Estate of Renick v. United States

• Decision Date: 25 August 1982
• Docket Number: No. 497-81T.,497-81T.
• Citation: 687 F.2d 371
• Parties: ESTATE OF Charles L. RENICK, William C. Renick and Robert P. Renick, Executors, Plaintiffs v. The UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

687 F.2d 371

ESTATE OF Charles L. RENICK, William C. Renick and Robert P. Renick, Executors, Plaintiffs v. The UNITED STATES, Defendant.

No. 497-81T.

United States Court of Claims.

August 25, 1982.

Kyler Knobbe, Cimarron, Kan., Atty. of record for plaintiff.

Paul Wright, Washington, D. C., with whom was Asst. Atty. Gen., Glenn L. Archer, Washington, D. C., for defendant.

Before FRIEDMAN, Chief Judge, SKELTON, Senior Judge, and NICHOLS, Judge.

ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SKELTON, Senior Judge:

Plaintiffs, William C. Renick and Robert P. Renick, co-executors of the estate of decedent, Charles L. Renick, sue the defendant United States for the refund of $6,000 of the estate taxes paid on the estate of the decedent, due to the reduction of the unified credit against the estate tax in that amount by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c). Plaintiffs allege that § 2010(c) is unconstitutional, because it is arbitrary and capricious and violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment of the Constitution and, as applied, amounts to unequal and double taxation. The case is before us on cross-motions for summary judgment. After hearing oral argument, we hold for the defendant.

The case arises under Section 2001 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 26 U.S.C. § 2001 et seq. (the Act or statute) enacted October 4, 1976. The Act adopted a single estate and gift tax rate schedule based on cumulative lifetime transfers as well as on transfers occurring upon death. Under prior law a donor was entitled to a specific exemption of $30,000 for gift tax purposes and the estate of a decedent was entitled to a specific exemption of $60,000 for estate tax purposes. The Act abolished the specific gift tax exemption with respect to gifts made by persons after December 31, 1976, and abolished the specific estate tax exemption for the estates of persons dying in 1977 and thereafter, and replaced them with a unified credit. The unified credit is an amount applied as an offset against any federal gift and estate tax liability owed by an individual or his estate. The statute provided that the unified credit would be phased-in over a five-year transition period, beginning at $30,000 for the calendar year 1977, and rising to $47,000 for 1981 and years thereafter. As part of the transition plan, Congress created an interim period between September 8, 1976, and January 1, 1977, by the enactment of § 2010(c)¹ whereby the unified credit allowed to the estate of a decedent would be reduced 20% on all gifts made during that period where the $30,000 specific exemption, or any part thereof, allowable under prior law (§ 2521) was used for gift tax purposes. We can assume that Congress anticipated that without the reduction many gifts would be made during the interim period so that the donors could get the benefit of the $30,000 specific gift tax exemption allowable under prior law and also, upon their deaths, their estates could get the benefit of the full unified credit of $30,000 under the new law. It is obvious that the reduction in the unified credit during this period would tend to restrict or limit this windfall for many of such donors and their estates. Of course, there was no need for the reduction to be in force after December 31, 1976, because the specific gift tax exemption of $30,000 would not be available to donors making gifts in 1977 and thereafter when the unified credit would be applied.

It was in this setting that the plaintiffs' decedent, Charles L. Renick, made a gift of $100,600 to his three children on December 30, 1976, which was two days before the expiration of the interim period created by § 2010(c). On his quarterly gift tax return Renick took advantage of the $30,000 specific gift tax exemption then in effect pursuant to Section 2521 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, and after gift-splitting with his wife, paid a gift tax in the amount of $964.50. Thereafter, Renick died on August 13, 1977.

Since the 1976 gift was made within three years of his death, the value of that gift was included in Renick's gross estate as a gift made in contemplation of death under § 2035 which plaintiffs do not contest.² The tax return filed on Renick's estate claimed the maximum unified credit of $30,000 against the estate and gift tax pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 2010(b) for decedents dying in 1977. In addition, the $964.50 in taxes paid on the 1976 gift was credited against the estate tax. In the course of an estate tax audit, the Internal Revenue Service, pursuant to § 2010(c), disallowed $6,000 of the unified credit claimed by the estate, thereby reducing the unified credit by twenty percent to $24,000.

On August 27, 1977, one of the plaintiffs filed a claim seeking a refund of $6,000 for the disallowed credit. By letter dated September 29, 1980, the IRS disallowed the refund claim, whereupon the co-executors timely brought suit on behalf of the estate for the recovery of the amount of the disallowed credit.

