Evans v. May
| Decision Date | 11 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-95-01026-CV,01-95-01026-CV |
| Citation | 923 S.W.2d 712 |
| Parties | Myron Anna EVANS, Appellant, v. Carl MAY, Appellee. (1st Dist.) |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Carnegie H. Mims, Jr., Houston, for Appellant.
Debra Jo Catlett, Houston, for Appellee.
Before SCHNEIDER, C.J., and TAFT and ANDELL, JJ.
This is a case involving a will contest between the decedent's sister and the decedent's "lifemate" who is the executor and sole beneficiary of the decedent's estate. The primary issues we address are: (1) whether an executed will, that was torn up, then taped back together, with a writing signed by the decedent on each page stating another person had torn the will and it was still in force, was revoked; and (2) whether appellee's 30-year relationship with the decedent constituted undue influence as a matter of law. We affirm the trial court's admission of the will to probate.
The decedent, Jack W. Knickerbocker, executed his will with all the formalities required by law on February 18, 1980. He appointed appellee, Carl May (decedent's "lifemate"), as independent executor and appellant, Myron Anna Evans, his sister, as alternate independent executrix. May was the sole beneficiary under the will. On February 23, 1980, May was drinking when he fought with the decedent, resulting in May tearing up the original will. The decedent pieced the will back together, and wrote, signed, and dated a message on each page of the will stating,
The parties stipulated to the authenticity of the decedent's signature on page two of the will and in the margin of each page of the will. At trial, the attorney who prepared the will and a handwriting expert testified that the handwriting on the side of each page of the will was that of the decedent. By admitting the will to probate, the probate court determined that the handwriting was not a forgery and the handwriting did not constitute a codicil to the will.
Evans' first point of error claims the trial court erred in admitting decedent's will to probate, because the will was revoked when the decedent tore up the original will.
In a trial to the court, the trial court's judgment must be upheld if supported by the evidence. In re Estate of Johnson, 781 S.W.2d 390, 391-92 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied). Evans correctly states the rule that if a will is found in the possession of the testator at his death, in a "state of mutilation, obliteration, or cancellation" representing a sufficient act of revocation within the meaning of the statute, then it is presumed, in absence of evidence to the contrary, that the testator destroyed it with the intention of revoking it. Simpson v. Neely, 221 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1949, writ ref'd).
Here, the will was found not in a state of mutilation, but taped together. There is also evidence rebutting the presumption of intent to revoke, i.e., the decedent's handwritten message. We conclude that the evidence sufficiently supports the trial court's implied finding that the will had not been revoked, either because the presumption of intent to revoke did not arise or because it was rebutted.
Accordingly, we overrule Evans' first point of error.
Evans' second point of error contends the trial court erred in admitting the decedent's will to probate because the evidence of nonrevocation violated the Dead Man's Statute and was self-serving, unverified, and unauthenticated. The Dead Man's Statute prohibits admission of a decedent's words or actions through a third party who could benefit. See TEX.R.CIV.EVID. 601(b). Evans complains May, as executor, should not have been allowed to testify concerning any communications with the decedent. Evans also claims that the spelling of the word "whom" as "whome," casts suspicion on the authenticity of the written statement.
In regard to the spelling of the word "whom" casting suspicion on authenticity, we hold that this merely created a fact issue for the trial court to resolve. As for inadmissibility pursuant to the Dead Man's Statute, no such objection was made at trial. Any complaint as to the admission of the evidence was thus waived. See TEX.R.APP.P. 52; Tuttle v. Simpson, 735 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1987, no writ).
Therefore, we overrule Evans' second point of error.
Evans' third point of error argues the trial court erred in admitting the decedent's will to probate because the evidence shows, as a matter of law, the decedent was unduly influenced by May. It is undisputed that May and the decedent lived together for over 30 years and had a "special" relationship. The attorney who prepared the will, Ruth...
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