Estate of Knott by Knott v. Jones

• Decision Date: 10 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. CA,CA
• Parties: The ESTATE OF Dave KNOTT, by Charlie KNOTT, Administrator, Appellant, v. John Harris JONES and Certain Lands, Appellees. 84-262.
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals

Page 529

687 S.W.2d 529

14 Ark.App. 271

The ESTATE OF Dave KNOTT, by Charlie KNOTT, Administrator, Appellant, v. John Harris JONES and Certain Lands, Appellees.

No. CA 84-262.

Court of Appeals of Arkansas Division I.

April 10, 1985.

Robert F. Morehead, Pine Bluff, for appellant.

Jones & Petty, Pine Bluff, for appellees.

CLONINGER, Judge.

Appellant's statement of the issues can perhaps best be reduced to a single contention: the chancellor erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of res judicata. We do not agree, and we affirm the lower court's holding.

In his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Dave Knott, appellant filed an action in Jefferson County Chancery Court to quiet title to 14.6 acres of land. Jefferson County Circuit Court, in a previous ejectment action, had held that appellee was the owner and entitled to the possession of the land in question. The chancellor dismissed appellant's action, stating that it was barred by res judicata because of the circuit court's prior summary judgment in appellee's favor in a suit involving the same land. The chancellor found that appellant had claimed in the circuit court case that he personally owned the land and was therefore estopped from bringing an action in his fiduciary capacity. "The issues are the same," said the chancellor, "and only the capacity of the parties differs." Appellant as administrator of the estate was held to be merely a nominal plaintiff. "The real party in interest," the chancellor concluded, "is Charlie Knott, individually."

Ark.Stat.Ann. § 62-2401 (Repl.1971) provides that realty becomes an asset in the hands of the administrator of an estate "when so directed by the Will (if any), or when the court finds that such property should be sold, mortgaged, leased or exchanged for any purpose enumerated in [§ 62-2704]." The latter statute lists the following contingencies:

(1) For the payment of claims,

(2) For the payment of a legacy given by the will of the decedent,

(3) For the preservation or protection of assets of the estate,

(4) For making distribution of the estate or any part thereof, or

(5) For any other purpose in the best interest of the estate.

Since 1956, when appellant was appointed administrator, no claim has been filed against the estate, and no other "purpose enumerated" has been found by the probate court. In Cranna, Administrator v. Long, 225 Ark. 153, 279 S.W.2d 828 (1955), the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that legal title of an intestate's lands, upon his death, descends and vests in his heirs at law, subject to a widow's dower and the payment of debts through his administrator. Thus, the property cannot be said ever to have been an asset in appellant's hands; only when real property has become an asset in an administrator's hands may he, in the language of § 62-2401, "maintain or defend an action for the possession thereof, or to determine or protect the title thereto." See Miller v. Watkins, 169 Ark. 60, 272 S.W. 846 (1925).

By 1982, appellant, through inheritance and conveyance from his brothers, had acquired all the interest in the lands comprising the estate. It was in his capacity as an individual landowner that he appeared as a party to the action in circuit court in 19...