Estate of Lohr, Matter of
| Decision Date | 09 February 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-2490,92-2490 |
| Citation | 174 Wis.2d 468,497 N.W.2d 730 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Robert Anthony LOHR, Sr., a/k/a Robert A. Lohr, Sr. Robert A. LOHR, Jr., as Personal Representative and Individually, Elaine Elizabeth Lohr, Patricia A. Lohr, William J. Lohr, and James A. Lohr, Appellants, v. Gretchen G. VINEY, Respondent. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
For the appellant, Robert E. Lohr, Jr., the cause was submitted on the briefs of Richard W. Pitzner and William F. Mundt of Murphy & Desmond, S.C., Madison.
For the appellants, Elaine Lohr, Patricia Lohr, William J. Lohr and James Lohr, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Allen D. Reuter of Clifford & Reuter, S.C., Madison.
For the respondent the cause was submitted on the brief of Lawrence J. Wiesneske of O'Melia, Schiek & McEldowney, S.C., Rhinelander.
Before CANE, P.J., and LaROCQUE and MYSE, JJ.
The Lohrs, individually, and Robert Lohr, Jr., as personal representative of the estate (collectively, "Lohrs"), jointly appeal the trial court's order construing Robert Lohr, Sr.'s (testator), will by adding a sentence to Article Five, Paragraph A, of the will. They contend that the trial court erroneously (1) exercised its discretion by concluding that attorney Gretchen Viney's petition to construe the will was not barred by equitable estoppel and laches, (2) concluded that the will is ambiguous and (3) added a sentence to the will. The Lohrs argue that estoppel and laches bar Viney from filing the petition because the Lohrs relied on her failure to file the petition to construe the will when she first became aware of drafting mistakes. They also argue that the will is not ambiguous on its face or in its application because Article Six on its face provides for distribution of the estate in the event the testator's spouse survived him. Therefore, the Lohrs argue, no construction was necessary and, in any event, the court was without authority to add a sentence to the will. Because we conclude that equitable estoppel and laches do not bar Viney's petition for construction of the will, the will is ambiguous and the trial court properly construed the will, the order is affirmed.
The will was admitted to probate on waivers in early January 1990. Viney had drafted the will. In late January 1990, attorney Robert Pitzner wrote a letter to Miller, Rogers & Owens, the law firm with whom Viney was associated when she drafted the will, to inform the firm of an alleged drafting error. The letter explained that because of Viney's alleged failure to provide for the creation of a residual trust during the testator's spouse's lifetime, the estate was subject to federal taxes that could have been avoided via the unified credit.
In January 1991, after approximately one year of correspondence between Viney's attorneys and the Lohrs' attorneys that included at least one attempt to agree on an interpretation of the will, the Lohrs commenced a malpractice action against Viney, her former law firm and their malpractice insurance carriers. Meanwhile, the personal representative administered the estate according to his interpretation of Article Six of the will and filed federal estate tax and Wisconsin inheritance tax returns.
In mid-October 1991, Viney petitioned to intervene in the estate for the purpose of filing a petition to construe the will. Viney offered as grounds for the petition the fact that the Lohrs had brought a malpractice action against her and that no person interested in the estate would protect her interests. The personal representative did not object to the petition, which the court granted in February 1992.
The trial court granted Viney's motion to construe the will and construed the first sentence of Article Five, Paragraph A, to provide for the creation of a residual trust if the testator's spouse was living thirty days after the testator's death. The court concluded that the petition to construe the will was not barred by laches or equitable estoppel because there is no statutory time limit for such a petition and the Lohrs' "prejudice" results from the personal representative's failure to request construction
of the will himself and his distribution of the estate prior to judgment, especially in light of his awareness of the drafting problems. The court also concluded that several provisions of the will, when read together, are ambiguous concerning how the estate is to be distributed when the testator's spouse survives him by thirty days. Finally, the court concluded that its construction of Article Five was consistent with the testator's intent to take full advantage of tax-avoiding estate planning techniques.
Estoppel may be applied where the inaction or action of the party against whom estoppel is asserted induced reliance by another in the form of inaction or action to that person's detriment. Gonzalez v. Teskey, 160 Wis.2d 1, 12, 465 N.W.2d 525, 530 (Ct.App.1990). "The ultimate determination whether to apply estoppel is addressed to the trial court's discretion." Id. at 13, 465 N.W.2d at 530. We will affirm the trial court's exercise of its discretion if the record shows that the court correctly applied the legal standards to the facts and reached a reasoned conclusion. Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis.2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16, 20-21 (1981).
The trial court found that Viney's delay in filing her petition for construction of the will was not unreasonable, in light of the facts that there is no statutory time limit for petitioning for construction of the will and the construction of the will has significant implications in the malpractice action that was filed against her. We note that Viney was not served in the malpractice action until the end of January 1991, nine months prior to her petition to construe the will. Further, attorneys for both parties engaged in continuing correspondence attempting to reach an agreement whether there existed a drafting error that needed correcting, the proper method of correcting such error and negotiating a possible settlement to avoid litigation. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by determining that estoppel did not bar Viney's petition to construe the will.
