Thompson v. Box

• Decision Date: 09 May 1927
• Docket Number: 26384
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: THOMPSON v. BOX. [*]

112 So. 597

147 Miss. 1

THOMPSON v. BOX. ^[*]

No. 26384

Supreme Court of Mississippi

May 9, 1927

(In Banc.)

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Court should, if possible, uphold- statute by placing reasonable construction thereon, rendering it harmonious with federal and state Constitutions.

Supreme court, in construing a statute, must, if possible, uphold statute by placing a reasonable construction thereon which would render it harmonious with both federal and state Constitutions.

2. MASTER AND SERVANT. Person contracting with laborers believing they had abandoned1 original contract, held not liable for statutory penalty (Laics 1924, chapter 160).

Person contracting with negro laborers, believing in good faith that they had abandoned contract and premises of their former employer, did not render himself liable to 'penalty imposed by Laws 1924, chapter 160, in case of willfully interfering with; enticing away, or knowingly employing laborer or renter who had contracted with another person to leave employer or leased premises.

3. MASTER AND SERVANT. Law forbidding interference with employment must be strictly construed in favor of liberty of contract and person (Laws, 1924, chapter 160).

Laws 1924, chapter 160, forbidding interference with, or employment of, laborer or renter contracting with another person, being extremely drastic, must be construed strictly in favor of liberty of action, liberty of contract, and liberty of person.

4. Master and Servant. Statements and actions of negro laborers held to have constituted abandonment of former contract authorizing re-employment by another (Laws 1924, chapter 160). Statements and action of negro laborers relative to leaving former employment, together with their refusal to return for statements of account, held to constitute such abandonment of former contract as authorized their re-employment by any other person without creating liability for statutory penalty under Laws 1924, chapter 160.

SMITH C. J., dissenting.

HON. S F. Davis, Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Humphreys county HON. S. F. DAVIS Judge.

Action by W. M. Thompson against C. B. Box. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Montgomery & Montgomery, for appellant.

I. The decision of this case involves a construction of chapter 160, Laws of 1924. This statute provides for four separate activities that are condemned by its provisions: (1) wilful interference, (2) enticing away, (3) knowingly employing, and (4) inducing in any manner to leave the leased premises. The declaration in the case at bar covers all four of these activities and if the existence of any one of the four has been reasonably established by the testimony, then plaintiff below was entitled to have his case go to the jury for its determination.

We are of the opinion that the testimony does establish the liability of the defendant and does show a violation of the statute, because it shows without dispute and admittedly an open case of enticing, interferring with, knowingly employing, and inducing to leave the leased premises. Compare Gregory v. State, 42 So. 168; Armistead v. Chatters, 71 Miss. 509, 15 So. 39. The latter cases, to our minds, covers the case at bar like a blanket. The facts are almost identical.

II. The second ground of defendant's motion to exclude is that "The proof shows that the alleged tenants, Holsteen and Barton, had abandoned their contract with plaintiff and had actually left the plantation premises of the plaintiff with the acknowledged purpose not to return during the period of their contract with plaintiff and the statute does not make the defendant liable in such cases." This ground is not supported by the testimony.

When the statute says "leave his employer or the leased premises," the statute uses the word leave in the sense of abandon. Let us look to the law of abandonment and see the requirements thereof. 1 C. J., page 6, paragraph 7; Utt v. Frey, 106 Cal. 392, 397, 39 P. 807; Mitchell v. Garden, 21 W.Va. 277 at 285; 1 R. C. L., page 4, paragraph 5; 1 R. C. L., page 1, paragraph 1; Young v. Berman, 96 Ark. 78, 131 S.W. 62, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.).

In the light of the above authorities we cannot see how it can be said that the darkies in the case at bar had left, forsaken, or abandoned the leased premises, when the undisputed proof shows that they were in possession of the premises, occupying the houses, their families actually eating, sleeping and residing in the houses, and they themselves going back there at night to their families.