The plaintiffs contend that § 2010(c) is unconstitutional because its application amounts to double taxation. They claim that when the gift was included in the decedent's estate under § 2035 and taxed accordingly and later his estate's unified credit was reduced 20% by reason of § 2010(c), the property was taxed twice, once for estate tax purposes at regular estate tax rates, and again as a gift by the reduction of the unified credit. They argue that it is a fundamental principle of taxation that the same property shall not be subject to a double tax, payable by the same party, either directly or indirectly.

It is well established that double taxation is not unconstitutional per se. See, e.g., Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U.S. 233, 48 S.Ct. 244, 72 L.Ed. 544 (1928); King v. United States, 79 F.2d 453 (4 Cir. 1935); Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 67 F.2d 172 (3 Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 666, 54 S.Ct. 441, 78 L.Ed. 1057 (1934); Packard Motor Car Co. v. United States, 69 Ct.Cl. 570, 39 F.2d 991, cert. denied, 282 U.S. 848, 51 S.Ct. 27, 75 L.Ed. 752 (1930); and cases cited. In Hellmich v. Hellman, supra, the Supreme Court stated:

When * * * Congress has clearly expressed its intention, the statute must be sustained even though double taxation results. See Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 46 L.Ed. 713, 22 Sup.Ct.Rep. 493; Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County, 253 U.S. 325, 330, 64 L.Ed. 931, 934, 40 Sup.Ct.Rep. 558 560 276 U.S. at 238, 48 S.Ct. at 246, 72 L.Ed. at 547.

In the instant case Congress' intention regarding gift and estate taxes was clearly shown by its enactment of § 2010(c). There is nothing to indicate that it was unaware of the possibility that a donor might make a gift during the interim period and that the unified credit allowable to him would be reduced under the statute, and that he might also die within three years after making the gift and by reason thereof his gift would be included in his estate for tax purposes.

Since the intention of Congress is expressed by the statute, the fact that its application may result in some degree of double taxation in the instant case, does not render it unconstitutional. Hellmich v. Hellman, supra.

Plaintiffs also claim that § 2010(c) violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment, because it is arbitrary and capricious and results in unequal taxation among taxpayers. The Supreme Court discussed the limited applicability of the due process clause to tax statutes in A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 54 S.Ct. 599, 78 L.Ed. 1109 (1934) as follows:

Except in rare and special instances, the due process of law clause contained in the Fifth Amendment is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24, 60 L.Ed. 493, 504, 36 S.Ct. 236 244, L.R.A. 1917D, 414 Ann.Cas. 1917B, 713.

* * * * * *

That clause is applicable to a taxing statute such as the one here assailed only if the act be so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as, for example, the confiscation of property. Compare M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 4 Wheat. 316, 423, 4 L.Ed. 579, 605; Child Labor Tax Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.) 259 U.S. 20, 37 et seq., 66 L.Ed. 818, 819, 42 S.Ct. 449 450, 21 A.L.R. 1432; McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 60, 49 L.Ed. 78, 97, 24 S.Ct. 769 778, 1 Ann.Cas. 561; Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co. supra, (240 U.S. 24, 25, 60 L.Ed. 504, 36 S.Ct. 236 244, L.R.A. 1917D, 414, Ann.Cas. 1917B, 713); Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, 173 U.S. 592, 614, 615, 43 L.Ed. 823, 831, 19 S.Ct. 553 561, 562; Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542, 71 L.Ed. 1184, 1192, 47 S.Ct. 710 713, 52 A.L.R. 1081, 292 U.S. at 44, 54 S.Ct. at 601, 78 L.Ed. at 114.

In Fernandez v. Weiner, 326 U.S. 340, 66 S.Ct. 178, 90 L.Ed. 116 (1945), the Supreme Court held that:

It has long been settled that an Act of Congress which on its face purports to be an exercise of the taxing power, is not any the less so because the tax is burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed. In such a case it is not within the province of courts to inquire into the unexpressed purposes or motives which may have moved Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513, 514, 81 L.Ed. 772, 775, 776, 57 S.Ct. 554, 555, 556, and cases cited. 326 U.S. at 362, 66 S.Ct. at 189, 90 L.Ed. at 134.

See also, Heitsch v. Kavanagh, 97 F.Supp. 749 (E.D.Mich.1951), aff'd, 200 F.2d 178 (6 Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 939, 73 S.Ct. 829, 97 L.Ed. 1365 (1953). As stated by Judge Learned Hand in Neuss, Hesslein & Co. v. Edwards, 30 F.2d 620, 621 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 872, 49 S.Ct. 513, 73 L.Ed. 1008 (1929), ...