Evans v. Braun

• Decision Date: 14 December 2010
• Citation: 2010 PA Super 231,12 A.3d 395
• Parties: Christine M. EVANS, Appelleev.Gordon P. BRAUN, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

12 A.3d 395

2010 PA Super 231

Christine M. EVANS, Appellee

v.Gordon P. BRAUN, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted June 28, 2010.Filed Dec. 14, 2010.

Frank C. Sluzis, Harrisburg, for appellant.Rebecca S. Dempsey, Chambersburg, for appellee.BEFORE: BENDER, SHOGAN and CLELAND,^* JJ.OPINION BY BENDER, J.:

Appellant, Gordon P. Braun, appeals from the January 21, 2010 order granting Appellee, Christine M. Evans, a final protection from abuse (PFA) order against him. Braun argues that the trial court erred in finding that Evans had standing to seek such an order under the Protection from Abuse Act (PFA Act), 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101–6122. We affirm.

The court set forth the facts of this case as follows:

[Evans and Braun] work together for a community health care provider. After meeting at work, the two began a stormy dating relationship during the summer of 2009. After an agreeable date, however, [Braun] came to [Evans'] home uninvited, causing her to become upset and ask him for space. The two later reconciled at some point prior to December, 2009. Both parties agree that on December 5, 2009, [Evans and Braun] attended a play in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. On the way to the performance, [Braun] informed [Evans] he was carrying a gun. Later, when the two returned to his home, [Braun] removed the gun from his waistband, handed it to [Evans], remarked on its weight and told her it could put a very big hole in her. [Evans] testified that she did not know whether [Braun] was attempting to impress her or intimidate her with the statement, and kept her concerns to herself.

On December 17, 2009, the parties were in the midst of a quarrel. [Evans], attending a Christmas party organized by women who were friendly to one another at work, asked [Braun] to come over to the restaurant-bar, Dilly's, to make amends. When [Braun] arrived, [Evans] was standing outside smoking a cigarette with a particularly close friend [named Tammy Harnish]. [Ms. Harnish] went inside, knowing the two were fighting and wishing to allow them to speak freely. After [Braun] became increasingly short tempered, sarcastic, and aggressive, [Evans] turned to go back into the establishment. [Braun] called her name, and [Evans] halted and turned around to look at him. [Braun] then proceeded to pull back his jacket and expose his Colt forty-five semi-automatic pistol, held in his waistband. He told [Evans] to remember he still had the gun, and he was not afraid to use it.

[Evans] fled inside, feeling threatened, intimidated, and scared of [Braun], given his previous comments regarding the gun. [Evans] testified that [Braun] has a harsh temper, and she was afraid of him. Although she told the table of women only that the two had fought, [Evans] reported the entire incident confidentially to [Ms. Harnish] soon thereafter that same evening, becoming hysterical upon relaying [Braun's] threatening behavior with the pistol. The next day, [Evans] reported the incident to her employer, impelled by fear due to their shared workplace. An employee assistance counselor advised her to inform the police, who in turn referred her to the office of Women in Need (WIN). The office responded by scheduling her for the next available appointment. After the appointment, WIN filed a [PFA] action on [Evans'] behalf, with a temporary order of protection issued ex parte the same date, Friday, January 8, 2010. Hearing was set for January 14, 2010, but was continued by [o]rder dated January 12, 2010, at the request of [Braun]. Hearing was held Thursday, January 21, 2010.

Following [Evans'] case in chief, [Braun] moved for a directed verdict. The [c]ourt denied the motion, and [Braun] presented his case. Following the conclusion of argument by counsel, the [c]ourt issued a Final [PFA] [o]rder. As did the temporary order, the final [o]rder required that [Braun] surrender his handgun as well as other firearms kept in his home.

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 3/25/10, at 2–3.

Braun filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as a timely concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Herein, he raises two issues for our review:

(1) Did the trial court commit an error of law in denying Mr. Braun's Motion for a Directed Verdict based on lack of standing made at the conclusion of Ms. Evans's case-in-chief because Ms. Evans had failed to present any evidence sufficient to support the contention that she is part of the protected class entitled to seek a [PFA] order as defined under the term “abuse” in 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102?

(2) Did the trial court commit an error of law in granting Ms. Evans's Petition for Protection from Abuse despite the fact that Ms. Evans failed to demonstrate that she is a member of the protected class as defined under the term “abuse” in 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102 as eligible to receive a [PFA] [o]rder?

Appellant's Brief at 7.

First, Braun argues that Evans failed to establish her standing under the PFA Act and, thus, the court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict after Evans' case-in-chief.

In reviewing a trial court's decision whether or not to grant judgment in favor of one of the parties, we must consider the evidence, together with all favorable inferences drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. Our standard[s] of review when considering motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict are identical. We will reverse a trial court's grant or denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when we find an abuse of discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case. Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is the same as that for a trial court.

There are two bases upon which a judgment N.O.V. can be entered; one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and/or two, the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. With the first, the court reviews the record and concludes that, even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the movant, the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor. Whereas with the second, the court reviews the evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure.

Campisi v. Acme Markets, Inc. 915 A.2d 117, 119 (Pa.Super.2006) (citations omitted). Here, Braun avers that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because, even taking Evans' allegations as true, her evidence failed to establish that she had standing to obtain relief under the PFA Act. Braun correctly notes that an issue involving standing under a statute is a question of law as it involves the interpretation of that statute. Scott v. Shay, 928 A.2d 312, 313 (Pa.Super.2007). Thus, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Id. (citation omitted).

With these standards of review in mind, we must begin by analyzing whether the evidence presented by Evans was sufficient to prove that she is a member of the class of people that the PFA Act seeks to protect. The statute directs that an adult may seek relief “by filing a petition with the court alleging abuse by the defendant.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a). “Abuse,” as defined in the Act, includes, inter alia:

The occurrence of one or more of the following acts between family or household members, sexual or intimate partners or persons who share biological parenthood:

(1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury, serious bodily injury, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault or incest with or without a deadly weapon.

(2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury.

23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a)(1)-(2). In Scott, we explained that “[f]or the Act to apply, the petitioner seeking to invoke it must have standing, which is to say that the petitioner and the intended respondent must be a family or household member.” Scott, 928 A.2d 312. Applicable to the instant case is the fact that “family or household member” is defined as including “current or former sexual or intimate partners.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a).

Instantly, Evans sought relief under the PFA Act alleging that she and Braun were “sexual or intimate partners.” While the PFA Act does not specifically define that phrase, we examined the meaning of this language in Scott. We began by analyzing the intent of the legislators in enacting the PFA Act, stating:

As we have already made clear, their intent was to prevent domestic violence and to promote peace and safety within domestic, familial and/or romantic relationships.

... [T]he persons who undoubtedly fit the Act's definition of family or household members— e.g., spouses, parents, children, relatives, paramours, and persons who undertake romantic relationships-typically share some significant degree of domestic, familial and/or intimate interdependence. There is often an obvious emotional bond. Frequently, these individuals interface in very practical areas of private life—a mutual residence, common family obligations and/or shared involvement in the affairs of day-to-day living. Even in a dating relationship, where the functional interdependence might not be as substantial as in a family, the participants have elected some measure of personal interaction. This interaction often involves emotional or private concerns not unlike those found in family settings, albeit not normally as extensive or as intense. In sum, the persons protected by the Act as family or household members have a connection rooted in blood, marriage, family-standing, or a chosen romantic relationship.

Scott, 928 A.2d at 315. With this rationale in mind, we construed the word “partners” “to mean those persons who mutually chose to enter relationships.” Id. at 316. This interpretation, we concl...