Estate of Kelley v. Moguls, Inc.
Decision Date | 27 August 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 92-529,92-529 |
Citation | 160 Vt. 531,632 A.2d 360 |
Parties | ESTATE OF Dean C. KELLEY v. MOGULS, INC. |
Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
John J. Welch, Jr., Rutland, for plaintiff-appellant.
Allan R. Keyes, Ryan Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland, for defendant-appellee.
Before ALLEN, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.
The question certified to this Court pursuant to V.R.A.P. 5(a) is whether a licensed vendor of alcoholic beverages may be liable for injuries to and the death of an imbiber resulting from the imbiber's driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated. This liability would arise from the vendor's negligence in serving alcohol to someone who reasonably appeared to be under the influence of alcohol and who the vendor knew, or should have known, would soon be operating an automobile. We hold that the vendor may be liable under the facts alleged.
Plaintiff, the imbiber's estate, concedes that the Dram Shop Act, 7 V.S.A. § 501, does not provide a remedy under the facts alleged. See Langle v. Kurkul, 146 Vt. 513, 516, 510 A.2d 1301, 1303 (1986) ( ). Plaintiff, however, contends that a common-law cause of action exists that would permit recovery.
The Dram Shop Act preempts those common-law negligence actions that come within its scope. Winney v. Ransom & Hastings, Inc., 149 Vt. 213, 215-16, 542 A.2d 269, 270 (1988). Defendant argues that plaintiff's claim is among the actions preempted, and that the specific language of recent amendments evidences legislative intent to allow a common-law remedy only against social hosts, not licensed vendors. We disagree.
In Langle, we held that a social host has a duty of care only in situations in which the host furnishes alcoholic beverages to someone visibly intoxicated and "it is foreseeable to the host that the guest will thereafter drive an automobile, or, where the social host furnishes alcoholic beverages to a minor." 146 Vt. at 521, 510 A.2d at 1306. In the legislative session following Langle, the Act was extensively revised, including the adoption of subsection (g):
Nothing in this section shall create a statutory cause of action against a social host for furnishing intoxicating liquor to any person without compensation or profit, if the social host is not a licensee or required to be a licensee under this title. However, this subsection shall not be construed to limit or otherwise affect the liability of a social host for negligence at common law.
7 V.S.A. § 501(g). Defendant argues that this language implicitly forecloses all other common-law causes of action for furnishing intoxicating liquor because it explicitly preserves a common-law cause of action against a social host.
As a general rule, we look to the plain language of the statute to determine the intent of the Legislature. Furthermore "rules of the common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication, nor overturned except by clear and unambiguous language." E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co. v. City of Burlington, 106 Vt. 446, 464, 175 A. 35, 44 (1934). Because 7 V.S.A. § 501 does not expressly foreclose a common-law cause of action, we cannot conclude that the Legislature intended to preempt such an action.
The legislative history of the 1987 amendments supports the view that there was no intent to preempt common-law remedies available to those not covered by the Act. Originally, the Senate and House bills called for the amended act to be "the exclusive remedy against a defendant for claims for those suffering damages based on the defendant's furnishing of alcoholic beverages," and to abolish "any common law action against a person who sells or furnishes intoxicating liquor." House Jour. 778 (May 8, 1987, Vt., Bien.Sess.). This language was eliminated from the amendments as finally enacted. Therefore, we conclude that the Legislature considered and rejected an expansion of the Dram Shop Act to preempt all common-law negligence actions for those suffering damages based on the furnishing or selling of alcoholic beverages. The evident intent of 7 V.S.A. § 501(g) was to prevent recovery in strict liability against a social host under the Act's other provisions, but not to bar recovery in negligence. Defendant's suggestion that the amendments carved a lone exception to permit negligence actions against social hosts would make sense had the above language been enacted. Absent such language, we cannot limit common-law remedies. We hold that a licensed vendor may be liable in negligence in addition to remedies provided under the Dram Shop Act.
We turn next to the question of whether an imbiber has a cause of action against a licensed vendor. This depends on the existence of a legally cognizable duty, " 'an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.' " Smith v. Day, 148 Vt. 595, 597, 538 A.2d 157, 158 (1987) (quoting W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 53, at 356 (5th ed. 1984)). In Langle, we declined to impose liability against a social host for injuries received by a guest because we could not find that a legal duty of care existed. 146 Vt. at 517-21, 510 A.2d at 1303-06. The complaint in that case alleged that the defendant negligently and unlawfully served the plaintiff intoxicating liquor, that the plaintiff became intoxicated, and that as a proximate result of that intoxication the plaintiff was injured. The certified question before us differs in one important respect: here the imbiber was intoxicated when served.
A duty may be established by safety statutes and regulations if they are intended, exclusively or in part,
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965). See, e.g., Rule v. Johnson, 104 Vt. 486, 490, 162 A. 383, 385 (1932) ( ); Porter Screen Mfg. Co. v. Central Vermont Ry., 92 Vt. 1, 8, 102 A. 44, 47 (1917) ( ).
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