Estate of Luger, Matter of

Citation797 P.2d 229,244 Mont. 301,47 St.Rep 1642
Decision Date05 September 1990
Docket NumberNo. 90-210,90-210
PartiesIn the Matter of the ESTATE OF Edward E. LUGER, Deceased. David J. LLOYD, Petitioner and Appellant, v. INTERMOUNTAIN DEACONESS HOME FOR CHILDREN, and Montana Children's Home and Hospital, Defendants and Respondents.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Montana

Craig W. Holt, Billings, for petitioner and appellant.

John R. Sullivan, Helena, Garry P. Bunke, Miles City, Jodie L. Johnson, Luxan & Murfitt, Helena, for defendants and respondents.

TURNAGE, Chief Justice.

David J. Lloyd, nephew to the deceased Edward E. Luger, appeals the summary judgment of the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Rosebud County, which found Edward E. Luger's will valid. In his will, Luger devised all of his estate to Montana Children's Home and Hospital and Intermountain Deaconess Home for Children, both located in Helena, Montana. The District Court held that no genuine issue of fact existed with regard to Luger's testamentary capacity and that Luger's will was valid as a matter of law. We affirm.

Lloyd raises the following issue:

Did the Sixteenth Judicial District Court properly grant the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the respondents Montana Children's Home and Hospital and Intermountain Deaconess Home for Children?

One-hundred-year-old Edward E. Luger died testate on February 15, 1988. He never married or had children. His surviving heirs were five nieces and two nephews, all of whom lived out-of-state and had little personal contact with Luger throughout the years. In his 1980 will, Luger devised his entire estate equally between Montana Children's Home and Hospital (Shodair) and Intermountain Deaconess Home for Children (Deaconess), both located in Helena, Montana. Luger's charitable intent of his 1980 will was consistent with his intent in a previous will dated 1948 and an unsigned copy of a 1976 will with the exception of adding Deaconess as a beneficiary in the 1980 will. Additionally, Luger specifically stated in his 1980 will that his nieces and nephews were to receive nothing from his estate because of their previous inheritances from Luger's deceased parents' estates.

David J. Lloyd, nephew to Luger, filed a petition contesting probate of the 1980 will on February 13, 1989, pursuant to Sec. 72-3-308, MCA. Although Lloyd had not seen Luger since 1947, Lloyd claimed that Luger had been subject to undue influence by Robert Martinek, Luger's accountant and the personal representative of Luger's estate. Martinek was not a named beneficiary of the 1980 will. Additionally, Lloyd claimed that Luger was not of sound mind when he executed his 1980 will. Respondents Shodair and Deaconess moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the District Court on March 21, 1990. From this judgment, Lloyd appeals.

Rule 56(c) of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphasis added.)

Lloyd argues that summary judgment was granted improperly by the District Court because disputed facts exist concerning Luger's testamentary capacity, and these facts should be presented to a jury for determination. First, Lloyd asserts that there are disputed facts with regard to Robert Martinek's undue influence over Luger, and cites the five criteria for establishing undue influence as set forth in Christensen v. Britton (Mont.1989), 784 P.2d 908, 911, 46 St.Rep. 2223, 2227 (citations omitted):

(1) Confidential relationship of the person attempting to influence the testator;

(2) The physical condition of the testator as it affects his ability to withstand influence;

(3) The mental condition of the testator as it affects his ability to withstand the influence;

(4) The unnaturalness of the disposition as it relates to showing an unbalanced mind or a mind easily susceptible to undue influence, and

(5) The demands and importunities as they may affect the particular donor taking into consideration the time, the place, and all the surrounding circumstances.

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4 cases
  • In re Estate of Bradshaw
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • 24 Mayo 2001
    ... ... the erroneous and unsupported notion from Christensen that all five criteria must be satisfied to prove undue influence in In re Estate of Luger (1990), 244 Mont. 301, 304, 797 P.2d 229, 231; Taylor v. Koslosky (1991), 249 Mont. 215, 218, 814 P.2d 985, 987; In re Estate of Jochems (1992), 252 ... ...
  • Estate of Tipp, In re
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • 4 Febrero 1997
    ... ...         Jochems, 826 P.2d at 536 (citing In re Estate of Luger (1990), 244 Mont. 301, 303-04, 797 P.2d 229, 231 and Christensen, 784 P.2d at 911). These same criteria are used in determining whether undue ... ...
  • Taylor v. Koslosky
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • 2 Julio 1991
    ... ... genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Emphasis added.) ...         This Court has held that in order for summary ...         Matter of Estate of Luger (Mont.1990), 797 P.2d 229, 231, 47 St.Rep 1642, 1644; Christensen v. Britton (1989) 240 ... ...
  • Estate of Jochems, Matter of
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • 4 Febrero 1992
    ...the particular donor, taking into consideration the time, the place, and all the surrounding circumstances. Matter of Estate of Luger (1990), 244 Mont. 301, 303-04, 797 P.2d 229, 231, citing Christensen v. Britton (1989), 240 Mont. 393, 784 P.2d Dan asserts that it is significant that the D......

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