Estate of Kim v. Coxe
| Decision Date | 22 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. S–14077.,S–14077. |
| Citation | 295 P.3d 380 |
| Parties | ESTATE OF Simone Young KIM, by its Personal Representative, Serena ALEXANDER, Chu Cha Kim, and Ambrosus H. Kim, Appellants, v. Ray COXE, d/b/a Rayco Sales, and Jason Coday, Appellees, and United States Of America, Intervenor–Appellee. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mark Choate, Choate Law Firm L.L.C., Juneau, and Jonathan E. Lowy and Daniel R. Vice, Brady Center To Prevent Gun Violence, Washington D.C., for Appellants.
Anthony M. Sholty and Lael A. Harrison, Faulkner Banfield, P.C., Juneau, for Appellee Coxe.
No appearance by Appellee Coday.
Richard Pomeroy, Assistant United States Attorney, and Karen Loeffler, United States Attorney, Anchorage, and Benjamin S. Kingsley, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, and Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Washington D.C., for Intervenor–Appellee United States of America.
Before: CARPENETI, Chief Justice, FABE, WINFREE, and STOWERS, Justices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Jason Coday shot and killed Simone Kim with a rifle obtained from Ray Coxe's gun store. Kim's Estate (the Estate) brought a wrongful death action against Coxe, alleging that Coxe negligently or illegally provided Coday the rifle. Coxe defended in part by asserting immunity under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act 1 (PLCAA). The Estate argued against applying the PLCAA and alternatively that it was unconstitutional. The superior court ruled that the PLCAA was constitutional and, interpreting and applying the PLCAA's immunity provisions to the facts of this case, granted summary judgment dismissing the Estate's claims against Coxe. The Estate appeals.
We affirm the superior court's ruling that the PLCAA is constitutional and its interpretation of the PLCAA, but because it is unclear whether certain evidence before the superior court actually was or should have been considered when granting summary judgment dismissing the Estate's claims, we vacate the summary judgment ruling and remand for further consideration.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGSA. Facts
Rayco Sales is a licensed gun shop in Juneau owned and operated by Ray Coxe. On an August 2006 afternoon, Jason Coday entered Rayco. Present in Rayco were Coxe, Rayco employee Bill Driver, and Rayco customer Stan Bickham.
Coxe thought Coday looked like he was “living in the woods or had just got off the ferry” because he had on a backpack and had a sleeping bag in a plastic bag tied around his waist. Coxe, Driver, and Bickham all testified that they did not notice any appearances or behavior indicating danger, drug use, or potential for violence.
Coday asked Driver if Rayco stocked Ruger 10/22 rifles. Coday then asked Bickham about differences between several .22 rifles. Coday told Bickham he was going to do some target shooting, and was wondering about the various rifles' accuracy and prices.
Coday then approached Coxe and asked to look at .22 rifles. Fearing Coday's backpack might knock over merchandise, Coxe asked Coday to remove it. Coday complied and the two went behind the sales counter, where Coxe explained the differences between several .22 rifles. Coday seemed most interested in a Ruger 10/22, and Coxe showed Coday a used rifle priced at $195. After discussing the rifles and prices, Coday indicated he would have to think about a purchase. He went back to the public side of the sales counter and put his backpack on. Thinking Coday was leaving, Coxe went to the back of the store to attend other matters.
Driver later noticed a rifle missing and two $100 bills on the counter. Driver asked Coxe if he had sold Coday the rifle. Coxe verified the rifle was missing and then drove his truck around the neighboring area in an unsuccessful attempt to find Coday. At some point either Coxe or an employee called the Juneau Police Department. Coxe reported the rifle stolen, and on the advice of a police officer, deposited the $200 in the bank as a sale. Rayco had two videotape surveillance systems, but neither captured any footage of the day's events.
Two days later Coday shot and killed Simone Kim with the rifle.
B. Proceedings
In 2008 the Estate brought a wrongful death action against Coxe and Coday. Coday did not appear and default was entered against him.
