Estate of Kasuba

• Decision Date: 24 October 1977
• Docket Number: No. 17,17
• Parties: Estate of Rose KASUBA, M. I. STATE of Michigan, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, REVENUE DIVISION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dolores RICKLE, Guardian, Defendant-Appellant. 401 Mich. 560, 258 N.W.2d 731
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 731

258 N.W.2d 731

Estate of Rose KASUBA, M. I. STATE of Michigan, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, REVENUE DIVISION Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dolores RICKLE, Guardian, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17.

401 Mich. 560, 258 N.W.2d 731

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 24, 1977.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Richard R. Roesch, Charles E. Liken, Asst. Attys. Gen., for plaintiff-appellee.

Radka & Lewis, Rogers City, for defendant-appellant; Arthur J. Tarnow, Detroit, of Counsel.

RYAN, Justice.

Appellant Delores Rickle, as guardian of Rose Kasuba, appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the Presque Isle County Circuit Court's affirmance of an order of the Probate Court granting rehearing on certain claims asserted by the State of Michigan.

Rose Kasuba was declared mentally incompetent by the Presque Isle County Probate Court on February 12, 1952. Her husband was appointed guardian and ordered to fully reimburse the state for her care. The required reimbursement was subsequently reduced to 10% of the cost of care. Mrs. Kasuba was released from the hospital in April, 1957 and was readmitted on June 30, 1960 as a public patient.

Mr. Kasuba died on September 23, 1965 and Rose Kasuba became possessed of her survivor's interest in a home in Presque Isle County and 80 acres in Otsego County.

Delores Rickle, appellant in this case, was appointed guardian in 1968. On June 27, 1971, Mrs. Rickle filed a petition to sell real estate and an order for hearing on claims was set for October 6, 1971. The Revenue Division of the Treasury Department of the State of Michigan filed a claim for reimbursement for the aforementioned care in the amount of $40,423.75. A hearing on the claim was scheduled and adjourned to December 1, 1971. On that date a hearing was held at which plaintiff and defendant appeared. The hearing resulted in an order allowing the state's claim. Copies of the order were mailed to the parties on June 20, 1972.

On July 3, 1972, the state filed a petition for an order to show cause why the guardian should not be removed for failure to sell the property and pay the claim, and on August 9, 1972 it filed an additional petition requesting reimbursement from Mrs. Kasuba's children. On October 12, 1972 the guardian filed a petition for rehearing. On October 19, 1972 the Presque Isle County Probate Court dismissed the state's petitions for removal of the guardian and reimbursement from Mrs. Kasuba's children, and granted a rehearing.

The decision of the Probate Court was affirmed in the Presque Isle County Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that "regardless of whether one counts from December 1, 1971, the date on which the order was filed, or June 20, 1972, the date on which copies of the orders were mailed to the parties, more than 90 days had elapsed, with the result that the probate court lost jurisdiction." In re Kasuba Estate, 65 Mich.App. 25, 28, 236 N.W.2d 751, 752 (1975).

We granted leave to appeal limited to the issue of the constitutionality of the three month limitations period on the power of probate courts to grant rehearings contained in M.C.L.A. § 701.19(6); M.S.A. § 27.3178(19)(6) and the said statute as currently in effect. ¹ 397 Mich. 812 (1976).

We hold that the legislative limitation on the jurisdiction of the probate court to grant rehearings violates neither the Michigan Constitution nor the United States Constitution.

I

Appellant first contends that under Const.1963, art. 6, § 5, which grants to the Supreme Court the power to make rules governing practice and procedure in the courts of the state, the statutory limitation period must give way to General Court Rule provisions, GCR 1963, 701 et seq., for seeking relief from an order of the probate court. See GCR 1963, 16; Perin v. Peuler (On Rehearing), 373 Mich. 531, 130 N.W.2d 4 (1964). Specifically, the argument is that obedience to the limitation language of the statute in question means that in some instances a circuit court would be unable to remand a case to probate court for further proceedings and, therefore, GCR 701.10 ² could not have been followed even where the circuit court determined that the interests of justice required a remand, thus resulting in impermissible legislative invasion of a solely judicial prerogative. Assuming, without deciding, that a case could not be remanded to probate court after three months had passed from the date of the order appealed from, we believe the argument is without merit.

