Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co.

• Decision Date: 03 May 2012
• Docket Number: Docket No. WCB–11–352.
• Citation: 2012 ME 62,55 A.3d 411
• Parties: ESTATE OF Michael JOYCE v. COMMERCIAL WELDING CO. et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

55 A.3d 411

2012 ME 62

ESTATE OF Michael JOYCE ¹

v.COMMERCIAL WELDING CO. et al.

Docket No. WCB–11–352.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: Feb. 14, 2012.

Decided: May 3, 2012.

Cathy S. Roberts, Esq., Elizabeth K. Peck, Esq. (orally), Thompson & Bowie, LLP, Portland, on the briefs, for appellants Commercial Welding Co. and Esis, Inc.

James J. MacAdam, Esq., Nathan A. Jury, Esq., and David E. Hirtle, Esq. (orally), MacAdam Jury, P.A., Portland, on the briefs, for appellee Estate of Michael Joyce.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

JABAR, J.

[¶ 1] Commercial Welding Co. appeals from a decision of a Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer ( Collier, HO ) awarding the estate of Michael Joyce (Estate) benefits on a petition for an award of compensation pursuant to the Occupational Disease Law, 39–A M.R.S. §§ 601–615 (2011), and ordering benefits paid to Mary Joyce, widow of Michael, on a petition for death benefits pursuant to 39–A M.R.S. § 215 (2011).² Commercial Welding also challenges the hearing officer's determinations that (1) it had not cured a previously established violation of the “fourteen-day rule,” Me. W.C.B. Rule, ch. 1, § 1, because it had not paid interest on the required payment imposed for the violation, and (2) it was not permitted to offset the amount of the death benefits ordered to be paid to Mary Joyce by the amount of the payment for the fourteen-day rule violation. We disagree with the hearing officer's decision that interest was due on the required payment to the Estate, but we agree with the hearing officer's decision that the required payment cannot be used to offset the death benefits ordered to be paid to Mary. Accordingly, we vacate the hearing officer's decision in part and affirm in part.

I. FACTS

[¶ 2] Michael Joyce worked as a union laborer, longshoreman, and boilermaker from 1973 until 2004. He was frequently exposed to airborne asbestos fibers on the job, and rarely wore respiratory protection. His last documented exposure to airborne asbestos dust was in 1987 while working for Commercial Welding. See39–A M.R.S. § 606 (2011). He died of lung cancer on September 16, 2008.

[¶ 3] Before his death, Michael Joyce filed a petition for award and for payment of medical and related services pursuant to the Occupational Disease Law, 39–A M.R.S. § 601–615. After his death, Michael's widow, Mary Joyce, filed a petition for death benefits pursuant to 39–A M.R.S. §§ 215, 614(7)(C) (2011).³ Commercial Welding did not timely respond to Michael's petition for award, but did timely respond to Mary's petition for death benefits.

[¶ 4] The proceedings were bifurcated so that the hearing officer could first decide two threshold issues: (1) whether Michael had provided sufficient notice of the occupational disease claim pursuant to 39–A M.R.S. §§ 301, 607 (2011), and (2) whether the fourteen-day rule, Me. W.C.B. Rule, ch. 1, § 1, applies to a claim under the Occupational Disease Law.

[¶ 5] In a 2009 decree, the hearing officer determined that Michael had provided adequate notice of his claim for compensation, and that the fourteen-day rule applies to claims brought pursuant to the Occupational Disease Law.

[¶ 6] On September 30, 2009, Commercial Welding paid Michael's Estate $61,763.98 as a required payment for the fourteen-day rule violation, and filed a Memorandum of Payment and Notice of Controversy. This amount represented total compensation from October 1, 2007, the date of Michael's incapacity, through September 30, 2009, the date of payment. The payment did not include any amount for interest.

[¶ 7] At a second hearing, the hearing officer considered the merits of the petitions for award, for death benefits, and for medical payments. ⁴ He granted the petition for award entitling Michael's estate to benefits for total incapacity for the period from October 1, 2007, the date of Michael's incapacity, to September 16, 2008, the date of Michael's death. The hearing officer also granted Mary's petition for death benefits amounting to 500 weeks of total compensation.

[¶ 8] The hearing officer further determined that Commercial Welding had not cured the fourteen-day rule violation because it had not yet paid the 10% interest on the payment pursuant to 39–A M.R.S. § 205(6) (2011) and Me. W.C.B. Rule, ch. 8, § 7. Because Commercial Welding had not yet cured the fourteen-day rule violation, the hearing officer ordered Commercial Welding to pay to the Estate total compensation plus interest at 10% from October 1, 2007, to the date of the order, April 6, 2010, and continuing until Commercial Welding paid its full liability.