The Lohrs argue that the personal representative was induced to pay taxes and distribute the estate to the beneficiaries by Viney's delay in petitioning for construction of the will and failure to suggest legal authority contrary to the personal representative's conclusion that "the issue at hand could not be reformed by a judge on a petition for construction." However, as the trial court noted, the continuing correspondence and disagreement concerning the existence of drafting errors should have put both parties on notice that questions remained concerning the proper construction of the will. Despite his knowledge that there were disputes concerning drafting errors and that he himself could file a petition for construction of the will, the personal representative proceeded to pay the taxes and distribute the estate. When a personal representative distributes the estate before entry of an order of distribution, he does so at his own risk. Grover v. Grover, 197 Wis. 347, 348, 222 N.W. 228, 228-29 (1928).
Equitable remedies are not available to one whose own actions or inactions result in the harm. See State Bank of Drummond v. Christophersen, 93 Wis.2d 148, 160, 286 N.W.2d 547, 553 (1980). We conclude that the trial court correctly exercised its discretion when it determined that equitable estoppel was not available because the detriment resulted in part from the personal representative's decision to pay the taxes and distribute the estate in the face of a known controversy concerning the proper construction of the will.
The elements of the equitable doctrine of laches are (1) unreasonable delay, (2) knowledge of and acquiescence in the course of events and (3) prejudice to the party asserting laches. Ozaukee County v. Flessas, 140 Wis.2d 122, 127, 409 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Ct.App.1987). Although the issue of reasonableness presents a question of law that we ordinarily review independently of the trial court's determination, because The Lohrs' laches claim fails for the same reasons that their estoppel claim fails. In light of the parties' continuing attempts to resolve the conflict from the time that Viney was made aware of the alleged error until the malpractice suit was filed, we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that Viney's delay in filing the petition for construction of the will was unreasonable.
the determination of reasonableness is so intertwined with the factual findings[174 Wis.2d 478] supporting it, we defer to the trial court's conclusion. See Id. "The determination whether the delay was so unreasonable, inexcusable, and prejudicial to the [party asserting laches] as to bar the [non-asserting party's] remedies rested in the sound discretion of the trial judge." Blue Ribbon Feed Co. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 731 F.2d 415, 420 (7th Cir.1984). We need not determine whether the deference standard identified in Ozaukee County or the erroneous exercise of discretion standard identified in Blue Ribbon Feed applies because we would reach the same result under either standard.
The portions of the will relevant to the dispute provide:
ARTICLE FOUR
A. Residue; Spouse Survives. If my spouse survives me by THIRTY (30) Days, I give to my spouse outright, as a marital bequest, the share specified in Paragraph B of this Article Four.
B. Marital Share.
1. The marital share shall be the greater of the following:
a. The minimum pecuniary amount which will qualify for the Federal estate tax marital deduction and which will result in the smallest Federal estate tax being payable by reason of my death.... or;
b....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry
... ... proved that Coleman unreasonably delayed in filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus as a matter of law. However, the factual record is insufficient for a reviewing court to decide whether the ... Reasonableness is a question of law based upon factual findings. See Lohr v. Viney, 174 Wis.2d 468, 477-78, 497 N.W.2d 730 (Ct.App.1993). When the facts are known, we ... ...
-
All Star Rent a Car v. Wi Dept. of Transp.
... ... 5 DOT claimed the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over DHA and subject matter jurisdiction. 6 ... Page 511 ... The circuit court agreed and dismissed All Star's petition ... Reasonableness is a question of law based on factual findings. Lohr v. Viney, 174 Wis.2d 468, 477-78, 497 N.W.2d 730 (Ct.App.1993). When the facts are known, we ... ...
-
State ex rel. Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann
... ... That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered." Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The ... The quoted precept came from Lohr v. Viney , 174 Wis. 2d 468, 477, 497 N.W.2d 730 (Ct. App. 1993), in connection with that court's ... ...
-
Flannery v. McNamara
... ... McNamara, administrator of the estate of William H. 432 Mass. 666 White, Jr. (decedent), and the decedent's heirs, the Daleys and the ... That answer, given by the Restatement, supra, is that reformation is not available, as matter of law, to an individual claiming that he is the true object of the testator's bounty, because the ... 236 (1981) ; McCauley v. Alexander, 543 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) ; Estate of Lohr, 174 Wis. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1993) ... However, each of these cases involves an ambiguous will, making ... ...
-
Correcting Documentary Misdescription With Reformation
...minor flaws in the execution of a will; it does not authorize a court to reform an unambiguous will. 16. UPC § 2-805. 17. Estate of Lohr, 497 N.W.2d 730 (Wis.App. 1993). 18. Estate of Ikuta, 639 P.2d 400 (Haw. 1981). 19. Wilson v. First Florida Bank, 498 So.2d 1289 (Fla.App. 1986). 20. See,......