Whitt v. Columbus Co-op. Enterprises
| Decision Date | 30 December 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-713,80-713 |
| Citation | 64 Ohio St.2d 355,18 O.O.3d 512,415 N.E.2d 985 |
| Parties | , 18 O.O.3d 512 WHITT et al., Appellants, v. COLUMBUS COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISES, D.B.A. Co-Op Optical et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
The statute of limitations contained in R.C. 2305.11(A) is limited to the areas specifically enumerated therein and to the common-law definition of "malpractice." (Hocking Conservancy Dist. v. Dodson-Lindblom Assoc., 62 Ohio St.2d 195, 404 N.E.2d 164, approved and followed.)
On November 20, 1978, Rosemary Whitt and Earle Whitt, plaintiffs-appellants herein, commenced an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County against Columbus Cooperative Enterprises, d.b.a. Co-Op Optical, and James H. Connor, O.D., and George W. Knox, O.D., both optometrists. Rosemary Whitt alleged that she made an appointment for an eye examination with defendant Knox after experiencing visual difficulties. She was examined by Knox's associate, defendant Connor, on August 13, 1977. He prescribed glasses and advised her that her visual difficulties would disappear in two weeks. Mrs. Whitt had her prescription filled at the adjoining offices of Columbus Cooperative Enterprises, which she described as involved in a joint venture with the other defendants. Certain visual problems disappeared within two weeks. She picked up her new glasses in December 1977. In May 1978, an ophthalmologist discovered that Mrs. Whitt was suffering from a detached retina and generalized deterioration of her eyes due to diabetes mellitus. Mrs. Whitt alleged that the defendants' failure to diagnose and recommend appropriate medical attention proximately resulted in the loss of vision in one eye and accelerated deterioration in the other. Whitt claimed loss of consortium, loss of services and medical expenses arising from the defendants' negligence.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and for failure to bring the action within the one-year statute of limitations for "malpractice" in R.C. 2305.11(A). The Court of Common Pleas sustained the motions and dismissed the cause.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the complaint stated a cause of action against Columbus Cooperative Enterprises, but that R.C. 2305.11(A) barred the action against optometrists Knox and Connor. Finding its judgment on this latter issue to be in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Stark County in Ruble v. Nupuf (February 14, 1979), No. 4934, unreported, the Court of Appeals certified the record of the case to this court for review and final determination.
E. Bruce Hadden and Nicholas W. Zuk, Columbus, for appellants.
Crabbe, Brown, Jones, Potts & Schmidt, William L. Schmidt and Irving B. Marks, Columbus, for appellee James H. Connor.
George W. Ankney, Jr., Columbus, for appellee George W. Knox.
McNamara & McNamara, John L. Miller and Dennis D. Liston, Columbus, for appellee Columbus Co-Op. Enterprises.
The sole issue in the instant cause is whether the one-year statute of limitations, under the purview of R.C. 2305.11(A), or the two-year statute of limitations, under R.C. 2305.10, is applicable to a negligence action against an optometrist. 1 Stated otherwise, the issue is whether negligence by an optometrist constitutes "malpractice" within the meaning of R.C. 2305.11(A). 2
The common-law meaning of malpractice was restricted to intentional or negligent acts by physicians and lawyers. That meaning was given to the term "malpractice" in the original version of R.C. 2305.11. 3 In 1975 and 1976, the General Assembly amended R.C. 2305.11(A). The relevant changes resulted in the addition of the phrase, "including an action for malpractice against a physician, podiatrist, or a hospital," after the term "malpractice." 4
This court recently interpreted R.C. 2305.11(A), as amended, in Hocking Conservancy Dist. v. Dodson-Lindblom Assoc. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 195, 404 N.E.2d 164, a case involving the applicability of the statute to negligence by a professional engineer. In that case, this Court held as follows: "The statute of limitations contained in R.C. 2305.11(A) is limited to the areas specifically enumerated therein and to the common-law definition of 'malpractice.' "
Further, in Hocking Conservancy Dist., supra, this court noted, at 198, 404 N.E.2d 164, that " * * * (t)he inclusion of three specific medical classes does not indicate that the General Assembly has accepted Judge Matthias' invitation (in Richardson v. Doe (1964), 176 Ohio St. 370, 199 N.E.2d 878,) to extend the one-year statute of limitations to professional negligence actions outside the legal, health care and medical areas." Citing this sentence, appellees contend that as optometry is a health care profession, a negligence action against an optometrist is barred unless brought within the one-year time limitation of R.C. 2305.11(A). The reference to health care and medical areas in Hocking Conservancy Dist., supra, serves to illustrate the character of those professions included within the ambit of R.C. 2305.11(A) malpractice actions and is not intended to expand the protection given by that statute to health care and medical professions other than those specifically enumerated or within the common-law definition.
If the General Assembly had wished to protect groups which are not traditionally associated with malpractice, such as optometrists and dentists, it would have listed them under R.C. 2305.11(A), as it did by amendment for podiatrists and hospitals, or included them in an expanded definition of "physician" under R.C. 2305.11(D). Hocking Conservancy Dist., supra, and Richardson v. Doe, supra. We do not feel that the General Assembly intended to extend the one-year statute of limitations to negligence actions against all professionals in the health care field. Accordingly, we find that negligence by an optometrist is not within the meaning of malpractice under R.C. 2305.11(A). The applicable statute of limitations is the two-year time limitation for bodily injury under R.C. 2305.10.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Franklin County is reversed as to the issue of the applicability of the statute of limitations, and the cause is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for proceedings consonant...
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