Evans v. State

• Decision Date: 24 November 1919
• Docket Number: 20811
• Citation: 121 Miss. 252,83 So. 167
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: EVANS v. STATE

83 So. 167

121 Miss. 252

EVANS v. STATE

No. 20811

Supreme Court of Mississippi

November 24, 1919

APPEAL from the circuit court of Marshall county, HON. C. LEE CRUM Judge.

LANDLORD AND TENANT. Inducing Tenant to breach contract.

The mere hiring of a tenant, who had already broken his contract with his landlord before he had entered upon such contract was not a violation of Code 1906, section 1146 (Hemingway's Code, section 874), penalizing efforts to persuade tenant to breach his contract.

HON. C LEE CRUM, Judge.

Reversed and dismissed.

LESTER G. FANT, for appellant.

Our contention is, in regard to the written contract, first, that the contract is too indefinite to be binding under the section of the code proceeded under, which is as follows: Section 1146, Code 1906.

"Enticing servants: If any person shall wilfully interfere with, entice away, knowingly employ, or induce a laborer or renter who has contracted with another person for a specified time to leave his employer or the leased premises, before the expiration of his contract without the consent of the employer or landlord, etc. . . .

The written contract did not specify any certain time but was indefinite in its terms. It does not state the terms of the contract as to wages, etc., nor the time it is to run but leaves it indefinite. In addition to this, the prosecuting witness testimony as has been shown above, stated that this contract had been abrogated. The next contract which is alleged to have been made in the field in October or November, 1918, as a share cropper, for the year 1919 had not begun.

Dora Oglesby had not begun the service for the year 1919 and consequently the appellant could not have been convicted for enticing her away before 1919 begun. See case of Hendrix v. State, 79 Miss. 368, where the court holds that there cannot be any enticing before the contract begins, nor any breach of a contract before it begins.

Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant had a right to be told exactly what the offense was that he was charged with, he was forced to go to trial at this time and stay throughout the trial without any election on the part of the state, for which contract he was going on. Whichever contract they were going on, the defendant was entitled to be discharged because the written contract, so called, had been finished and abrogated, and the new contract had not yet begun.

The charge granted the state is objectionable for many reasons. For the convenience of the court we quote the charge here: "The court instructs the jury for the state that if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Dora Oglesby was under a contract as a laborer with J. W. Henderson, and that before said contract had expired, the defendant, A. B. Evans, either wilfully interfered with, enticed away, knowingly employed, or induced said Dora Oglesby to leave the employment of said J. W. Henderson, then you will convict said defendant and the form of your verdict should be: "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged."

The charge is vitally defective because it attempts to state facts and does not state all the facts, and charges that before said contract had expired the defendant either wilfully interfered with, enticed away, knowingly employed or induced said Dora Oglesby to leave the employment of J. W. Henderson, "then you will convict said defendant," leaving it to the jury to convict this defendant even though the employment had not yet begun.

There is absolutely no doubt in the statement of the case by the prosecuting witness that the written contract had been abandoned and that neither he nor Dora Oglesby considered themselves bound by it, and the oral contract had not yet begun, so it is very apparent that appellant was convicted without a syllable of testimony to show his guilt and should have been granted his discharge by the court at the conclusion of the testimony of the state and a peremptory instruction should have been given in view of the record in this case absolutely disclosing that there could not be any guilt, we respectfully request the court to reverse this case and dismiss the affidavit against appellant here.

Ross A. Collins, attorney-general, for the state.

In our opinion, this appeal presents one simple proposition of law. There is no doubt but that the appellant in this case knew of the relations existing between Mr. Henderson and Dora Oglesby, and so knowing same, he deliberately moved her from Mr. Henderson's place to his place.

As we understand the record, the question of law presented by this appeal is: Does the certificate of employment, herein before set out, coupled with Dora's relations with Mr. Henderson on November 23, 1918, constitute such a contract as is contemplated by section 1146 above quoted?

Respectfully submitted.

IN BANC

OPINION

COOK, J.

In December, 1916, one Dora Oglesby entered into a written contract with J. W. Henderson, a landholder in Marshall county, whereby she bound herself and children to work with Mr. Henderson for four or five years. The contract was in these words:

Potts Camp, Miss., 12--20--16.

"This is to certify that Dora Oglesby has contracted with J. W. Henderson for her and her children to work with said J. W. Henderson for four or five years, said Dora Oglesby and children to work by the day.

DORA [her mark X] OGLESBY."

It seems that Dora and the children remained on Mr Henderson's place until the fall of 1918. The evidence discloses that Dora did but little actual work; she cooked for and carried food to the children at work in the field. In the fall of 1918, according to the evidence of the state, the written...