[¶ 9] Commercial Welding filed a motion for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the hearing officer responded by issuing additional findings and conclusions. He concluded that the employer may offset the amount of benefits it was ordered to pay to the Estate pursuant to the petition for award by the amount of the payment it made for its fourteen-day rule violation, but that the employer may not offset the amount of death benefits ordered to be paid to Mary pursuant to her petition for death benefits by the payment for the fourteen-day rule violation. The hearing officer reasoned that the fourteen-day rule violation occurred with respect to the petition for award filed by Michael, and that the claim for death benefits was a separate claim filed by Mary. The additional findings did not alter the original decision.

[¶ 10] Commercial Welding filed a petition for appellate review, which we granted pursuant to M.R.App. P. 23(c) and 39–A M.R.S. § 322(3) (2011).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 11] Determining whether interest must be paid on a payment for a fourteen-day rule violation involves interpretation of both statutory language and Board rules. “[W]e give deference to Board rules interpreting the Act and have encouraged the Board to enact rules to fill in the ‘gray areas' that were intentionally left in the Act.” Baker v. S.D. Warren Co., 2010 ME 87, ¶ 10, 3 A.3d 380;see also Doucette v. Hallsmith/Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 2011 ME 68, ¶ 11, 21 A.3d 99;Bridgeman v. S.D. Warren Co., 2005 ME 38, ¶ 11, 872 A.2d 961. However, the Court will defer to the Board only when there is no direct conflict between the Board rules and statutory language. Jasch v. The Anchorage Inn, 2002 ME 106, ¶ 10, 799 A.2d 1216.

[¶ 12] When construing a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, our purpose is to give effect to the legislative intent. Jordan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 651 A.2d 358, 360 (Me.1994). In so doing, we first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, and “construe that language to avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results.” Id. “If the statutory language is ambiguous, we then look beyond the plain meaning and examine other indicia of legislative intent, including its legislative history.” Id. A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations. Peters v. O'Leary, 2011 ME 106, ¶ 13, 30 A.3d 825. Decisions of the Board interpreting ambiguous provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act are ordinarily “entitled to great deference and will be upheld on appeal unless the statute plainly compels a different result.” Jordan, 651 A.2d at 360 (quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. “Fourteen–Day Rule” Violation

[¶ 13] The Maine Workers Compensation Board adopted Me. W.C.B. Rule, ch.l, § 1, requiring an employer who receives notice of a work-related injury to take certain steps within fourteen days.⁵ The employer must either accept the claim, pay without prejudice, or deny the claim. If the employer fails to comply by not exercising any of these three options, it must pay the employee an amount equal to total benefits from the date of incapacity to the date of the payment.

[¶ 14] This rule was promulgated to implement 39–A M.R.S. § 205 (2011), which was adopted in 1992 with the wholesale reenactment of the Workers' Compensation Act. P.L.1991, ch. 885, § A–8 (effective Jan. 1, 1993). Section 205 was preceded by the controversial “early pay system,” adopted in the 1980s, whereby the failure of an employer to file a notice of controversy within rigid statutory time frames created a “compensation payment scheme” in which the employer was deemed to have accepted the employee's claim of injury. See39 M.R.S. § 51–B (1989), repealed by P.L.1991, ch. 885, § A–7 (effective Jan. 1, 1993); see also Doucette, 2011 ME 68, ¶ 16, 21 A.3d 99. The purpose of the early pay system was to encourage informal acceptance of claims and reduce attorney involvement. L.D. 1322, Statement of Fact (111th Legis.1983). We interpreted section 51–B to preclude late-filing employers from disputing that the injury was work related, and to accept the claim at the level alleged by the employee. See Wentworth v. Manpower Temp. Servs., 589 A.2d 934, 938 (Me.1991); Stickles v. United Parcel Serv., 554 A.2d 1176, 1178–79 (Me.1989). The enactment of section 205 imposed a penalty for late payment, but did not preclude employers from disputing any aspect of the claim. See Doucette, 2011 ME 68, ¶ 17, 21 A.3d 99;see also39–A M.R.S. § 205.

[¶ 15] Section 205 requires that employers and insurers pay incapacity benefits “within 14 days after the employer has notice or knowledge of the injury,” and weekly thereafter. 39–A M.R.S. § 205(2). The statute also imposes daily penalties for failure to make timely payments of weekly compensation benefits, not to exceed $1500, and for late payments of compensation pursuant to an award, the statute imposes interest. Id. § 205(3), (6).

[¶ 16] The hearing officer in this case determined that interest is owed on a payment for a fourteen-day rule violation pursuant to 39–A M.R.S. § 205(6), ⁶ which provides:

When weekly compensation is paid pursuant to an award, interest on the compensationmust be paid at the rate of 10% per annum from the date each payment was due, until paid.

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