Estate of Renwanz, Matter of
| Decision Date | 26 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-134,96-134 |
| Citation | 561 N.W.2d 43 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF the ESTATE OF Lee D. RENWANZ, Deceased. Susan RASMUSSEN, Appellant, v. Teresa TUHN, Executor of the Estate of Lee D. Renwanz, Deceased, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Peter C. Riley of Tom Riley Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Bernard L. Spaeth, Jr. and Nancy P. O'Brien of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by CARTER, P.J., and LAVORATO, SNELL, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.
Our inquiry in this case is whether an executor is required by statute to mail notice of probate to a creditor who has actual knowledge of the probate proceedings. We hold that mailed notice is required. We reverse and remand.
On December 18, 1993, Lorraine Renwanz went to her husband's residence to pick up various items of personal property that were divided by the court under the terms of a dissolution settlement. After she arrived, Lee Renwanz shot and killed her. He then got into his pickup truck and ran it into the front of the residence of Mark Rasmussen, who had represented Lorraine in the dissolution proceeding. Susan Rasmussen was home at the time of the incident, along with her child, Christopher, and a guest, Janice Thorn. Lee Renwanz subsequently left the area and committed suicide.
Lee Renwanz's estate was opened for probate on December 27, 1993; the second notice to creditors was published on January 6, 1994. On February 17, 1994, Susan Rasmussen brought a civil action against the estate for personal injuries resulting from the collision of the pickup truck with the Rasmussen house. 1 Prior to scheduled trial, Susan was sanctioned for failing to comply with the court's order compelling discovery. The sanctions precluded Susan from offering certain expert testimony and medical records into evidence. As a result of these sanctions imposed by the court, Susan decided to voluntarily dismiss her suit, without prejudice, on June 14, 1995. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 215.
On October 17, 1995, Susan filed a claim in probate against the estate seeking damages of $90,000 as a result of the collision into the house. The claim was accompanied by a request for a hearing and a jury trial. The executor of the estate, Teresa Tuhn, filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, contending Susan's claim was not timely filed under Iowa Code section 633.410 (1995).
The district court granted the executor's motion for summary judgment, noting that Susan had already filed a separate action against the estate and then chose to voluntarily dismiss it. The court opined that pursuant to section 633.415, this action was considered a claim against the estate. The district court reasoned that because Susan had already filed a claim against the estate, the executor was not required to give notice to Susan as a "reasonably ascertainable creditor." The court concluded that the February 1994 action waived any further obligation of the executor under section 633.410 regarding notice, and thus the October 1995 action was untimely. It is from this order that Susan appeals.
The district court's order sustaining Tuhn's motion for summary judgment is reviewed for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c). We will uphold a summary judgment order when the movant shows there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. C-Thru Container Corp. v. Midland Mfg. Co., 533 N.W.2d 542, 544 (Iowa 1995). We review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.; Hoffnagle v. McDonald's Corp., 522 N.W.2d 808, 811 (Iowa 1994).
When the estate was opened, the executor was required to publish notice on two consecutive weeks and mail notice to each creditor of the estate whose identity was reasonably ascertainable. Any claim against the estate was to be commenced within the later of either four months from the date of the second publication or one month after service of notice by ordinary mail to claimant's last known address to all reasonably ascertainable claimants. Iowa Code § 633.410. Due process requires that all known or reasonably ascertainable creditors of an estate must be given notice by mail, instead of mere notice by publication. See Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 489, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 1347, 99 L.Ed.2d 565, 579 (1988); In re Estate of Weidman, 476 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Iowa 1991).
Susan contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the time limitation of section 633.410 had not run. She argues that upon filing her claim in February of 1994, she became a "readily ascertainable creditor" entitled to notice by mail. Accordingly, she contends the estate's failure to provide her with such notice prevents the limiting statute from running. In response, the estate argues that Rasmussen's claim was barred on May 6, 1994, four months after publication of the second notice to creditors. The estate contends, and the trial court agreed, that once Rasmussen filed her original claim, nothing in section 633.410 entitled her to additional notice.
Susan argues that her actual knowledge of the pendency of the probate of the Renwanz estate is irrelevant to the requirement that mailed notice be given by the executor. She points out that prejudicial consequences do not attach to the voluntary dismissal of her prior lawsuit against the estate. We have approved the practice of a party's dismissing a lawsuit, without prejudice, and refiling it in order to avoid the consequences of discovery rules or orders. Venard v. Winter, 524 N.W.2d 163, 168 (Iowa 1994); Alden v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 479 N.W.2d 318, 320-21 (Iowa 1992). In dismissing her prior suit, we therefore find no prejudicial consequences attach to that act.
We are not here considering an issue of due process but,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Wendland v. Sparks
...the lost-chance theory. B. Principles of review. We review an order granting summary judgment for errors of law. In re Estate of Renwanz, 561 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Iowa 1997); Iowa R.App. P. 4. As we explained in Huber v. Hovey, 501 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa When reviewing a grant of summary judgment we ask......
-
Lumley v. Advanced Data-Comm, Inc., No. 9-565/09-0224 (Iowa App. 8/19/2009), 9-565/09-0224
...II. Standard of Review We review the granting of a summary judgment motion for correction of errors at law. In re Estate of Renwanz, 561 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Iowa 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving par......
-
Estate of Herron, Matter of
...to a reasonably ascertainable creditor, even though the creditor had actual knowledge of the pendency of the probate. In re Estate of Renwanz, 561 N.W.2d 43, 45 (Iowa 1997). Section 633.410, which bars untimely claims filed against an estate, contains an exception This section does not bar ......
-
Heer v. Thola
... ... claim arising on or after January 1, 1992, by reason of a transfer of an interest in real estate by a trustee, or a purported trustee, shall not be maintained either at law or in equity, in any ... In re Estate of Renwanz, 561 N.W.2d 43, 45 (Iowa 1997). I understand why our legislature would place a one-year statute of ... ...