We will concede that it is no violation of the statute merely to rent land, without knowledge of the former contract. The statute is directed against wrong and if the defendant did not know of the contract at the time and did not knowingly do anything to interfere with the laborer or renter or interfere between him and his landlord, then of course there would be no wrong on his part that could be the basis of punishing him, and any punishment inflicted would be punishment for exercising his right to contract. Such is the principle laid down in Sneed v. Gillman, 44 So. 830. But if the defendant has knowingly contracted or induced or otherwise interfered, then there is a wrong that is punishable under the statute and the statute applies.

The proof does not show "that the defendant only rented land," but it shows that he is guilty of every activity that is denounced and condemned by the statute.

IV. Counsel contends that where a tenant has breached his contract and left the leased premises another landlord can knowingly employ him without liability. In short, he asserts that the "knowingly employ" provision of the statute is not a valid provision. In our judgment, the provision is unquestionably constitutional and had already been so held in Hoole v. Dorroh, 75 Miss. 257, 22 So. 829.

To sum up: There must have been a valid and subsisting contract between the laborer and the first employer. Otherwise, the employer would have had no property right in the services of his servant. Such is the holding in State v. Richardson, 86 Miss. 439, 38 So. 497.

In the next place, of course, the servant must have actually entered upon the performance of the service. Such is the holding in Hendricks v. State, 79 Miss. 368, 30 So. 708; Alford v. Pegues, 92 Miss. 558, 46 So. 76; Evans v. State, 121 Miss. 252, 83 So. 167; and similar cases.

In the next place, there must have been no breach of the contract on the part of the employer, for if there has been such a breach, then the laborer is entitled to leave the services of the employer; and he no longer is entitled to the services of the laborer for he has forfeited his right to this service by the breach of the contract. Such is the holding in Mahoney v. McNeil, 77 Miss. 406, 27 So. 528; Petty v. Leggett, 38 So. 549 (not officially reported); and Beale v. Yazoo Yarn Mill, 126 Miss. 807, 88 So. 411.

But when the breach of the first contract has been on the part of the laborer, this does not excuse him from the performance of his contract and he is still under a duty to perform. When he explains and represents to his second employer that he, the laborer, has breached the contract, then he does not relate any facts to the second employer that would excuse and release him from performance to his first employer. If the second employer employs, upon such representations, no matter how much he relies thereon, then he does knowingly employ. This distinction was recognized in Armistead v. Chatters, supra, and was pointed out in the Beale case, supra. So a reliance in such cases, on the part of the second employer, does not in any way exonerate him from liability.

If the tenant abandons his contract and leaves the leased premises and after so breaching his contract and surrendering up possession he then goes to another and is employed by him, with knowledge of the first contract, there is then liability upon the second employer for his act in so knowingly employing said laborer. Hoole v. Dorroh, supra.

Barbour & Henry and C. M. Murphy, for appellee.

Counsel for appellee argue that Armistead v. Chatters, 71 Miss. 509, and Hoole v. Dorroh, 75 Miss. 257, are conclusive here. We do not argue that either of these cases will have to be overruled. However, there has been a gradual and at last, in our judgment, a definite departure from the holding in these two cases. This is evidenced by a brief consideration of state and federal decisions since that time. See Jackson v. State, 16 So. 299, holding that the mere hiring after the tenant had left the premises was not a violation of the statute; Sneed v. Gilman, 44 So. 830, holding that the mere renting of land (and this is all that appellee Box did) to a tenant under contract to rent other land, even while he was occupying the land first rented, did not impose liability as the statute must be strictly construed; and so construed, it did not prohibit the renting of land from two parties. Hendrix v. State, 79 Miss. 368, held the statute forbidding the laborer or share-cropper, who was under contract, to leave the employer or the leased premises without giving notice of the first contract, was not violated in a case where the tenant had not actually gone on the premises. That statute of course has been declared unconstitutional, and the case is cited only to show the strictness of construction employed. See, also, Alford v. Pegues, 92 Miss. 558; Evans v. State, 121 Miss. 252, and Shilling v. State, 109 So. 737, are conclusive here.

In Beale v. Yazoo Yarn Mill, 125 Miss. 807, the court makes clear its purpose to follow the rule that where there are two reasonable constructions to be placed upon a statute, one of which would endanger its constitutionality, the court will...