Evans v. City of Atlanta

• Citation: 377 S.E.2d 31,189 Ga.App. 566
• Decision Date: 05 December 1988
• Docket Number: No. 77744,77744
• Parties: EVANS v. CITY OF ATLANTA et al.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

Page 31

377 S.E.2d 31

189 Ga.App. 566

EVANS v. CITY OF ATLANTA et al.

No. 77744.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Dec. 5, 1988.

Richard Evans, pro se.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Joseph J. Drolet, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

McMURRAY, Presiding Judge.

Appellant, who is serving a 15-year sentence for aggravated assault, terroristic threat and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, ¹ mailed from the Central Correctional Institution in Macon, Georgia an "Inmate Form for Civil Action," a pauper's affidavit and other papers to the Clerk of the Superior Court of Fulton County. The pleadings were presented to a superior court judge for review prior to filing and the court held that "the pleadings show on their face such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact that it cannot be reasonably believed that the court should grant any relief against any parties named in the pleadings and therefore deny the filing of the pleading." This appeal followed. Held:

OCGA § 9-15-2(d) provides in part as follows: "When a civil action is presented for filing under this Code section by a party who is not represented by an attorney, the clerk of court shall not file the matter but shall present the complaint or other initial pleading to a judge of the court. The judge shall review the pleading and, if the judge determines that the pleading shows on its face such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact that it cannot be reasonably believed that the court could grant any relief against any party named in the pleading, then the judge shall enter an order denying filing of the pleading."

"When examining a complaint, courts are compelled to determine whether the facts alleged state a claim for relief under which the plaintiff may recover. It is not necessary that the complaint be perfect in form or set out all of the issues with particularity, it is necessary only to place the defendant on notice of the claim against him. OCGA § 9-11-8; Sheppard v. Yara Engineering Corp., 248 Ga. 147, 149, 150 (281 SE2d 586)." Walton v. James & Dean, Inc., 177 Ga.App. 77, 78(1), 338 S.E.2d 516.

In the case sub judice, appellant attempted to file, pro se, a lawsuit against three law enforcement officers, the police officers' governmental employers and a municipal court judge, asserting "legal negligence, obstruction of public administration, abuse of governmental office, conspiracy [and] prejudice." In a confusing and convoluted statement of facts, appellant alleged that the police officers arrested him illegally; that one of the officers knowingly perjured himself and manipulated evidence to secure appellant's conviction; that the municipal court judge considered non-probative evidence at a pre-trial hearing and that the judge was prejudiced against appellant because the judge was the victim of a crime for which appellant had been charged. From these allegations, it is apparent that appellant's claim against the municipal court judge is barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir.1966). See Calhoun v. Little, 106 Ga. 336(2), 32 S.E 86 and Hill v. Bartlett, 126 Ga.App. 833, 836(1), 192 S.E.2d 427. However, "[w]e cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears 'beyond doubt that the [appellant] can prove no set of facts in support of his [claims against the law enforcement officers and their governmental employers] which would entitle him to relief.' Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 [78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80] (1957). See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (CA2 1944)." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652. A liberal reading of appellant's pleading in the case sub judice reveals a potential Civil Rights action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. ² Accordingly, without expressing a view as to the merits of appellant's allegations, we conclude that he is...