Estate of Hunter v. General Motors Corp., 96-CA-01278-SCT.
Decision Date | 14 January 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 96-CA-01278-SCT.,96-CA-01278-SCT. |
Citation | 729 So.2d 1264 |
Parties | The ESTATE OF Joseph L. HUNTER, deceased and Ida Mae Rogers, Willie Greenwood and Jessie Ward v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and Frank Wilson, Chancery Clerk of Claiborne County, Mississippi, as the Administrator of the Estate of Joseph Hunter, deceased; and General Motors Corporation and Carter Auto Sales, Inc. |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
John Barret Martin, Natchez, Franklin G. Shaw, New Orleans, Dennis C. Sweet, III, Jackson, Deanne Mosley, Jackson, William F. Riley, Natchez, Attorneys for Appellants.
Gene Barry, David P. Stone, Robert L. Johnson, III, Natchez, Kyle H. Dreyer, Dallas, TX, Attorneys for Appellees.
Before PRATHER, C.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and MILLS, JJ.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
¶ 1. On March 8, 1992, a tractor-trailer truck driven by Lowell D. Gann and owned by Rowe Machinery Salvage & Sales, Inc. ran a stop sign and collided with a 1981 Oldsmobile Toronado driven by Joseph Hunter. There were three passengers in the Toronado at the time of the accident: Ida Rogers, Willie Greenwood, and Jessie Ward. Officer William Neeley was one of the first officers on the scene of the accident, and he described the scene as follows:
The first witness to the scene, Michael Phillips, testified that the occupants of the Toronado were not wearing seatbelts, and Deputy Neeley also testified to this effect. Jessie Ward maintained, however, that she had in fact been wearing her seatbelts at the time of the accident.
¶ 2. Hunter died from injuries sustained in the accident, and he was survived by a fifteen-year old son, Joseph Jr. In addition to the death of Hunter, Ida Rogers suffered a subluxation of the spine at the C6-7 vertebral area, causing incomplete quadriplegia. Ida's sister, Jessie Ward, testified that Ida was unable to walk or use her hands to grasp objects as a result of her paralysis. Willie Greenwood suffered a concussion and severe head lacerations in the accident, and he testified to recurring headaches and dizziness following the accident. Dr. Richard Beattie testified that Willie had suffered significant neurological impairment as a result of the accident.
¶ 3. Following the accident, the passengers and the Estate of Hunter ("the plaintiffs")1 sued the owner of the truck, William L. Rowe Machinery Salvage and Sales, Inc. and its driver, Lowell Gann, in the Circuit Court of Claiborne County. The passengers also sued the Estate of Hunter, alleging that Hunter's negligence had contributed to the accident. Prior to trial, the Plaintiffs reached a settlement with Gann and his employer, collecting over $1,000,000.00 in settlement proceeds from these defendants. The passengers reserved their claim for negligent driving against the Estate of Hunter, however, thus retaining venue in Claiborne County (and joining the Chancellor as administrator) even though the accident occurred in Adams County.
¶ 4. The Plaintiffs later joined General Motors and a Port Gibson used car dealer in their lawsuits, and the case against GM proceeded through extensive discovery. The Plaintiffs and Hunter took the depositions of several current and former GM employees, along with the depositions of all of GM's expert witnesses. The case proceeded to trial on August 19, 1996, following which the jury returned unanimous verdicts in favor of GM and in favor of Hunter as a defendant. The plaintiffs timely filed an appeal to this Court, and the passengers also filed an appeal as to the Estate of Hunter.
¶ 5. The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in not implementing the "settlement first" method endorsed by this Court in McBride v. Chevron, USA, 673 So.2d 372 (Miss.1996). This argument is without merit. The settlement-first method provides a method of adjusting a verdict against a defendant to reflect an earlier settlement with a joint tortfeasor. See McBride, 673 So.2d at 376. Given that the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants in the present case, there is no judgment which must be adjusted under the facts herein. Therefore, the settlement-first method is clearly inapplicable to the present case. In addition, it is worth noting that this Court held in McBride that:
This opinion is limited, however, to cases in which, as here, the trial court instructed the jury to consider only the relative culpabilities of the plaintiff and the non-settling defendant(s) in apportioning fault under comparative negligence principles.
Id. at 381. The trial judge in the present case instructed the jury to consider the fault of the settling defendant (Gann) in apportioning fault in the present case, and McBride would therefore be inapplicable on its face to the present case even if a verdict reduction procedure were required herein, which it is clearly not. This point of error is without merit.
¶ 6. The Plaintiffs argue that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting evidence that the rear passengers were not wearing seatbelts at the time of the accident and in instructing the jury that seat belt non-usage constituted contributory negligence. Miss.Code Ann. § 63-2-3 (1996) provides that:
This chapter shall not be construed to create a duty, standard of care, right or liability between the operator and passenger of any passenger motor vehicle which is not recognized under the laws of the State of Mississippi as such laws exist on the date of passage of this chapter or as such laws may at any time thereafter be constituted by statute or court decision. Failure to provide and use a seat belt restraint device or system shall not be considered contributory or comparative negligence, nor shall the violation be entered on the driving record of any individual.
Miss.Code Ann. § 63-2-3 thus provides that the non-usage of seat belts may not be "considered contributory or comparative negligence," but the statute does not forbid the admission of evidence of seat belt non-usage outright2.
¶ 7. This Court has on two prior occasions reversed cases based at least in part upon the erroneous admission of evidence of seat belt non-usage. See: Roberts v. Grafe Auto Co., 701 So.2d 1093 (Miss.1997); Jones v. Panola County, 725 So.2d 774 (Miss.1998).
¶ 8. GM raises an argument which was not raised in either Roberts or Jones, arguing that § 63-2-3 should not be given the effect of a statutory rule of evidence. Specifically, GM argues that:
Finally, to allow § 63-2-3 to prevent admission of fact testimony that Plaintiffs were not wearing seat belts would equate to a statute to a rule of evidence. In Hughes v. Tupelo Oil Co., 510 So.2d 502 (Miss.1987), this Court held that the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 501, abrogated all statutory privileges. This Court has consistently ruled there can be no statutory rule of evidence. Whitehurst v. State, 540 So.2d 1319, 1323 (Miss.1989).
¶ 9. In noting that this Court has held that there can be no statutory rule of evidence, GM is correct. Miss.Code Ann. § 63-2-3 is not an improper exercise of legislative power, however, given that the statute does not purport to bar the admission of seat belt non-usage in all cases, but rather forbids the non-usage of seat belts from being considered as contributory or comparative negligence. While this statute does have significant implications as far as the admission of seat belt evidence is concerned, this fact is hardly unusual, given that substantive rules of law set forth by the Legislature very often have implications in this regard.
¶ 10. It is apparent that many states have enacted statutes similar to § 63-2-3, and federal courts have grappled with the related issue of whether such statutes constitute substantive rules of law or procedural rules of evidence for Erie purposes. In Barron v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd., 965 F.2d 195 (7th Cir.1992), the Seventh Circuit noted that:
Barron, 965 F.2d at 199-200. A similar holding should apply with regard to § 63-2-3. As long as § 63-2-3 is enforced as written and not given an overbroad application, then the statute is best considered to be a substantive statute rather than an improper evidentiary one.
¶ 11. This Court concludes...
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