Estate of Santana

Decision Date04 November 1977
Docket NumberNo. M-19746,M-19746
PartiesApplication of Haydee SANTANA, as the Administratrix of the Goods, Chattels and Credits of Candido Santana, Deceased and Haydee Santana, Individually, for an order granting permission to file a Claim against the NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY and the State of New York. Motion
CourtNew York Court of Claims
OPINION

GERARD M. WEISBERG, Judge.

This is an application to file a late claim pursuant to subdivision 6 of section 10 of the Court of Claims Act.

The claim is for conscious pain and suffering and wrongful death of Candido Santana, and is brought by Haydee Santana, decedent's widow, as Administratrix of his estate, and also individually for loss of consortium. Mrs. Santana will hereinafter be referred to as movant.

Movant alleges that on October 25, 1975 at approximately 5:30 a. m., Candido Santana was walking southbound on the center line of the southbound lane of the New York State Thruway, Interstate 87, hereinafter referred to as Thruway, when he was struck by a tractor trailer, also travelling southbound. The tractor trailer was owned by Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. and operated by Glenn S. Decker. Movant's papers do not disclose what Mr. Santana's purpose was, if any, in being on the Thruway. Mr. Santana died later that same morning at approximately 7:45 a. m., leaving a wife and three children surviving.

The liability of the State of New York and the New York State Thruway Authority, hereinafter referred to as the State and the Authority respectively, is predicated upon the allegation that at approximately 4:15 a. m. on October 25, 1975, Mr. Santana's presence on the Thruway was reported to the toll collector of the Woodbury toll station, by Mr. Charles Eidel of Gardiner, New York, and possibly by others. Movant contends that either or both defendants were negligent in failing to remove Mr. Santana from the Thruway after learning of his presence thereon.

Letters of Administration were granted to Haydee Santana on June 3, 1976. The present motion, accompanied by the proposed claim, as required by subdivision 6 of section 10 of the Court of Claims Act, was filed on July 25, 1977.

Subdivision 2 of section 10 of the Court of Claims Act states in relevant part:

"(a) claim by an executor or administrator of a decedent who left him or her surviving a husband, wife or next of kin, for damages for a wrongful act, neglect or default, on the part of the state by which the decedent's death was caused, shall be filed within ninety days after the appointment of such executor or administrator, unless the claimant shall within such time file a written notice of intention to file a claim therefor in which event the claim shall be filed within two years after the death of the decedent. In any event such claim shall be filed within two years after the death of the decedent."

Having failed to comply with these statutory requirements, movant would have this Court exercise its discretion in permitting a late filing pursuant to subdivision 6 of section 10 of the Court of Claims Act. This recently amended statute (L.1976, ch. 280, eff. Sept. 1, 1976) provides, in part, as follows:

" . . . (i)n determining whether to permit the filing of a claim pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall consider, among other factors, whether the delay in filing the claim was excusable; whether the state had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim; whether the state had an opportunity to investigate the circumstances underlying the claim; whether the claim appears to be meritorious; whether the failure to file a timely claim or notice of intention resulted in substantial prejudice to the state; and whether the claimant has any other available remedy."

The Court has examined movant's proposed claim and finds that it satisfies the requirements of section 11 of the Court of Claims Act in that it sets forth the time and place of the occurrence, the nature of the claim, the items of damage and the total sum demanded. Additionally movant's application was filed within two years of Candido Santana's death as required by subdivision 2 of section 10 of the Court of Claims Act.

In applying the criteria set forth in subdivision 6 of section 10 of the Court of Claims Act, the Court must weigh each factor specifically enumerated therein as well as any others which it deems relevant. These factors need not be found to exist conjunctively as was the case under former subdivision 5 of section 10 of the Court of Claims Act. (Sessa v. State of New York, 88 Misc.2d 454, 458, 388 N.Y.S.2d 513, 516, (Court of Claims, 1976); DeMarco v. State of New York, 43 A.D.2d 786, 350 N.Y.S.2d 230 affd. 37 N.Y.2d 735, 374 N.Y.S.2d 619, 237 N.E.2d 131.) As stated by Judge DeIorio in Walach v. State of New York, Misc., 397 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Court of Claims, 1977):

" * * * the purpose of the amendatory legislation was to vest broader discretion in the courts to permit late filings than theretofore existed; * * * the legislative aim, purpose and intent was to create a fairer and more logical late claim judicial procedure which would at least obviate (if not replace) the resort to private bills for access to this Court, as theretofore existed."

