Evans v. Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc., SUNSHINE-JR
| Decision Date | 30 August 1991 |
| Docket Number | SUNSHINE-JR |
| Citation | 587 So.2d 312 |
| Parties | Rickey EVANS and Emily J. Evans, as parents of Ronald Eugene Evans; and Rickey Evans, as administrator of the Estate of Ronald Eugene Evans, deceased v.STORES, INC. 1900409. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Eason Mitchell, Alabaster, for appellants.
Jack J. Hall and John M. Fraley of McDaniel, Hall, Conerly & Lusk, Birmingham, for appellee.
Rickey Evans and Emily J. Evans, as parents of Ronald Eugene Evans, and Rickey Evans, as administrator of the estate of Ronald Eugene Evans, deceased, appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc., in an action to recover damages for the death of Ronald Eugene Evans. This judgment was made final pursuant to Rule 54(b), A.R.Civ.P. 1
Ronald Eugene Evans was killed when his automobile collided with a pickup truck driven by Earl Simpson, Jr., at approximately 12:25 a.m. on May 6, 1989. At the time of the accident, Simpson was driving under the influence of alcohol. At approximately 11:45 p.m. on May 5, Simpson had purchased a 12-pack of beer from Sunshine-Jr. Stores in Columbiana, Alabama. Rickey Evans and Emily J. Evans, as parents of Ronald Eugene Evans, and Rickey Evans, as administrator of the estate of Ronald Eugene Evans, deceased, sued Sunshine-Jr. Stores, alleging that it had negligently and wantonly caused the death of Ronald Eugene Evans and claiming damages under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-71, "The Dram Shop Act." The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Sunshine-Jr. Stores and denied the Evanses' subsequent motion to alter, amend, or vacate that summary judgment. The Evanses appeal.
Under Alabama's Dram Shop Act, any person or the personal representative of any person injured or killed by an intoxicated person has a cause of action against one who "by selling, giving or otherwise disposing of to another, contrary to the provisions of law, any liquors or beverages, cause[s] the intoxication of such person." Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-71. The Evanses allege that Sunshine-Jr. Stores, a licensee of the Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board ("ABC Board"), violated Regulation 20-X-6-.15 of the regulations promulgated by the ABC Board by allowing Simpson to drive on its premises while under the influence of alcohol. The Evanses contend that because the regulations of the ABC Board have the full force and effect of law, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 28-3-49, they have a cause of action under the Dram Shop Act based on the alleged violation of Regulation 20-X-6-.15. That regulation provides:
This Court is not persuaded by this argument. The cause of action created by the Dram Shop Act is confined to the unlawful selling, giving, or otherwise disposing of liquors or beverages. Moreover, the language in Regulation 20-X-6-.15 sets forth the consequences for criminal conduct on the premises of a licensee and provides that the licensee shall be accountable to the ABC Board for criminal conduct. It does not appear that Regulation 20-X-6-.15 was promulgated to impose liability to third parties for criminal conduct on the premises of an ABC Board licensee. This Court concludes that the Evanses do not have a cause of action under the Dram Shop Act based on the alleged violation of Regulation 20-X-6-.15.
The Evanses also contend that they have a cause of action under the Dram Shop Act based on an alleged violation by Sunshine-Jr. Stores of Ordinance No. 295 of the City of Columbiana, Alabama, which reads:
Ordinance No. 295 was enacted on December 20, 1979, and became effective on January 1, 1980. At the time the ordinance was passed and became effective, Ala.Code 1975, § 28-3-260(2), provided, inter alia, that it was unlawful for a liquor licensee to sell alcoholic beverages to any person visibly intoxicated. On September 30, 1980, § 28-3-260 was repealed by the Alabama legislature and as of the time of the accident in this case, there was no Alabama law prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages by an off-premises liquor licensee to any person visibly intoxicated. 2 The Evanses argue that the city ordinance preserved the state law that was in effect at the time of the passage of the ordinance and that the ordinance, therefore, prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages by an off-premises licensee to a visibly intoxicated person.
This Court, in distinguishing between "specific reference statutes" and "general reference statutes," has held that a specific reference statute is one that incorporates an earlier statute by specific and descriptive reference thereto and that a general reference statute is one that refers generally to the law relating to the subject under consideration. Shelby County Commission v. Smith, 372 So.2d 1092 (Ala.1979); Carruba v. Meeks, 274 Ala. 714, 150 So.2d 195 (1963). A general reference statute includes not only the law in force at the time the adopting act became effective, but also any subsequent modifications to the general law, unless there is a clear expression of a contrary legislative intent. Shelby County Commission v. Smith, supra. A general reference statute or ordinance assures that the city ordinance is not inconsistent with state laws and "puts the local government behind the suppression of evils defined and made public offenses by state law." Casteel v. City of Decatur, 215 Ala. 4, 4, 109 So. 571, 572 (1926). Any ordinance adopted by a municipality on the authority granted to the municipality by Ala.Code 1975, § 11-45-1, must not be inconsistent with the general laws of the state. Lanier v. City of Newton, 518 So.2d 40 (Ala.1987). An ordinance is inconsistent with the general laws of the state if the municipal law prohibits anything that the state law permits. Lanier v. City of Newton, supra.
This Court finds that Ordinance No. 295 is a general reference ordinance encompassing the state law in effect at the time the ordinance became effective, as well as the subsequent modifications to the state law. Even if the city council of Columbiana had clearly expressed its intent to the contrary, the ordinance, to be consistent with the laws of Alabama, must necessarily be interpreted as conforming to the state law at the time § 28-3-260 was repealed by the Alabama legislature. Consequently, § 28-3-260 was not preserved by the ordinance and the ordinance did not prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages by an off-premises licensee to a...
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Tulley v. City of Jacksonville (Ex parte Tulley)
...offenses, and violations when those acts occur within the City's corporate limits or its police jurisdiction. See Evans v. Sunshine–Jr. Stores, Inc., 587 So.2d 312 (Ala.1991), superseded by regulation, Krupp Oil, Inc. v. Yeargan, 665 So.2d 920 (Ala.1995) (addressing a general-reference ordi......
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..."has ‘the full force and effect of law.’ " Krupp Oil Co. v. Yeargan, 665 So.2d 920, 924 (Ala. 1995) (quoting Evans v. Sunshine–Jr. Stores, Inc., 587 So.2d 312, 316 (Ala. 1991) ); see also § 28-3-49(a). Therefore, we hold that, in accordance with the requirements imposed on ABC Board on-prem......
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Krupp Oil Co., Inc. v. Yeargan
...Act, "the legislature would have repealed the statute itself, not just its teeth." Buchanan, 463 So.2d at 124. In Evans v. Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc., 587 So.2d 312 (Ala.1991), the deceased was killed after being struck by a drunk driver. The driver had purchased a 12-pack of beer from the d......
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