Evans v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 14 April 2020 |
Docket Number | 1:19 CV 257 WCM |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
Parties | PEGGY J. EVANS, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Under Rule 12(c) ("Motion") filed by Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Defendant"). Docs. 3 & 4. Peggy Evans ("Plaintiff") has responded and Defendant has replied. Docs. 12 & 13.1
On August 5, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint ("Complaint") in the Superior Court of Jackson County, North Carolina asserting three claims: (1) breach of an insurance contract; (2) unfair and deceptive tradepractices/unfair claim settlement practices; and (3) punitive damages/bad faith. Doc. 1-1.
Defendant removed the action to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 on September 4, 2019.2
On September 5, 2019, Defendant filed a Verified Answer and Affirmative Defenses ("Answer"), as well as the instant Motion. Docs. 2, 3, 4, & 5.3
On October 8, 2019, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second and Third Causes of Action, leaving only Plaintiff's breach of contract claim. Doc. 14.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she is the sole owner of a home and personal property located at 451 Rugged Mountain Road, Jackson County, North Carolina ("Property"). The Property was insured under a policy that was issued by Defendant and that provided dwelling and personal property coverage ("Policy"). Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 7, 8 & 13.
Plaintiff contends that on August 24, 2018, a fire originated in her home, resulting in a total loss of the Property. Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 11 & 12.
Plaintiff alleges that despite "fully cooperat[ing] with [Defendant] in the claims process and compl[ying] with all material obligations of the Policy," Defendant "wrongfully and unreasonably denied liability for the claimed losses." Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 16 & 18. Plaintiff further alleges that she "never made any material misrepresentation to [Defendant] and was in no way responsible for the fire, nor did she have any knowledge that the fire would occur." Doc. 1-1, ¶ 20.
The Declarations page of the Policy lists David L. Beaudoin and Plaintiff as the named insureds. Doc. 2-1, p. 2.4 Plaintiff contends that notwithstanding any alleged wrongdoing by Mr. Beaudoin, "[Defendant] is still obligated to provide coverage under the Policy for the dwelling loss and for Ms. Evan's personal property loss." Doc. 1-1, ¶ 24.
In its Answer as well as in the Motion, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim should be dismissed because the Policy was voided pursuant to the "Concealment or Fraud" condition, which states that "no coverage is provided under the policy if, whether before or after a loss, an insured has intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact orcircumstance, engaged in fraudulent conduct, or made false statements relating to this insurance." Doc. 2, pp. 2-3; Doc. 3, ¶ 14. Specifically, Defendant argues that coverage has been voided under this condition as a result of: (1) Mr. Beaudoin's inconsistent statements regarding his whereabouts around the time of the August 24, 2018 fire; (2) misrepresentations by Plaintiff and Mr. Beaudoin in their insurance application before the loss;5 and (3) misrepresentations by Plaintiff in contents inventories submitted after the loss.6 Doc. 4, p. 6.
Under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move for judgment on the pleadings "[a]fter the pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay trial." A motion brought under Rule 12(c) is analyzed "under the same standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 115 (4th Cir. 2013).
However, "[u]nlike when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court, when deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, may considerthe Answer." Garey v. James S. Farrin, P.C., 1:16CV542, 2018 WL 6003546, at * 2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 15, 2018) (citing Alexander v. City of Greensboro, 801 F.Supp.2d 429, 433 (M.D.N.C. 2011)). In particular, "[t]he factual allegations contained in the Answer 'are taken as true only where and to the extent they have not been denied or do not conflict with the complaint.'" Id. (quoting Jadoff v. Gleason, 140 F.R.D. 330, 331 (M.D.N.C. 1991)); see also Anderson v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:13-cv-489-MOC, 2014 WL 4987207, at * 3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2014) () (citing Bradley v. Ramsey, 329 F.Supp.2d 617, 622 (W.D.N.C. 2004)). "Because the plaintiff is not required to reply to the Answer, 'all allegations in the [A]nswer are deemed denied'" and "[t]he defendant cannot therefore 'rely on allegations of fact contained only in the [A]nswer, including affirmative defenses, which contradict Plaintiffs' complaint.'" Garey, 2018 WL 6003546, at * 2; (quoting Jadoff, 140 F.R.D. at 332) (alteration in Garey).
In support of the Motion, Defendant relies on the following exhibits that were attached to its Answer:
"In a Rule 12(c) motion, the court may consider the complaint, answer, and any materials attached to those pleadings or motions for judgment on the pleadings 'so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.'" Lafayette Life Ins. Co. v. Cole, 3:17-cv-561, 2018 WL 4705561, at * 2 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2018)) (internal citation omitted); Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Civil No. WMN-06-1892, 2008 WL 7275126, at * 5 (D. Md. May 13, 2008) ( ).
Here, the first of Defendant's exhibits is a certified copy of the Policy. Doc. 2-1. The remainder of the substantive exhibits relate to Defendant's affirmative defense that coverage under the Policy has been voided pursuant to the Concealment or Fraud condition. See Doc. 5 & Docs. 2-2 through 2-20.
The Policy is central to Plaintiff's Complaint and its authenticity has not been challenged. Accordingly, the Court may rely on the Policy when considering the Motion. Brown v. Economy Premier Assurance Company, No. 1:17-cv-206-MOC-DLH, 2018 WL 1594669, at * 2 (W.D.N.C. April 2, 2018) () (quoting Colin v. Marconi Commerce Sys. Employees' Retirement Plan, 335 F.Supp.2d 590, 596 (M.D.N.C. 2004)).
In her opposition to the Motion, Plaintiff objects to several of the other exhibits.7
In addition, Plaintiff disputes Defendant's contention that the representations described in some of these documents were false, material, or knowingly and willfully made. See Doc. 12, p. 9 ( ).
Consequently, the additional exhibits may not be considered unless the Motion is converted into a motion for summary judgment. Considering that this case is in an early procedural stage and that no conversion request has been made by the parties, the undersigned does not find that such a conversion would be appropriate. See Lefkoe, 2008 WL 7275126, at * 5 & n. 9 (...
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