Estate of Holley v. Am. Family Life Assur. Co. of Columbus, 2005 Ohio 2281 (OH 5/5/2005)
| Decision Date | 05 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 04CA5. |
| Citation | 2005 Ohio 2281 |
| Parties | Estate of Norman Holley, by Mary K. Holley, Executor, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. American Family Life Assurance : Company of Columbus (AFLAC), et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
James R. Kingsley, Circleville, Ohio, for appellants.
P. Eugene Long, Circleville, Ohio, for appellee, Dr. Michael E. Geron.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶1} This is an appeal from the Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons set forth in the opinion below, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter so that judgment may be entered as directed by this court.
{¶2} Norman Dean Holley was found drowned in Walnut Creek which ran through the rear of his property. The coroner, Dr. Michael E. Geron, determined that Holley's death was a suicide and entered such finding on the death certificate. Appellants brought this action under R. C. 313.19 seeking to have the coroner change the determination from suicide to accidental. R.C. 313.19 provides:
{¶3} "The cause of death and the manner and mode in which the death occurred, as delivered by the coroner and incorporated in the coroner's verdict and in the death certificate filed with the division of vital statistics, shall be the legally accepted manner and mode in which such death occurred, and the legally accepted cause of death, unless the court of common pleas of the county in which the death occurred, after a hearing, directs the coroner to change his decision as to such cause and manner and mode of death."
{¶4} The trial court conducted a hearing pursuant to this statute and issued a decision and entry finding "*** that Mr. Holley committed suicide." From that decision, appellants take this appeal designating one assignment of error.
{¶5} ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I: Was the Trial Court's refusal to direct the Coroner to change his decision as to the mode of death from suicide to accidental against the manifest weight of the evidence and/or was there insufficient evidence.
{¶6} We begin our discussion of the facts by noting that there is no direct evidence of suicide, such as a suicide note. There is no evidence from which one could only infer suicidal intent, such as jumping from a high building or putting a gun to one's mouth. There also is no evidence that Holley was subjected to those life stresses that often lead people to kill themselves, such as poor health, economic ruin, unrequited love, criminal prosecution, etc. Nor is there any evidence that Holley was depressed or, as is often the case, talked of taking his own life.
{¶7} The evidence in this case is entirely circumstantial. That is, the conclusion of suicide rests entirely on inferences drawn from essentially undisputed facts.
{¶8} There are two questions for this court to resolve. First, what standard is used by a coroner in reaching his decision as to the cause of death? Second, what standard is to be used by the trial court in reviewing the coroner's decision in a R.C. 313.19 hearing.
{¶9} There is in Ohio a presumption against suicide:
{¶10}"Where it is shown that death resulted from bodily injury caused by violent external means without a showing as to how the injury was in fact sustained, there is a presumption that death did not result from suicide, self-infliction of injury, criminal assault of another or voluntary employment as the means of causing death." Sheppard v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1949), 152 Ohio St. 6, 15.
{¶11} In Evans v. Nat. Life Acc. Ins. Co. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 87, paragraph one of the syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio indicates that this presumption is rebuttable:
{¶12}
{¶13} The presumption against suicide would appear to be applicable to the coroner in as much as his determination has been described as "quasi judicial." Several cases have challenged the constitutionality of the coroner's decision making authority as being void for vagueness and a denial of due process. For a discussion of the issue of void for vagueness see, Estate of Severt v. Wood (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 123.
{¶14} The constitutional objections were found to be not valid in Vargo v. Travelers Ins. Co. (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 27, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus, which provides:
{¶15} "The coroner's factual determinations concerning the manner, mode and cause of death, as expressed in the coroner's report and the death certificate, create a nonbinding rebuttable presumption concerning such facts in the absence of competent, credible evidence to the contrary. (R.C. 313.19, construed.)
{¶16}
{¶17} The opinion in Vargo, further states:
{¶18} "Accordingly, we hold that the coroner's factual determinations concerning the manner, mode and cause of the decedent's death, as expressed in the coroner's report and death certificate, create a non-binding, rebuttable presumption concerning such facts in the absence of competent, credible evidence to the contrary.
{¶19} Vargo at 30.
{¶20} Thus the answer to the first question in this case is that the standard to be used by a coroner in reaching his decision as to the cause of death is quasi-judicial. Quasi-judicial proceedings are strictly bound by the Rules of Evidence.
{¶21} The hearing conducted by the court pursuant to R. C. 313.19 is a judicial proceeding, and the procedures and results must be in accord with the Rules of Evidence.
{¶22} Many states have a presumption against suicide for the reasons best described in Knox v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 19 Conn. Sup. 274, 277, "The basis of any such presumption must be the common knowledge, which may be noted without proof by a judge and jury, that sane persons do not ordinarily kill themselves." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wilkes, supra, 704; Mallory v. Travelers Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52, 54; Grosvenor v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 102 Neb. 629, 631, 168 N. W. 596; Reynolds v. Maryland Cas. Co., 274 Mo. 83, 96; Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Watkins, 38 Ohio App. 420, 429, 176 N. E. 469; Indianapolis v. Taylor (1999), 707 N.E.2d 1047; Cutrell v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1945), 145 Neb. 550.
{¶23} Counsel in their briefs discuss the presumption against suicide, the burden of going forward, the burden of proof, but it appears to this court that under the ordinary rules there is no evidence of suicide in this case at all. Dr. Geron and his expert witness Dr. Kennedy expressed their opinion that Holley committed suicide, but those opinions appear to lack foundation.
{¶24} Evid.R. 702 permits experts to testify as to their opinion, and even their opinion as to the ultimate issue under Evid.R. 704. Evid.R. 703 and 705, however, require that the expert establish the basis from which they draw the inferences for their expert opinion.
{¶25} A trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences from established evidentiary facts just as an expert witness may have an opinion based on inferences drawn from facts as provided for in Evid.R. 703. But an expert witness cannot, as we instruct our juries, reach a conclusion where one inference is based on another inference. One may make separate inferences from the same fact. This often is a hard distinction to make, but the decision in Waldman v. Shipyard Marina, 102 R.I. 366, 1967, gives a good explanation of the application of the rule:
{¶26}
{¶27} In McDougall v. Glenn Cartage Co. (1959), 169 Ohio St. 522, 525, inferences are discussed:
{¶28} "`An inference of fact cannot be predicated upon another inference, but must be predicated upon a fact supported by evidence.' The phrase, `basing an inference upon an inference,' is frequently...
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