Pub. Interest Legal Found. v. Bellows
| Decision Date | 28 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-00061-GZS |
| Parties | PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. SHENNA BELLOWS, in her official capacity as the Secretary of State for the State of Maine, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court are Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Public Interest Legal Foundation Inc. (ECF No. 74) and Defendant Shenna Bellows (ECF No. 81).[1] Having considered the Motions and the related filings (ECF Nos. 73, 77-79 84-86), the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion (ECF No. 74) and DENIES Defendant's Motion (ECF No. 81) for the reasons stated herein.
A party is entitled to summary judgment if it appears, based on the record before the Court, “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A dispute is ‘genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party, and a fact is ‘material' if it has the potential of affecting the outcome of the case.” Taite v. Bridgewater State Univ., Bd. of Trs., 999 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence that supports the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
Once the moving party has made this preliminary showing, the nonmoving party must “produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy issue.” Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999) (cleaned up); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). “That evidence, however, cannot ‘rely on improbable inferences, conclusory allegations, or rank speculation.'” Snell v. Neville, 998 F.3d 474, 486 (1st Cir. 2021) (alterations in original omitted) (quoting Enica v. Principi, 544 F.3d 328, 336 (1st Cir. 2008)). “As to any essential factual element of its claim on which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment for the moving party.” In re Ralar Distribs., Inc., 4 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 1993). “However, summary judgment is improper when the record is sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to resolve a material factual dispute in favor of either side.” Morales-Melecio v. United States (Dep't of Health and Hum. Servs.), 890 F.3d 361, 368 (1st Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). “When determining if a genuine dispute of material fact exists, [courts] look to all of the record materials on file, including the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits without evaluating the credibility of witnesses or weighing the evidence.” Taite, 999 F.3d at 93 (cleaned up). The existence of cross-motions for summary judgment does not change the standard for construing the undisputed facts. Rather, the Court is required to “view each motion separately and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the respective non-moving party.” Roman Catholic Bishop v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2013).
District of Maine Local Rule 56 prescribes a detailed process by which the parties are to present to the Court the “material facts . . . as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue.” D. Me. Loc. R. 56(b). This local rule requires each statement of material fact to be “followed by a citation to the specific page or paragraph of identified record material supporting the assertion.” D. Me. Loc. R. 56(f). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must then file an opposing statement in which it admits, denies, or qualifies the moving party's statements, with citations to supporting evidence, and in which it may set forth additional facts, again with citations to supporting evidence. See D. Me. Loc. R. 56(c). In constructing the narrative of undisputed facts for purposes of summary judgment, the Court deems any statement with a supporting record citation admitted but “may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly considered on summary judgment.” D. Me. Loc. R. 56(f).
Plaintiff, the Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “PILF”), “is a 501(c)(3) non-partisan, public interest organization” that “seeks to promote the integrity of elections nationwide through research, education, remedial programs, and litigation.” ( ) It uses “records and data complied through [federal and state] open records laws” to: “analyze[] the programs and activities of state and local election officials in order to determine whether lawful efforts are being made to keep voter rolls current and accurate”; and “produce and disseminate reports, articles, blog and social media posts, and newsletters in order to advance the public education aspect of its organizational mission.” (Id.)[3] Defendant Shenna Bellows, the Secretary of State for the State of Maine (“Defendant” or the “Secretary”), “is Maine's chief election official and ‘the coordinator of state responsibilities under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993.'” (Joint Stipulation of Material Facts (ECF No. 73) (“JSMF”), Page ID # 631 (citing 21-A M.R.S.A. § 180).)
“For many years, Congress left it up to the States to maintain accurate lists of those eligible to vote in federal elections, but in 1993, with the enactment of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), Congress intervened.” Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S.Ct. 1833, 1838 (2018). “The NVRA ‘erect[s] a complex superstructure of federal regulation atop state voter-registration systems.'” Id. (quoting Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 5 (2013)). It requires states to, inter alia:
maintain for at least 2 years and [] make available for public inspection and, where available, photocopying at a reasonable cost, all records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters, except to the extent that such records relate to a declination to register to vote or to the identity of a voter registration agency through which any particular voter is registered.
52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)(1) (hereafter, the “Public Disclosure Provision”).
Since 2007, Maine has maintained a computerized voter registration system that contains “the name and registration information of every legally registered voter in the State.” ( ) Under Maine law, “information contained electronically in the central voter registration system and any information or reports generated by the system are confidential and may be accessed only by municipal and state election officials for the purposes of election and voter registration administration,” along with certain other individuals or entities for delineated purposes. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 196-A(1).
On October 17, 2019, PILF sent a letter to the Secretary requesting an electronic copy of Maine's “statewide voter registration list” (the “Voter File”)[4] pursuant to the Public Disclosure Provision. (ECF No. 55-1; see JSMF, Page ID #s 630-31.)[5] The Voter File is stored in Maine's central voter registration system. (Pl. Resp. SMF, PageID # 881); see 21-A M.R.S.A. § 196-A(1)(B). PILF acknowledged in its letter that it did not meet any of Maine's statutory criteria then in effect for access to the Voter File. (See ECF No. 55-1); see also 21-A M.R.S.A. § 196-A(1) (Supp. 2021) (“Access to data from the central voter registration system”), amended by P.L. 2021 ch. 310, §§ 1-2 (eff Oct. 18, 2021). PILF also claimed that Maine's denial of access to the Voter File violated the Public Disclosure Provision. (See ECF No. 55-1.) After further communications with PILF, the Secretary ultimately concluded in early February 2020 that she did not have authority to release the Voter File to PILF. (See generally ECF Nos. 55-2-55-7; see also JSMF, PageID #s 630-31.) On February 19, 2020, PILF filed suit against the Secretary seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the NVRA. (ECF No. 1.)
In June 2021, the Governor of Maine signed into law a new exception to the general confidentiality regime prohibiting disclosure of the Voter File (“Exception J”). See P.L. 2021, ch. 310 § 2. Under Exception J, an “individual or organization that is evaluating Maine's compliance with its voter list maintenance obligations may . . . purchase” the Voter File. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 196-A(1)(J). The amended statute also provides for privacy protections that limit the use and dissemination of voters' data. Specifically, anyone obtaining the Voter File under Exception J is forbidden to:
Id. Under the amended statute, a violation of Exception J is “a civil violation for which a fine of not more than $1,000 may be adjudged.” Id. § 196-A(5).[6]“[E]ach voter's information” that is publicly shared in violation of Exception J ...
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