Estate of Pryor
Decision Date | 29 September 2009 |
Docket Number | No. B207402.,B207402. |
Citation | 177 Cal.App.4th 1466,99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 895 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Estate of RICHARD PRYOR, Deceased. ELIZABETH PRYOR, Petitioner and Appellant, v. JENNIFER LEE PRYOR, Objector and Respondent. |
Holland & Knight, Bruce S. Ross, Linda Rottman and Vivian L. Thoreen for Petitioner and Appellant.
Kibre & Horwitz, Howard L. Horwitz and Eric G. Stockel for Objector and Respondent.
This appeal concerns the presumptive disqualification of a care custodian from receiving a donative transfer from a dependent or elder adult. (Prob. Code, § 21350.)1 Appellant Elizabeth Pryor, daughter of the decedent, argues that her stepmother, respondent Jennifer Lee Pryor, may not invoke the spousal exception to this presumption because the marriage was the product of undue influence and fraud. (§ 21351.) We find nothing in the statutory scheme or the legislative history which would warrant the judicial creation of an exception to the rule that a spouse may receive a donative transfer. We shall affirm the judgment.
Elizabeth is one of six children of Richard Pryor, the well-known comedian and actor.2 Jennifer and Richard married in 1981 and divorced in 1982. Richard was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in the mid-1980's and his condition deteriorated thereafter. It is undisputed that Jennifer became a care custodian for Richard in 1994. In 2001, four and one-half years before Richard's death in 2005, Richard and Jennifer entered into a confidential marriage. Before and after this remarriage, Richard revised his estate plan to leave substantial assets to Jennifer rather than his six children. Apparently Elizabeth did not learn of the remarriage until after Richard's death.
In a companion appeal, Pryor v. Pryor (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1448, we affirmed the denial of Elizabeth's petition to annul the 2001 marriage between Jennifer and Richard on the ground of fraud. This case arises from a probate proceeding brought by Elizabeth. The first amended petition is the charging pleading. We are concerned here only with the fifth and sixth causes of action to set aside donative transfers under section 21350, because Elizabeth has confined her appeal to those claims. These causes of action seek to have various gifts, bequests, and transfers of property or assets made by Richard between 1994 and 2005 declared void under section 21350 because Jennifer's status as care custodian raises a presumption they are invalid.
Jennifer demurred to the first amended petition, invoking section 21351, subdivision (a) which allows a donative transfer by a dependent adult to a spouse. She argued that section 21351, subdivision (a) insulates any transfer to her by Richard from the presumption of invalidity raised by section 21350 regardless of the date of transfer. Elizabeth opposed the demurrer, challenging the validity of the remarriage, and arguing that transfers made by Richard before the remarriage come under section 21350. Her theory was that Jennifer's status as care custodian beginning in 1994 renders her ineligible to receive transfers under section 21350 and that the 2001 marriage does not "`cancel out' her care custodian status."
The court rejected Jennifer's expansive reading of section 21351, subdivision (a): The court found support for this interpretation in section 21351, subdivisions (b) and (c) and concluded
Elizabeth's interpretation of section 21350 also was rejected. The trial court distinguished the cases on which she relied because none involved a formal legal relationship like marriage. In this case, the probate court concluded that the formally recognized marriage between Richard and Jennifer on June 8, 2001, created a bright line unlike the circumstances in the cases cited by Elizabeth. It ruled that this bright line
The demurrer to the fifth and sixth causes of action was sustained to the extent that they alleged transfers to Jennifer after her remarriage to Richard. Elizabeth was given leave to amend at the conclusion of the annulment action and to amend the cause of action to allege only transfers occurring prior to the remarriage.
Elizabeth elected not to amend her petition. Jennifer applied for entry of an order of dismissal with prejudice, which Elizabeth opposed. The probate court granted Jennifer's application and dismissed the action. Elizabeth filed a timely appeal.
Elizabeth chose not to amend her complaint after the trial court sustained Jennifer's demurrer with leave to amend as to premarital gifts. (Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1091 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 483, 116 P.3d 1162].) "` " (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 45 P.3d 1171].) Questions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review. (Elsenheimer v. Elsenheimer (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1536 .)
Jennifer argues that Elizabeth has forfeited her argument because she did not amend her petition to apply to gifts by Richard between their first and second marriages and because she failed to present argument as to those gifts. We agree. (See Estate of Felder (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 518, 523 [failure to raise argument on appeal results in waiver of issue].)
(1) The issue in this case is one of statutory interpretation. (Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196], italics added.) We must construe the language of a statute "`in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme, and we give "significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose."'" (Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 137 P.3d 218], quoting People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1276 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 90 P.3d 1168].)
(2) Sections 21350 to 21351 were enacted in 1993 in response to reports that a probate attorney had exploited his elderly clients by drafting estate plans for them including large gifts to himself and his confederates.3 (Recommendation on Donative Transfer Restrictions (Oct. 2008) 38 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (2008) p. 113 (Law Revision Recommendation).) (Bernard v. Foley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 794, 799-800 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 248, 139 P.3d 1196], fns. omitted (Bernard).)
(3) Once it is determined...
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