The Estate contended that Coxe had illegally or negligently provided Coday the firearm. Coxe moved for summary judgment based on the PLCAA, which prohibits certain civil actions for damages against a manufacturer or seller of a firearm in connection with a third party's criminal or unlawful misuse of the firearm. 2 The Estate opposed the motion, arguing the PLCAA did not apply, but that if it did, it was unconstitutional. The Estate first argued the PLCAA did not immunize gun dealers from their own negligent acts. The Estate also argued there were disputes of material fact relevant to claims excepted from the PLCAA—negligent entrustment, negligence per se, and knowing violations of laws “applicable to the sale or marketing of [firearms].” 3 On the constitutional issues, the Estate argued the PLCAA violated the Tenth Amendment, separation of powers, due process, and equal protection.
After oral argument the superior court granted Coxe's motion for summary judgment. The Estate appeals the superior court's ruling on the PLCAA's constitutionality and construction, as well as the grant of summary judgment to Coxe based on the PLCAA. The United States intervened to defend the PLCAA's constitutionality, but takes no position on PLCAA interpretations or its application to this case.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying our independent judgment.4 We also review issues of constitutionalinterpretation de novo, applying our independent judgment,5 and similarly apply our independent judgment to the interpretation of federal statutes.6
IV. DISCUSSIONA. The PLCAA Bars Negligence Actions Not Falling Under An Enumerated Exception.
The Estate assigns error to the superior court's interpretation of the PLCAA as barring general negligence actions. The Estate argues that the PLCAA provides immunity only in cases where the harm is caused solely by others, relying primarily on the codified Congressional findings and purposes. 7 Coxe responds that the superior court correctly interpreted the PLCAA, consistent with the substantive provisions' plain meaning.
The PLCAA's substantive portion, 15 U.S.C. § 7902, titled “Prohibition on bringing of qualified civil liability actions in Federal or State court,” provides that: “A qualified civil liability action may not be brought in any Federal or State court.” 8 “Qualified civil liability action” is defined as “a civil action ... brought by any person against a ... seller of a [firearm] ... for damages ... resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a [firearm] by the person or a third party.” 9 The definition excludes from “qualified civil liability action” those actions based on negligence per se, negligent entrustment, and knowing violations of state or federal statutes related to firearms.10
A plain reading of this text supports a prohibition on general negligence actions—including negligence with concurrent causation. The statutory exceptions do not include general negligence, and reading a general negligence exception into the statute would make the negligence per se and negligent entrustment exceptions a surplusage.
The Estate argues the term “resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse” in § 7903(5)(A) must be read in light of Congressional findings and purposes codified at § 7901, which provides: “Congress finds ... [t]he possibility of imposing liability on an entire industry for harm that is solely caused by others is an abuse of the legal system” 11 and “[t]he purposes of this chapter are ... [t]o prohibit causes of action against ... dealers ... of firearms ... for the harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of firearm products ... by others when the product functioned as designed and intended.” 12
When interpreting statutes, “we must, whenever possible, interpret each part or section of a statute with every other part or section, so as to create a harmonious whole.” 13 We presume that Congress “intended every word, sentence, or provision of a statute to have some purpose, force, and effect, and that no words or provisions are superfluous.” 14 However a statutory preamble “can neither restrain nor extend the meaning of an unambiguous statute; nor can it be used to create doubt or uncertainty which does not otherwise exist.” 15 The Estate'sconstruction would elevate the PLCAA's preamble over the substantive portion's clear language.
In interpreting a statute, we do “not stop with the plain meaning of the text ... ‘even if a statute is facially unambiguous.’ ” 16 Rather, we apply “a sliding scale approach, where ‘[t]he plainer the statutory language is, the more convincing the evidence of contrary legislative purpose or intent must be.’ ” 17 The Estate points out portions of the PLCAA's legislative history supporting its interpretation. For example, Senator Craig, the PLCAA's sponsor, stated: “If manufacturers or dealers break the law or commit negligence, they are still liable.” 18 Coxe points out portions of the legislative history supporting his position. For example, Senator Reed stated: 19 Additionally, as another court has noted, a PLCAA amendment creating a simple negligence exception was offered but failed to pass.20
This history does not indicate a strong legislative intent in favor of either construction. Even if legislative history is “somewhat contrary” to the plain meaning of a statute, plain meaning still controls.21 The PLCAA's legislative history is not “somewhat contrary”; it is indeterminate, and it does not control the statute's interpretation.
The Estate also notes that, in contrast to the final version, a prior version of the...
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