Evans v. State, 5726

Citation653 P.2d 308
Decision Date09 November 1982
Docket NumberNo. 5726,5726
PartiesMichael James EVANS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

Sylvia Lee Hackl, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Steven F. Freudenthal, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., Allen C. Johnson, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael L. Hubbard, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), for appellee.

Before ROSE, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROONEY and BROWN, JJ.

ROONEY, Justice.

A jury found appellant guilty of the crimes of attempted (§ 6-1-201, W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1982) first degree sexual assault (§ 6-4-302(a)(i), W.S.1977) and of aiding and abetting (§ 6-1-114, W.S.1977) first degree sexual assault. He appeals from the resulting judgment and sentence, wording the only issue on appeal as follows "Whether Appellant was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial by an impartial jury through the state's use of premptory [sic] challenges to exclude minorities from the petit jury."

We affirm.

Appellant is a black man. He does not challenge the composition of the venire. In selection of the petit jury, the State challenged three jurors for cause, and the challenges were granted. Thereafter, the State exercised two of its eight peremptory challenges, challenging Willie Porter and John Martinez; and appellant exercised all eight of his. 1

After the jury selection process was completed, appellant moved for a mistrial on the grounds that minority members were excluded from the jury through jury challenges. He stated that juror Martinez was "Chicano" and juror Porter was "Negro." In reply, the prosecuting attorney said:

"Well, of course, by the surnames we can, it's not true that all the--And the State could have excluded all the minorities, but by the surnames it's obvious on the record that there are minorities on the jury, and the removal, as the Court probably detected, on the two challenges, were people that knew or knew of the defendant."

The court commented that:

"Certainly there are some Spanish surnames in the jury sitting, but I don't--that doesn't mean anything. They may be married individuals to persons having Spanish surnames."

Defense counsel noted that juror Ortega appeared to be Caucasian. The court commented that juror Lara could have a Spanish surname, and the assistant prosecutor commented that juror Ley "looks Chicano" although his name was otherwise. The record does not reflect anything further with reference to the race or national origin of the jurors. During voir dire, juror Porter said that he knew appellant by seeing him in public places and exchanging "common greetings" with him in those instances. During voir dire, juror Martinez said that he knew of defendant inasmuch as Martinez's son "goes to school" with defendant's brother.

The motion for mistrial was denied, and appellant contends the denial to have been error.

Appellant acknowledges the holding in Swain v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), to the effect that a defendant could not question a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in a particular case even if the peremptory challenge was allegedly used to discriminate against a particular group of persons. The court there said:

"The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control. State v. Thompson, 68 Ariz. 386, 206 P.2d 1037 (1949); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378, 13 S.Ct. 136, 139, 36 L.Ed. 1011. While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable. Hayes v. State of Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70, 7 S.Ct. 350, 351, 30 L.Ed. 578. It is often exercised upon the 'sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another,' Lewis, supra 146 U.S., at 376, 13 S.Ct., at 138, upon a juror's 'habits and associations,' Hayes v. State of Missouri, supra, 120 U.S., at 70, 7 S.Ct., at 351, or upon the feeling that 'the bare questioning [a juror's] indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment,' Lewis, supra, 146 U.S., at 376, 13 S.Ct., at 138. It is no less frequently exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty. For the question a prosecutor or defense counsel must decide is not whether a juror of a particular race or nationality is in fact partial, but whether one from a different group is less likely to be. It is well known that these factors are widely explored during the voir dire, by both prosecutor and accused, Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 26 L.Ed. 481; Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 51 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054. This Court has held that the fairness of trial by jury requires no less. Aldridge, supra. Hence veniremen are not always judged solely as individuals for the purpose of exercising peremptory challenges. Rather they are challenged in light of the limited knowledge counsel has of them, which may include their group affiliations in the context of the case to be tried.

* * *

* * *

"In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his challenges in any given case. The presumption in any particular case must be that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court. The presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor therefore...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Engberg v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 27 June 1984
    ...which relate to the selection of panels of veniremen, not the particular panel of twelve jurors which tries the case. In Evans v. State, Wyo., 653 P.2d 308 (1982), we dealt with a similar complaint with respect to the exercise of peremptory challenges by the prosecution. There we relied upo......
  • State v. Neil
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 27 September 1984
    ...(R.I.1982); Jason v. State, 589 S.W.2d 447 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); State v. Grady, 93 Wis.2d 1, 286 N.W.2d 607 (Ct.App.1979); Evans v. State, 653 P.2d 308 (Wyo.1982).4 One of these cases, People v. Payne, 106 Ill.App.3d 1034, 62 Ill.Dec. 744, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (App.Ct.1980), has been reversed an......
  • Wilson v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 30 December 1982
    ...resolves the issue of instructional error and results in an affirmance. 1 See, Haight v. State, Wyo., 654 P.2d 1232 (and Evans v. State, Wyo., 653 P.2d 308 (1982).2 An officer witness called by counsel for one of the defendants testified that he stopped the car and that all these items were......
  • Mattern v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 13 February 2007
    ...official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty. Evans v. State, 653 P.2d 308, 309-10 (Wyo. 1982). [¶ 7] The "any reason or no reason" rule came to an end, however, with the publication of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT