Estate of King, Matter of

• Decision Date: 26 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. 69075,69075
• Citation: 837 P.2d 463,1990 OK 138
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Robert D. (Bunk) KING, Deceased. J.D. CASEY, Appellant, v. Jimmy Ray SELF, Appellee.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 463

837 P.2d 463

1990 OK 138

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Robert D. (Bunk) KING, Deceased.

J.D. CASEY, Appellant, v. Jimmy Ray SELF, Appellee.

No. 69075.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Dec. 26, 1990.

As Corrected Jan. 11, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 10, 1992.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Division No. 3

Action by child born out of wedlock for determination of heirship pursuant to Okla.Stat. tit. 84, § 215. Trial court held paternity was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. Court of Appeals held section 215 to be unconstitutional under fourteenth amendment. Title 84, section 215 does not violate the fourteenth amendment. A child born out of wedlock claiming under section 215 must prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED. COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION WITHDRAWN AND VACATED. TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED.

Jonathan K. Sullivan, Poteau, for appellant.

John N. Henderson, Stigler, for appellee.

HODGES, Justice.

The issues presented are (1) the constitutionality of Okla.Stat. tit. 84, § 215 (1981), ¹ which provides for the inheritance of a child born out of wedlock, and (2) the degree of proof required to show paternity of a child born out of wedlock in order to inherit from a father. We find that Okla.Stat. tit. 84, § 215 is constitutional. We also find that a child born out of wedlock claiming under section 215 must prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence.

On December 10, 1985, Robert D. King (King) executed a will. King bequeathed all his property to Jimmy Ray Self (Self) and Charles Hare (Hare). On February 21, 1986, King died. Five days later, Self filed a petition to probate King's will and prayed that he be appointed personal representative of the estate.

On March 17, 1986, two of King's sisters, Margaret Tankersley and Vera Dorsey, and King's niece, Vera Mangum, filed an objection to the will alleging that it was obtained by undue influence and coercion or, in the alternative, that King lacked testamentary capacity. On April 28, 1986, the district court filed an order admitting the will to probate and finding that, at the time of the execution of the will, King was possessed of testamentary capacity and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence. On the same day, letters testamentary issued to Self. A motion for a new trial was filed and overruled; no appeal was taken.

On February 6, 1987, J.D. Casey (Casey), the respondent, filed an Application for Determination of Heirship as Unintentional Omitted Child. Casey bases his right to inherit from King on section 215 of title 84. A hearing was held on May 28, 1987, after which the district court denied the application. The district court found that the evidence of Casey's relationship to King was contradictory, conflicting, and not clear and convincing. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and found that section 215 was unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution.

I.

Constitutionality of Okla.Stat. tit. 84, § 215 (1981).

The fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Section 215 places special burdens on children born out of wedlock before they can inherit from their father. Casey argues that section 215 violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The United States Supreme Court has considered "the constitutionality of statutory provisions that impose special burdens on illegitimate children." ²

In Trimble v. Gordon, ³ the United States Supreme Court struck down an Illinois statute prohibiting illegitimate children from inheriting by intestate succession from their fathers unless the parents inter-married and the father acknowledged the child. ⁴ Under Illinois law, legitimate children In Lalli v. Lalli, ¹¹ the United States Supreme Court was asked to declare unconstitutional a New York statute imposing special burdens on children born out of wedlock. ¹² Inheritance from the father by a child born out of wedlock required a judicial determination of paternity made during the lifetime of the father. The Court held that the state had a substantial interest in providing "for the just and orderly disposition of property at death" ¹³ and the protection of " 'innocent adults and those rightfully interested in their estates from fraudulent claims of heirship and harassing litigation instituted by those seeking to establish themselves as illegitimate heirs.' " ¹⁴ Recognizing the particular problems of proof when an individual claims to be the illegitimate child of a deceased ¹⁵ and the increased accuracy of "placing paternity disputes in a judicial forum during the lifetime In Reed v. Campbell, ¹⁸ the United States Supreme Court once again addressed the issue of restrictions placed on an illegitimate child's right to inherit from her father by intestate succession. Under attack was a Texas statute which required that parents of an illegitimate child inter-marry before the child could inherit from the father. ¹⁹ After the death of the father, the child notified the administratrix and the Probate Court of her claim to the estate. Subsequently, a jury found that the deceased was the father of the illegitimate child. The United States Supreme Court held that Trimble applied retroactively and struck down the statute because the denial of the child's right to inherit from her father was not related to the state's interest. ²⁰ However, the Court reaffirmed its position that "statutory provisions that have an evident and substantial relation to the State's interest in providing for the orderly and just distribution of a decedent's property at death" would be upheld against fourteenth amendment challenges. ²¹ The Court further stated that "[t]he state interest in the orderly disposition of decedents' estates ... justifies the enforcement of generally applicable limitations on the time and the manner in which claims may be asserted." ²² In Reed, the Court affirmed its position that procedural requirements imposed on illegitimate children as a prerequisite to eligibility to inherit from a father by intestate succession are constitutional if the requirements are substantially related to the orderly disposition of decedent's estates. But when the statutory requirements effectively prevent illegitimate child from inheriting from the father by intestate succession, the statutory provisions violate the fourteenth amendment.

could inherit by intestate succession from both parents. ⁵ The father and mother had lived together from 1970 until the father's death in 1974. A paternity order had been entered in 1973 finding that the deceased was the father of the child and ordering him to pay for her support. The Court found that the state had a legitimate interest in "assuring accuracy and efficiency in the disposition of property at death." ⁶ However, the Court found that "[t]he reach of the statute extend[ed] well beyond [its] asserted purposes" ⁷ because the statute unnecessarily excluded "some significant categories of illegitimate children [whose] inheritance rights [could] be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates or the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws." ⁸ Refusing to apply the "strict scrutiny" test, ⁹ the Court recognized that "[t]he more serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers' estates than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' estates or for legitimate children generally." ¹⁰ of the father," ¹⁶ the Court found that the requirement imposed by the statute was substantially related to important state interests and upheld the statute. ¹⁷

Section 215 of title 84 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution. The statutory provisions in Lalli required a determination of paternity before the father's death. The United States Supreme Court held that those provisions did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. ²³ Section 215 is less restrictive than the provisions upheld in Lalli. Further, section 215 meets the test articulated in the Trimble, Lalli, and Reed: Special burdens placed on children born out of wedlock as a prerequisite to taking from an alleged father's estate must be substantially related to a legitimate state interest. ²⁴ The orderly disposition of estates is a legitimate state interest which justifies "limitations on the time and the manner in which claims may be asserted." ²⁵ In the present case, since the father is dead, the special burdens placed on children for inheritance purposes under section 215 are acceptable for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Unlike the statutory provisions under attack in Trimble and Reed, section 215 does not unnecessarily exclude "some significant categories of illegitimate children of intestate men [whose] inheritance rights can be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates or the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws." ²⁶ As in Lalli, the statutory provision under attack here is substantially

related to a legitimate state interest and does not violate the fourteenth amendment.

II.

Burden of Proof.

We next turn to the burden of proof required for a child born out of wedlock to inherit from his father by intestate succession. The trial court found that "[t]he evidence presented to the Court was not clear and convincing as to the relationship and kinship, if any, between said J.D. Casey and the deceased." Casey argues that the proper standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 215 provides four methods for a child born out of wedlock to inherit from its father: (1) the father acknowledges the child as his in a witnessed, signed writing, (2) the parents inter-marry...