The removal of the former restrictions on judicial discretion by the legislature indicates to this Court a strong concern that litigants with meritorious claims be afforded their day in court. With these principles in mind, the Court will discuss the individual factors enumerated in subdivision 6 of section 10 of the Court of Claims Act as they apply to each defendant.

The first factor which the Court must consider is whether the delay in filing is excusable. A claim, or a notice of intention to file a claim, should have been filed within ninety days of Mrs. Santana's appointment as Administratrix on June 3, 1976. Since neither of these documents was filed, the claim was barred after September 1, 1976. Under subdivision 6 of section 10 of the Court of Claims Act, the time period to which the applicant's excuse must relate, in a claim such as this, is the ninety day period from the granting of Letters of Administration. The Court may, however, consider the timeliness of the motion for permission to late file, as bearing on the issue of prejudice to the defendant. (Walach v. State of New York, supra.)

Movant's excuse is that during the ninety day period she was unaware of the facts which give rise to her claim against these defendants, and that she did not become aware of these facts until May 18, 1977. As previously indicated, movant's contention is that prior to the accident, Mr. Charles Eidel reported to a toll collector that Candido Santana was walking on the Thruway, and that having received this information, the State and/or the Authority were under a duty to remove Mr. Santana and thereby prevent the accident. Movant's attorney states that he was unaware of Mr. Eidel's role in the events surrounding Mr. Santana's death, until he received a transcript of Mr. Eidel's testimony at a hearing conducted by the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. At this hearing, held on March 9, 1976 in Goshen, New York, Mr. Eidel allegedly testified that he and other individuals reported Mr. Santana's presence on the Thruway at various intervals prior to the accident. Movant's attorney received the transcript on May 18, 1977, and thereafter filed the present motion on July 25, 1977.

In opposition to these contentions the Attorney-General argues that movant's attorney had been given a police accident report on March 2, 1976, which contained essentially the same information regarding Mr. Eidel's participation as does the transcript. Movant contends that the accident report did not set forth the essential facts upon which the proposed claim is based. This accident report reads in pertinent part as follows:

"Vehicle #1 Southbound Pedestrian walking south on centerline of roadway, struck by Vehicle #1 pedestrian reported walking north in southbound lanes, by wittness (sic) prior to accident

Wittness (sic) Charles Eidel, Box 99 Old Ford Rd Gardiner, NY 12525."

Whether movant's lateness in filing is excusable depends primarily upon the Court's interpretation of the above quoted language in the accident report. The Court finds this language to be ambiguous with respect to movant's allegation that the Woodbury toll taker was notified of Mr. Santana's presence on the Thruway. The phrase "prior to accident" is ambiguous since it could as well relate to (1) when the report was made, or (2) when Mr. Santana was observed walking on the roadway. There is no indication in the accident report itself of to whom the facts were reported, and certainly no mention is made of any toll taker. It would have been reasonable to assume that the information was "reported" to the officer who filled out the accident report. The Court finds that the accident report did not apprise movant's attorney of the substance of Mr. Eidel's later testimony. Having read this witness' testimony at the Motor Vehicle Department hearing, one might be inclined to give a different meaning to the words on the accident report, but the Court must judge the reasonableness of movant's attorney's conduct in light of what he knew at the time he read the report. In the absence of any reference to a toll taker, movant's attorney had no basis to assume the existence of negligence by an employee of the State or the Authority. Movant's attorney acted reasonably in trying to contact Mr. Eidel, but this witness refused to cooperate with him. Since counsel acted diligently to investigate the claim, but was nevertheless unaware of essential facts in support thereof, the Court finds that movant's failure to file is excusable.

The second factor which the Court must...

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