Goines v. State
| Decision Date | 16 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | Motion No. M-97689 |
| Parties | Isaiah Goines, Movant, v. The State of New York, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Court of Claims |
For Movant: BELDOCK LEVINE & HOFFMAN, LLP By: David B Rankin, Esq.
For Defendant: LETITIA JAMES, New York State Attorney General By Suzette Corinne Merritt, Assistant Attorney General
Movant Isaiah Goines seeks to bring a personal injury action for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of a high-speed police chase in Orange County, New York. Movant seeks an order pursuant to Court of Claims Act (CCA) § 10(5) deeming his proposed claim as timely or, in the alternative permitting him to file a late claim under CCA § 10(6). The State opposes the motion. For the reasons stated below movant's application for relief under CCA § 10(5) is denied but, after consideration of all the relevant factors the motion is granted insofar as it seeks late claim relief under CCA § 10(6).
According to the proposed claim [1] and the police accident report of the incident submitted by movant, on April 19, 2021, movant was driving at a high rate of speed while traveling west on Interstate 84, in the passing lane. After observing movant driving above the posted speed limit, a New York State Police vehicle initiated pursuit, attempting to catch up to movant's car from the right-hand lane. As the vehicles neared an off-ramp, movant crossed two lanes of travel in an apparent attempt to exit the highway, lost control of his vehicle, and struck the guardrail. The car became airborne and overturned several times, and movant was ejected from the vehicle. Movant was rendered a paraplegic and currently resides in a nursing home where he receives full-time medical care and assistance with basic life functions. The claim asserts that the State, under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the conduct of uniformed state troopers acting within the scope of their duties, acted negligently and with reckless disregard for movant's safety in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e), by initiating and then failing to terminate the high-speed pursuit of movant, which resulted in movant's serious injuries.
It is undisputed that no claim or notice of intention to file a claim was filed and served upon the Attorney General within 90 days of the accrual of the claim (see CCA § 10[3]). Movant brought this application approximately five months after the expiration of that time period.
The tolling provision of CCA § 10(5) provides that where a claimant is "under a legal disability, the claim may be presented within two years after such disability is removed." In other words, where a claim accrues while a claimant is under a legal disability, "the two-year period is applicable and the claim allowable as of right" (Boland v State of New York, 30 N.Y.2d 337, 342 [1972]), and "permission to file a claim is not necessary to validate a filing made within the [two]-year period after removal of the disability" (id. at 343).
Movant argues that the claim should be deemed timely filed because his physical disability-including his paraplegia and related injuries that, from the time of the incident to date, prevent him from engaging in the basic activities of daily life-constitutes a legal disability under a plain reading of section 10(5). Movant has submitted various medical records in support of his application which indicate the serious nature of his injuries, the several surgeries that were performed during the course of his medical treatment, and his extended hospitalization. In opposition, the State asserts that a physical disability has never been deemed a legal disability for purposes CCA § 10(5) and, further, that movant's physical condition did not prevent him from meeting with his attorneys.
CCA § 10(5) does not define the term "legal disability," but infancy and incompetency have been recognized in this context as the two quintessential legal disabilities permitting application of section 10(5)'s toll (see Barrett v State of New York, 161 A.D.2d 61, 64 & 68 [2d Dept 1990] [], aff'd for reasons stated 78 N.Y.2d 1111 [1991]; Kaplan v State of New York, 152 A.D.2d 417, 419 [3d Dept 1989]; see also Boland, 30 N.Y.2d at 342-343 [psychiatric hospitalization]; Puckerin v State of New York, 159 A.D.3d 848 [2d Dept 2018] [psychiatric hospitalization]; Weber v State of New York, 267 AD 325 [3d Dept 1944] [infancy]; cf. Baker v State of New York, 186 A.D.2d 329, 329 [3d Dept 1992] [ section 10(5) did not apply after "it was judicially determined that claimant was not an incapacitated person"]).
