A. Confirmation Motion Is Not a “Civil Action” to Recover a “Liquidated Debt”

¶ 8 As an initial matter, we agree with the estate that the district court mischaracterized the confirmation proceeding as an action to recover a liquidated debt pursuant to section 13–80–103.5(1)(a).

¶ 9 A confirmation proceeding is a special statutory proceeding, not a “civil action” in the ordinary meaning of that term. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cabs, Inc., 751 P.2d 61, 65 (Colo.1988) (“Arbitration is a special statutory proceeding, and the [CUAA] sets out in precise detail the rules which apply concerning confirmation of an arbitration award, and the methods by which a party may request the court to vacate or modify such an award.”); Levy v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 293 P.3d 40, –––– (Colo.App.2011) ( cert. granted2011 WL 4018206 (Sept. 12, 2011)) (same); cf. Morrison v. Colo. Permanente Med. Grp., P.C., 983 F.Supp. 937, 944 (D.Colo.1997) (an arbitration proceeding is not a “civil action” as contemplated by Colorado statute allowing only one civil action for recovery of damages for wrongful death of any one decedent); Sabon v. People, 142 Colo. 323, 326, 350 P.2d 576, 578 (1960) (a mental health adjudication action in the county court can best be described as a special statutory proceeding, and is neither a criminal case nor a civil action).

¶ 10 Former section 13–22–213 of the CUAA provided for initiation of the confirmation process by application to the district court. See also ch. 154, sec. 1, § 13–22–218, 1975 Colo. Sess. Law 577 (now recodified with amendments as § 13–22–205(1), C.R.S.2011) (“an application to the court under [the CUAA] shall be by motion and shall be heard in the manner and upon the notice provided by law or rule of court for the making and hearing of motions”). Although former section 13–22–218 provided that notice of an initial application for an order under the CUAA “shall be served in the manner provided by law for the service of a summons in an action,” ch. 154, sec. 1, § 13–22–218, 1975 Colo. Sess. Law 577 (now recodified with amendments as § 13–22–205(2), C.R.S.2011), an application for confirmation is not a complaint that initiates a civil action in the district court. It is thus not a “civil action” as that term is used in C.R.C.P. 3(a). SeeC.R.C.P. 3(a) (“A civil action is commenced (1) by filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by service of a summons and complaint.”).

¶ 11 Other jurisdictions have similarly held that a confirmation proceeding is not a “civil action.” See, e.g., City of Waterbury v. Waterbury Police Union, Local 1237, 176 Conn. 401, 407 A.2d 1013, 1015–16 (1979) (a statutory proceeding to confirm, modify, or vacate an arbitration award is not a “civil action”); Hardin Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Fuller Enters., Inc., 265 Ga. 770, 462 S.E.2d 130, 131 (1995) (an arbitration award confirmation proceeding filed pursuant to the Georgia Arbitration Code is a special statutory proceeding, not a civil action); Driver v. SI Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 80 P.3d 1024, 1030 (2003) (implying that a proceeding to confirm an arbitration award is not a “civil action”).

¶ 12 Therefore, regardless of how the district court characterized the arbitration award, the confirmation proceeding is not an independent “civil action” to recover a liquidated debt within the meaning of section 13–80–103.5(1)(a). Although the terms “liquidateddebt” and “unliquidated, determinable amount” are not defined in section 13–80–103.5, C.R.S.2011, the legislative history reveals that the portion of section 13–80–103.5(1)(a) referring to “liquidated debt” and “unliquidated, determinable amount” pertains to actions for breach of contract. Curtis v. Counce, 32 P.3d 585, 588 (Colo.App.2001). Here, there is no allegation of a contract between the estate and Exempla, and the estate did not file a complaint for breach of contract. Thus, section 13–80–103.5(1)(a) is inapplicable. See id. at 589. This proceeding is simply an effort by the estate to confirm the award pursuant to the CUAA. Although there is a clear statutory framework for this process under the CUAA, the district court did not recognize it.

B. Statute of Limitations Applicable to Confirmation Motions

¶ 13 We now examine the statutory scheme set forth in the CUAA to determine whether confirmation proceedings are subject to a time limit. Former section 13–22–213 ³ of the CUAA, which governs the confirmation of arbitration awards, corresponds to section 11 of the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956 (the 1956 Act) ⁴ and provides: “Upon application of a party, the court shall confirm an award, unless within the time limits imposed in this part 2 grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided in sections 13–22–214 and 13–22–215.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 14 The estate contends that former section 13–22–213 imposes no time bar to confirmation actions. Alternatively, the estate argues that the twenty-year limitations period for the enforcement of judgments, section 13–52–102(2)(a), should be applied to confirmation proceedings. Whether a time limit applies to proceedings to confirm arbitration awards is an issue of first impression in Colorado.

¶ 15 Statutory construction involves a question of law. Applehans v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 68 P.3d 594, 597 (Colo.App.2003). In interpreting a statute, we must give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Id. To discern that intent, we look to the language employed in the statute. Id. If the words used are plain and unambiguous, our task is accomplished by giving effect to the commonly accepted meaning of those words. Id.

¶ 16 A strained or forced construction of a statutory term is to be avoided, and we must look to the context in which a statutory term is employed. Id. Further, we must construe the statute as a...