State v. Pollander

• Decision Date: 05 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-387,96-387
• Citation: 706 A.2d 1359,167 Vt. 301
• Parties: STATE of Vermont v. Robert POLLANDER.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 1359

706 A.2d 1359

167 Vt. 301

STATE of Vermont v. Robert POLLANDER.

No. 96-387.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Dec. 5, 1997.

Lee Dow, Lamoille County Deputy State's Attorney, Hyde Park, for plaintiff-appellee.

David G. Miller of Brown, Cahill, Gawne & Miller, St. Albans, for defendant-appellant.

Before AMESTOY, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.

AMESTOY, Chief Justice.

Defendant Robert Pollander appeals the Lamoille District Court's denial of his motion to dismiss in a civil license-suspension proceeding, and challenges adverse findings by the court. Defendant argues that (1) the issue of his blood-alcohol content (BAC) on the night of his arrest was resolved in his favor by an earlier criminal jury verdict and was thus precluded from reconsideration at the civil suspension hearing; and (2) the district court erred by failing to consider defendant's necessity defense. We affirm.

Defendant was stopped by a law enforcement officer while driving in Morristown in August 1995 and processed for driving under the influence (DUI). Test results revealed defendant's BAC to be over the legal limit of .08%. Defendant was subsequently arraigned on criminal DUI charges. The State also moved to suspend defendant's driver's license in a civil action pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 1205(a). Defendant requested a civil suspension hearing in district court. See 23 V.S.A. § 1205(f).

In response to various motions filed by defendant, the district court continued the civil suspension proceeding until after the criminal DUI trial was held in July 1996. At the criminal trial, defendant attacked the validity of the State's evidence concerning his BAC and presented the affirmative defense of necessity. As a basis for his necessity defense, defendant stated that he was driving in his car to intervene in a friend's potential suicide and that any alleged violation of the DUI statute was necessary to save a human life. ¹ The jury returned a general verdict of not guilty. It did not identify the grounds upon which the verdict rested.

The civil suspension hearing was held in August 1996. Central to the State's case was evidence that defendant's BAC was .08% or more on the night of his arrest. Defendant argued that the State should have been precluded from relitigating the issue of his BAC because that issue had been resolved in his favor at the criminal trial. Defendant also sought to introduce his defense of necessity. The court ruled that the State should not be precluded from relitigating the BAC issue and denied defendant's request to introduce the necessity defense. The court made the findings required under the civil suspension statute, see id. § 1205(h), and entered judgment for the State. Defendant appeals.

I.

Defendant first argues that the criminal trial verdict precludes the State from relitigating at the civil suspension hearing whether defendant's BAC was .08% or more on the night of his arrest. ² Defendant contends that his acquittal at the criminal trial establishes a jury finding that his BAC was not .08% or more, and therefore, the issue of defendant's BAC should not have been considered at the summary suspension hearing.

We note initially that the applicability of collateral estoppel to a given set of facts is a question of law. See, e.g., Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 571, 71 S.Ct. 408, 415, 95 L.Ed. 534 (1951). We thus review de novo the district court's decision on this matter. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "bars a party from relitigating an issue decided in a previous action." In re J.R., 164 Vt. 267, 269, 668 A.2d 670, 673 (1995). Before precluding relitigation of an issue, a court must "examine the first action and the treatment the issue received in it." J. Cound, et al., Civil Procedure 1228 (6th ed.1993). This Court looks to the five elements set forth in Trepanier v. Getting Organized, Inc., 155 Vt. 259, 265, 583 A.2d 583, 587 (1990), and finds issue preclusion when:

(1) preclusion is asserted against one who was a party or in privity with a party in the earlier action; (2) the issue was resolved by a final judgment on the merits; (3) the issue is the same as the one raised in the later action; (4) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action; and (5) applying preclusion in the later action is fair.

See also Berlin Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Stoneman, 159 Vt. 53, 56, 615 A.2d 141, 144 (1992) (applying Trepanier elements). For purposes of analysis, we can assume that the first, third, and fourth Trepanier factors are satisfied: the State was a party to both actions, defendant's BAC was an issue in both proceedings, and there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the BAC issue in the earlier criminal trial. Defendant has not established, however, that the second and fifth Trepanier factors have been satisfied.

