Evans v. Chapman

• Decision Date: 24 December 1986
• Docket Number: No. 86-501,86-501
• Citation: 28 Ohio St.3d 132,502 N.E.2d 1012
• Parties: , 28 O.B.R. 228 EVANS, Appellant, v. CHAPMAN, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 132

28 Ohio St.3d 132

502 N.E.2d 1012, 28 O.B.R. 228

EVANS, Appellant, v. CHAPMAN, Appellee.

No. 86-501.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 24, 1986.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The "written notice" provision of R.C. 2305.11(A), which creates a mechanism for extending the statute of limitations by one hundred eighty days, applies only to malpractice claims against physicians, podiatrists, or hospitals, not to malpractice claims against dentists.

2. The operation of the "written notice" provision contained in R.C. 2305.11(A), as it applies to a dental malpractice claim, is not a denial of the equal protection of the laws.

This appeal specifically involves R.C. 2305.11, and its "written notice" provision, as they relate to an individual's dental malpractice claim. The material facts surrounding this case are not in dispute.

Appellee, Ira S. Chapman, D.D.S., is licensed to practice dentistry in the state of Ohio. Appellant, Verna Evans, began a dentist-patient relationship with the appellee in 1946 and terminated such relationship in June 1982. Prior to terminating this relationship, and again in September 1982, appellant sought dental treatment at other dentists' offices. On June 2, 1983, appellant sent a letter to appellee, advising him that she was contemplating legal action against him. Appellant's malpractice complaint was filed on December 1, 1983, and appellee was granted leave to file an answer on February 1, 1984. The trial court overruled appellant's motions to strike and for default judgment but granted appellee's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court in every respect, on the basis that the notice provision applies to medical, not dental, malpractice claims.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Teodosio, Cherpas & Manos, George D. Mallo and Christopher T. Cherpas, Akron, for appellant.

Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, Charles E. Pierson and Hamilton DeSaussure, Jr., Akron, for appellee.

HOLMES, Justice.

The two basic issues presented are whether the "written notice" provision of R.C. 2305.11(A) applies to dental claims and, if not, whether such application would violate equal protection rights of individuals with dental claims. For the reasons which follow, we hold that the "written notice" provision of R.C. 2305.11(A) does not apply to dental claims and that this application does not deny equal protection of the laws.

Prior to 1982, dental malpractice claims were governed by the two-year statute of limitations for general negligence contained in R.C. 2305.10. Whitt v. Columbus Cooperative (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 355, 358, 415 N.E.2d 985 . Effective March 15, 1982, R.C. 2305.11 was amended to add dental claims to those claims governed by its one-year statute of limitations. (139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2153.) R.C. 2305.11 provided, in pertinent part:

"(A) An action for * * * malpractice, including an action for malpractice against a physician, podiatrist, hospital, or dentist * * * shall be brought within one year after the cause thereof accrued * * *.

"If a written notice, prior to the expiration of time contained in this division, is given to any person in a medical claim that an individual is presently considering bringing an action against that person relating to professional services provided to that individual, then an action by that individual against that person may be commenced at any time within one hundred eighty days after that notice is given.

" * * *

"(D) As used in this section:

" * * *

"(2) 'Physician' means all persons who are licensed to practice medicine and surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery by the state medical board.

"(3) 'Medical claim ' means any claim asserted in any civil action against a physician, podiatrist, or hospital arising out of the diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person.

" * * *

"(5) 'Dentist' means all persons licensed to practice dentistry by the state dental board.

"(6) 'Dental claim ' means any claim asserted in any civil action against a dentist arising out of a dental operation or the dental diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person." (Emphasis added.)

Under these statutory definitions, appellant's claim is a "[d]ental claim" as a matter of law and, by the plain words of this statute, the "written notice" provision of R.C. 2305.11(A) does not apply to such claims. The "written notice" provision clearly applies only to "[m]edical claim[s]," and not to "[d]ental claim[s]" which are given separate statutory definitions. Appellant contends that there is no reason to find that a dental claim is not a medical claim, but the statute clearly distinguishes between the two types of claims. If the legislature had intended to include dental claims within the scope of the "written notice" provision, which would have the effect of extending the statute of limitations period as to them, it would have done so. See Whitt v. Columbus Cooperative, supra.

Appellant next argues that dental claimants and medical claimants are similarly situated people of the same class so that a one-hundred-eighty-day extension to one but not to the other is a denial of equal protection of the laws. This argument ignores the traditional distinction between these two groups of litigants. The common-law concept of "malpractice" dealt solely with the legal and medical professions--that is why dental claims were previously governed by the statute of limitations for general negligence actions until R.C. 2305.11 was amended to specifically add dental claims to its one-year statute of limitations for malpractice. See Hocking Conservancy Dist. v. Dodson-Lindblom Assoc. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 195, 404 N.E.2d 164 , and Morley v. E.B. Jones, D.D.S., Inc. (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d 112, 115, 493 N.E.2d 312. If we were to take appellant's arguments to their natural conclusion, all other health care professionals, e.g., chiropractors, or veterinarians, would be governed by R.C. 2305.11 simply because they also use the title "Dr." and have become specialists, even though their differing professions are not specifically listed in the statute.

Appellant also argues that this case involves not only differing treatment but also a fundamental right, i.e., "her day in court," if the "written notice" provision is held inapplicable to her dental claim. However, all that is at stake here is a mechanism which, if used, would allow extension of the applicable statute of limitations; clearly, there is no fundamental right to an additional one hundred eighty days in which to bring suit. The statute, then, " ' * * * must be upheld if there exists any conceivable set of facts under which the classification rationally furthered a legitimate legislative objective.' " Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hospital (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 300, 301, 452 N.E.2d 1337, quoting Denicola v. Providence Hospital (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 115, 119, 387 N.E.2d 231 (differing requirements pertaining to expert testimony for "medical claims" and "dental claims" are constitutional).

Although differing treatment between groups that are similarly situated may pose an equal protection problem, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia (1976), 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520, differing treatment among differing persons does not necessarily suggest a violation of equal protection rights. Even so, " * * * [a] classification 'must be...