Const.1963, art. 6, § 15 provides in pertinent part:

"The jurisdiction, powers and duties of the probate court and of the judges thereof shall be provided by law." (Emphasis added.)

We have said in considering the three month limitation upon the authority of a probate court to modify and set aside orders and to grant rehearings passed under a similar grant of power to the Legislature in Const.1908, art. 7, § 13, that the jurisdiction of the probate courts is defined entirely by statute and that action by a probate judge beyond the three month period is void for want of jurisdiction. In re Dowling's Estate, 308 Mich. 129, 13 N.W.2d 233 (1944); Smolenski v. Kent Probate Judge, 301 Mich. 8, 2 N.W.2d 900 (1942). See also In re Cummings Estate, 355 Mich. 210, 93 N.W.2d 881 (1959). The constitution provides for statutory definition of the jurisdiction of probate courts and our power to make rules of practice and procedure cannot be used to expand that jurisdiction without legislative consent.

II

M.C.L.A. § 701.19(6); M.S.A. § 27.3178(19)(6) is also attacked for providing a limitation period so short that Mrs. Kasuba has effectively been deprived of property without due process of law. We cannot agree.

It is well established that due process is primarily concerned with providing the opportunity for a full and fair trial on the merits. Ridenour v. County of Bay, 366 Mich. 225, 114 N.W.2d 172 (1962). Where an ample hearing is afforded, due process does not require a state to provide a rehearing of the same matter or a new trial, Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421, 14 S.Ct. 1114, 38 L.Ed. 1031 (1894); James v. Appel, 192 U.S. 129, 24 S.Ct. 222, 48 L.Ed. 377 (1904), or even an appellate review, United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 96 S.Ct. 2086, 48 L.Ed.2d 666 (1976); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 S.Ct. 913, 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894); J. F. Hartz Co. v. Lukaszcewski, 200 Mich. 230, 167 N.W. 18 (1918); Messenger v. Teagan, 106 Mich. 654, 64 N.W. 499 (1895). ³

In the case at bar, a hearing was held in the probate court after the guardian filed notice of contest to the state's claim. There is no claim regarding the adequacy of that hearing. A rehearing could have been applied for. Appeal of the order was available to the circuit court which was empowered to make any order or render any judgment that should have been made or rendered in the probate court or grant any other relief required by justice, and none was taken. GCR 1963, 701.10.

Our cases holding that limitations periods must afford a reasonable time within which a suit must be brought are of no avail to appellant. See Dyke v. Richard, 390 Mich. 739, 213 N.W.2d 185 (1973); Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318 (1865). They are concerned with limitations on an original cause of action. The grant of jurisdiction to the probate court to order rehearings within a limit of three months does not cut off the right to any hearing on a claim. Appellant does not call attention to any case of this Court finding a limitation period on the right to rehearing as being unreasonable. Appellant has not been deprived of property without due process of law.

III

Appellant contends finally that the challenged statutory provision deals arbitrarily with a mentally ill person subject to the jurisdiction of the probate court in violation of the equal protection provision of the state and Federal constitutions, because the three month limitation on rehearings applicable to the incompetent is not applicable to others before our courts. ⁴ It is argued that if the state or any other party had a claim against Mrs. Kasuba and were she not incompetent, the circuit court would have had jurisdiction to determine the claim and, pursuant to GCR 1963, 528, ⁵ could have granted relief from the judgment during a period in excess of three months.

With exceptions not pertinent here, one of two standards is generally applied in scrutinizing legislation to determine whether it creates impermissible classifications. Where the legislative classification discriminates against a "suspect" class or impinges on a "fundamental" right, courts will examine it with "strict scrutiny" to identify some compelling state interest justifying the classification. If neither a suspect class nor fundamental rights are involved, the classification will be upheld if it rationally furthers the object of the legislation. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Manistee Bank v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975). Under this second test, a legislative classification will only be found invalid where persons are treated differently on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective of the statute. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971).

The classification to which the three month limitation on rehearings is applicable embraces all persons interested in all matters within the jurisdiction of the probate court except juvenile orders. ⁶ The Legislature has given the probate court jurisdiction over a variety of matters including decedents' estates, trusts, minors' estates and incompetents' estates. In limiting rehearings to three months, with the exception noted, it treats all such matters equally.

We would also point out that the provision may work to...