Here despite movant's extensive physical injuries and long hospitalization for medical treatment after the incident, movant has not established that he was incompetent or otherwise mentally incapacitated as required for a claimant to obtain relief under CCA § 10(5). [2] To the contrary, the records submitted by movant indicate that, immediately after the incident, movant was able to describe his injuries to medical staff, and was also able to discuss and consent to numerous medical procedures and treatment over the following weeks and months. Moreover, movant has not cited any legal authority that has adopted or supports his broad reading of section 10(5) as encompassing someone hospitalized with extensive physical injuries or suffering solely from a physical disability.
Indeed, other than one now-abrogated exception discussed below, the application of CCA § 10(5) has not been expanded beyond the commonly understood legal disabilities of infancy and incompetency because section 10(5)-like all other filing requirements of CCA § 10-is jurisdictional in nature and, thus, is to be "strictly applied" (Doe v State of New York, 221 A.D.2d 218, 218 [1st Dept 1995] [affirming denial of relief under CCA § 10(5) where the claimant was no longer mentally disabled and citing McCarthy v Volkswagen of America, Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 543 (1982), which narrowly construed analogous CPLR 208 toll, in support of strict construction of section 10(5)]; see also Kolnacki v State of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 277, 281 [2007]; Greenspan Bros. v State of New York, 122 A.D.2d 249, 249 [2d Dept 1986]). As the Court of Appeals noted in discussing the Legislature's intent that the analogous tolling provision of CPLR 208 be "narrowly interpreted," a contrary, expansive interpretation of the statute "could greatly and perhaps inappropriately expand the class of persons able to assert the toll" and "weaken" the policy behind imposing the limitations periods in the first place (McCarthy v Volkswagen of America, Inc., 55 N.Y.2d at 548-549). This policy concern is of even greater significance where the State's waiver of its sovereign immunity under the CCA is involved. Notably, the Court of Appeals has rejected application of the analogous CPLR 208 toll to an individual who, after being struck by a train owned by the defendant, "sustain[ed] extensive physical injuries;" was "hospitalized and treated with strong pain-killing drugs;" and was "unable to effectively attend to his affairs" (Eisenbach v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 62 N.Y.2d 973, 974-975 [1984] []).
Movant's reliance on Crawford v State of New York, 37 A.D.2d 450 (4th Dept 1971) for the proposition that courts have expanded the definition of legal disability for purposes of CCA § 10(5) beyond infancy and incompetency is unavailing. Although movant is correct that the Crawford court considered a claimant's imprisonment to be a legal disability for purposes of the application of CCA § 10(5) in that case, Crawford has been effectively abrogated. Crawford's ruling was not based upon the fact of the claimant's incarceration and the attendant difficulties of prosecuting a claim from within prison; rather, the court relied upon an incarcerated person's legal incapacity to sue under former section 79 of the Civil Rights Law (). [3] The Civil Rights Law was later amended-effective September 10, 1973-to provide that "[a] sentence of imprisonment in a state correctional institution... shall not be deemed to suspend the right or capacity of any person so sentenced to commence and prosecute an action or proceeding in any court within this [S]tate" (Civil Rights Law § 79[2]; see Kelly, at 323, citing L. 1973, ch. 687, § 1). Appellate courts have thus subsequently held that incarcerated claimants are not under any legal disability within the meaning of CCA § 10(5), but rather, are subject to the typical 90-day filing requirement (see Hall v State of New York, 85 A.D.2d 835, 835 [3d Dept 1981] []; see also Kelly, 57 A.D.2d at 325-326, aff'd on opinion below 45 N.Y.2d 973).
In sum, movant has not established that he suffered from a qualifying legal disability under CCA § 10(5) at the time his claim accrued. Thus, to the extent movant seeks to deem his claim as timely filed under section 10(5), that branch of the motion is denied.
Late Claim Relief Under CCA § 10(6) is Warranted [4]
CCA § 10(6) enumerates six factors to be weighed by the Court in connection with a late claim motion: (1) whether the delay was excusable; (2) whether the State had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim; (3) whether ...
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