Estridge v. Town of Ware
| Decision Date | 25 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:20-cv-30058-KAR |
| Parties | ROBERT ESTRIDGE, Plaintiff, v. THE TOWN OF WARE, KYLE WHITCOMB, CHRISTOPHER DESANTIS, DEREK DESRUISSEAUX, BRIAN D'AMICO, JODY GREENE, and PEDRO MONTEIRO, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS DESRUISSEAUX'S, GREENE'S AND MONTEIRO'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS
In the aftermath of Plaintiff Robert Estridge's ("Plaintiff") arrest in the driveway of his home in Ware, Massachusetts, he sued the town and the responding police officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his constitutional rights protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and asserted associated state law claims (Complaint, Dkt. No. 1). Three of the responding officers, Derek Desruisseaux, Jody Greene, and Pedro Monteiro (collectively, "Defendants"), have moved to dismiss the § 1983 claims against them (Dkt. Nos. 17, 33, 36). The parties have consented to this court's jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 47). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. For the following reasons, Defendants' motions to dismiss are DENIED.
After 1:15 A.M. on April 30, 2017, Ware Police Officers Kyle Whitcomb and Christopher DeSantis responded to an anonymous tip reporting noise and possible underage drinking at Plaintiff's residence at 222 Belchertown Road, Apartment C (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 16-18). Upon arrival at that address, Whitcomb and DeSantis heard loud music and observed "numerous motor vehicles lining the private driveway" (Compl. ¶ 19). As the officers walked up the driveway toward the residence, Plaintiff appeared and told the officers that he lived there, the officers were not welcome, and they would need a warrant if they wanted to enter (Compl. ¶¶ 20-22). Plaintiff then proceeded back up the driveway to the residence (Compl. ¶ 23).
Whitcomb and DeSantis remained on the property (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 24). After they requested backup officers from the towns of West Brookfield, Hardwick, Warren, and Belchertown and from the Massachusetts State Police, Whitcomb and DeSantis remained on the driveway and proceeded toward the backyard of the residence (Compl. ¶¶ 26, 27). Plaintiff exited from the residence and said, "'I don't want you guys here and you need to leave'" (Compl. ¶ 28). The officers responded by notifying Plaintiff that they were going to remain to investigate an anonymous tip concerning underage drinking (Compl. ¶ 29). While using "expletives and obscenities" and waving his hands, Plaintiff repeated his demand that the officers leave his property (Compl. ¶ 30). Whitcomb and DeSantis "threatened" Plaintiff with arrest for disorderly conduct if he did not consent to a search of the property (Compl. ¶ 31). When Plaintiff refused to consent to a search, Whitcomb and DeSantis placed him under arrest and escorted him to the rear of their police cruiser for transport to the Ware Police Department (Compl. ¶¶ 32, 33, 35, 36, 41).
Defendants Hardwick Police Officer Desruisseaux and Massachusetts State Police Troopers Greene and Montiero were among the backup officers who entered the property whenPlaintiff was secured in the cruiser (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7, 8, 38, 39). Defendants and Trooper Brian D'Amico, another backup officer, "rounded up and arrested several of the guests" who they located on the property (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 39, 40). Ultimately, the Eastern Hampshire District Court found that there was no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest and dismissed the charges (Compl. ¶¶ 41, 42, 47-49).
In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by illegally entering onto his property in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights (Compl. ¶¶ 56-68).2 Defendants have moved to dismiss Count I in nearly identical motions (Dkt. Nos. 17, 33, 36). Plaintiff has opposed dismissal (Dkt. Nos. 20, 39, 40).
"A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss challenges a party's complaint for failing to state a claim." Ngomba v. Olee, CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-11352-MPK, 2020 WL 107969, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 9, 2020). In ruling on the motion, a court must "treat all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 919 F.3d 121, 127 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011)). "In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must provide 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ngomba, 2020 WL 107969, at *2 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content thatallows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Although evaluating the plausibility of a legal claim 'requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense,' Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, the court may not disregard properly pled factual allegations, 'even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.'" Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). However, "labels and [legal] conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . " are insufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "Simply put, the court should assume that well-pleaded facts are genuine and then determine whether such facts state a plausible claim for relief." Ngomba, 2020 WL 107969, at *2 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Section 1983 "provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States when that deprivation takes place 'under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.'" Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). "To prevail in a § 1983 claim, plaintiffs must establish three elements, to wit, the deprivation of a [federally secured] right, a causal connection between the actor and the deprivation, and state action." Dominguez v. Figueroa Sancha, 373 F. Supp. 3d 333, 343 (D.P.R. 2019). See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2019); Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2009). The first element is at issue here.
Count I alleges that Defendants violated § 1983 by depriving Plaintiff of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from a warrantless entry into his home (Compl. ¶¶ 61, 64).Defendants contend that dismissal of Count I is required because (1) they did not deprive Plaintiff of his rights and, even if they did, (2) they are entitled to qualified immunity (Dkt. Nos. 18 at 6, 34 at 6, 37 at 6). Defendants maintain that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement permitted them to enter and remain on Plaintiff's property and "[t]o suggest that [their] obtaining a warrant under the circumstances would not be impractical is bordering on the absurd" (Dkt. Nos. 18 at 8, 34 at 8, 37 at 8). However, the facts as alleged in the complaint do not support Defendants' contentions.
"Qualified immunity is 'an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.'" Castagna v. Jean, 955 F.3d 211, 213 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. denied, No. 20-253, 2020 WL 7132271 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2020) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). "When sued in their individual capacities, government officials like [Defendants] are immune from damages claims unless '(1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was "clearly established at the time."'" Id. at 219 (quoting Eves v. LePage, 927 F.3d 575, 582-83 (1st Cir. 2019) (en banc)). See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018). "Courts may analyze either part of the test first." Castagna, 955 F.3d at 219.
"The 'clearly established' inquiry itself has two elements." Id. "The first is focused on whether the law was '"sufficiently clear" such that every "reasonable official would understand that what he is doing" is unlawful.'" Id. (quoting Eves, 927 F.3d at 583) (alterations omitted). "Qualified immunity is supposed to 'protect "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."'" Id. (quoting Eves, 927 F.3d at 583) (alteration omitted). "Because of that, the right that was allegedly violated must be defined 'in a particularized sense so that thecontours of the right are clear to a reasonable official.'" Id. (quoting Eves, 927 F.3d at 583) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A]lthough there need not be 'a case directly on point, . . . existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.'" Eves, 927 F.3d at 583 () (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
The second element "'focuses on "the objective legal reasonableness of an official's acts,"'" and "'[e]vidence concerning the defendant's subjective intent is simply irrelevant . . . .'" Eves, 927 F.3d at 583 (alteration omitted) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588, 590 (1998)). This element provides "'some breathing room for a police officer even if he has made a mistake (albeit a reasonable one) about the lawfulness of his conduct.'" Gray, 917 F.3d at 10 (quoting Conlogue v. Hamilton, 906 F.3d 150, 155 (1st Cir. 2018)).
Based on the allegations in the complaint, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for remaining on Plaintiff's property under the first and second prongs of the qualified immunity test. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff's...
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