The second Trepanier factor requires that the issue be "resolved by a final judgment on the merits" in the earlier proceeding. 155 Vt. at 265, 583 A.2d at 587. A related precept is that preclusion apply only to "issues necessarily and essentially determined in a prior action." Berisha v. Hardy, 144 Vt. 136, 138, 474 A.2d 90, 91 (1984); see also American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 152 Vt. 363, 369, 566 A.2d 1323, 1327 (1989) (issue preclusion appropriate only "where that issue was necessary to the resolution of the [previous] action").

A party seeking preclusion has the burden of introducing " 'a sufficient record of the prior proceeding to enable the trial court to pinpoint the exact issues previously litigated.' " Ianelli v. Standish, 156 Vt. 386, 388, 592 A.2d 901, 902 (1991) (quoting United States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765, 769 (9th Cir.1979)). In Ianelli, this Court upheld the trial court's decision to deny preclusion because the party seeking preclusion had failed to show that the relevant issue was necessary to the earlier jury verdict. Id.; see also Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350, 110 S.Ct. 668, 673, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990) (where party seeks to preclude relitigation of issue based on previous general verdict acquittal, court must examine record of prior proceeding to determine if rational jury could have grounded its verdict on issue other than that which party seeks to foreclose from consideration). It is not sufficient for a party to assert that an issue could have been the basis of a prior judgment. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments explains: "If a judgment of a court of first instance is based on determinations of two issues, either of which standing independently would be sufficient to support the result, the judgment is not conclusive with respect to either issue standing alone." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. i (1982). Applying the rule in Ianelli to this case, we find that defendant has not satisfied his burden.

In the criminal trial, defendant attacked the State's evidence that he drove while his BAC was .08% or more. Defendant also presented the affirmative defense of necessity based on his friend's alleged suicide attempt. Accordingly, the trial judge instructed the jury that a not guilty verdict would follow from either of two jury findings: either (1) that defendant's BAC was under the legal limit; or (2) that, regardless of defendant's BAC, there was a need that defendant drive to his friend's house the night of the arrest. Thus the jury could rationally acquit defendant without reaching a conclusion on his BAC.

The jury at defendant's criminal DUI trial returned a general verdict of not guilty, but did not specify the grounds upon which the verdict stood. Because defendant has not established that determination of his BAC was necessary and essential to the criminal verdict, as required under the second Trepanier factor, the trial court was correct to allow relitigation of the BAC issue at the civil suspension proceeding.

Defendant has also failed to satisfy the fifth element, which requires that "applying preclusion in the later action is fair." Trepanier, 155 Vt. at 265, 583 A.2d at 587. Relevant considerations for applying this part of the test include "the legal standards and burdens employed in each action." Id.; see also In re J.R., 164 Vt. at 269, 668 A.2d at 673 (1995) (important factor to consider in issue preclusion is degree of proof required in each action).

Defendant contends that this is a case of "crossover estoppel" where application of issue preclusion is appropriate because the State had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of defendant's BAC in the earlier criminal trial. Crossover estoppel occurs where an issue adjudicated in a civil proceeding is claimed to be precluded in subsequent criminal proceeding. State v. Stearns, 159 Vt. 266, 268, 617 A.2d 140, 141 (1992). We have noted that although cases of crossover estoppel are relatively rare, there is no barrier to the application of the doctrine as long as the standards of proof are the same and no right of jury trial is attached. Id.

Here, defendant argues that the State's failure at the criminal trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his BAC was .08% or more precludes the State, at the suspension hearing, from proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's BAC was above the legal limit. See 23 V.S.A. § 1205(i) (State has burden of proof by preponderance of evidence at civil suspension hearing). Defendant ignores that what cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt may still be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. VanDusen, 166 Vt. 240, ----, 691 A.2d 1053, 1055 (1997) (it is not inconsistent that State could not prove issue at criminal trial under beyond-reasonable-doubt standard but could at sentencing hearing governed by preponderance-of-evidence standard); Donley v. Donley, 165 Vt. 619, 620, 686 A.2d 943, 945-46 (1996) (acquittal of domestic assault charges under beyond-reasonable-doubt standard does not preclude court,...