Evanston Y.M.C.A. Camp v. State Tax Commission

Decision Date31 December 1962
Docket NumberNo. 63,63
Citation369 Mich. 1,118 N.W.2d 818
PartiesEVANSTON Y.M.C.A. CAMP, a Michigan nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE TAX COMMISSION, Defendant and Appellee.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Reber & Reber, Fremont, for appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Eugene Krasicky, Sol. Gen., T. Carl Holbrook, William D. Dexter, Asst. Attys. Gen., Lansing, for appellee.

Before the Entire Bench, except ADAMS, J.

KELLY, Justice.

The Sherman township, Newaygo county, supervisor assessed appellant's property at a $20,000 valuation. Appellant protested, claiming the property was legally exempt. The board of review denied the petition for exemption. The State tax commission affirmed the board of review, and, on leave granted, this appeal is taken in the nature of certiorari.

Appellant was duly incorporated (November 22, 1923) as a Michigan nonprofit, nonstock, membership corporation, and its purposes were described in article 3 as follows:

'To provide benevolent and charitable means whereby young men and boys may obtain physical, social, moral, and religious culture, and the development of Christian character through life in the out-of-doors; to hold, own, and purchase or otherwise acquire, and to sell, convey, mortgage, handle, manage, or otherwise dispose of, any real or personal property, that may, in the judgment of the trustees or directors of this corporation, be necessary or proper to carry out and effectuate the purposes aforesaid.'

In 1923 appellant acquired less than 400 acres of land in Newaygo county and has improved same by constructing thereon a dining hall, social lodge, infirmary, 14 cabins, craft shop, warehouse, pump house, and directors' cabin.

Appellant contends the property is exempt from taxation for the year 1961 under paragraph 'Fourth,' of section 7 of the general property tax act as amended by P.A.1960, No. 155 (C.L.1948, § 211.7 [Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. § 7.7, as amended]).

In construing said paragraph we follow the cardinal rule that effect must be given to all statutory language employed by the legislature and that the history of legislation should be considered in determining the purpose of the legislature.

In Remus v. City of Grand Rapids, 274 Mich. 577, 581, 265 N.W. 755, 756, we stated:

"'In the construction of a particular statute, or in the interpretation of any of its provisions, all acts relating to the same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, as together constituting one law. The endeavor should be made, by tracing the history of legislation on the subject, to ascertain the uniform and consistent purpose of the Legislature, or to discover how the policy of the Legislature with reference to the subject-matter has been changed or modified from time to time.' 36 Cyc. 1147-1149.' Quoted in Miles, ex rel. Kamferbeek v. Fortney, 223 Mich. 552, 558, 194 N.W. 605, 607.'

The history of the act in question discloses that the pertinent portion of paragraph 'Fourth' has been amended 4 times since 1938. Prior to its amendment by P.A.1939, No. 232, this paragraph contained only 2 sentences, and read as follows:

'Fourth, Such real estate as shall be owned and occupied by library, benevolent, charitable, educational or scientific institutions and memorial homes of world war veterans incorporated under the laws of this state with the buildings and other property thereon while occupied by them solely for the purposes for which they were incorporated. Also charitable homes of fraternal or secret societies.'

P.A.1939, No. 232, added 1 additional sentence:

'Also real estate owned by any boy or girl scout organization, while occupied by them solely for the purpose for which they were incorporated or established.'

This sentence, however, was amended by P.A.1941, No. 125, to read:

'Also real estate not to exceed 160 acres of land owned by any boy or girl scout organization, while occupied by them solely for the purpose for which they were incorporated or established.'

P.A.1960, No. 155, again amended this sentence so that it read:

'Also real estate not to exceed 400 acres of land in this state owned by any boy or girl scout organization, or by young men's Christian associations or young women's Christian associations, if at leeast 50% of the membership of the associations or organizations are residents of this state, while occupied by them solely for the purpose for which they were incorporated or established.'

This same sentence was last amended by P.A.1961, No. 238, by inserting between the words 'state' and 'while,' the following language: 'but upon petition of any association or organization the board of supervisors may waive the residence requirement.'

It is appellant's position that 4 categories of exempt property are provided by said paragraph 'Fourth' and that each of the 4 sentence thereof contains a description of at least 1 such category that is separate and distinct from the others; that appellant's real estate falls within the scope of the category of the first sentence which 4 sentences thereof contains a description 'benevolent, charitable, educational * * * institutions' and, also, by the third sentence exempting real estate of 'young men's Christian associations or young women's Christian associations.'

Appellant, citing Ready-Power Company v. City of Dearborn, 336 Mich. 519, 58 N.W.2d 904, states that it is a 'fundamental principle that tax laws are to be construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer.'

Appellant raises the following question:

'Is there any evidence in the certified original record to support the order of the tax commission determining that such real estate of appellant is correctly assessed and that the assessment has been made in compliance with law?'

Appellant evidently proceeds on the fallacious theory that it is entitled to exemption unless the commission established that it was not entitled to an exemption.

While it is true that the imposition provisions of a taxing statute should be construed in favor of the taxpayer, this rule of construction does not supplant or eliminate the important rule to be applied in the question here presented: That exemption provisions must be strictly construed in favor of the taxing agency.

We made this clear in City of Detroit v. Detroit Commercial College, 322 Mich. 142, p. 149, 33 N.W.2d 737, p. 739, when we quoted 2 Cooley on Taxation (4 ed.), § 672, p. 1403, as follows:

"Exemptions are never presumed, the burden is on a claimant to establish clearly his right to exemption, and an alleged grant of exemption will be strictly construed and cannot be made out by inference or implication but must be beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, since taxation is the rule, and exemption the exception, the intention to make an exemption ought to be expressed in clear and unambiguous terms; it cannot be taken to have been intended when the language of the statute on which it depends is doubtful or uncertain; and the burden of establishing it is upon him who claims it. Moreover, if an exemption is found to exist, it must not be enlarged by construction, since the reasonable presumption is that the state has granted in express terms all it intended to grant at all, and that unless the privilege is limited to the very terms of the statute the favor would be extended beyond what was meant.'

When we construe statutory language containing both specific and general provisions, we adopt the rule set forth in 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 367, p. 371:

'Where there is in the same statute a specific provision, and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include matters embraced in the former, the particular provision must control, and the general provision must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular provision.'

See, also, Dossin's Food Products, Inc. v. Michigan State Tax Commission, 360 Mich. 312, 103 N.W.2d 474; Mayor of Port Huron v. City Treasurer of Port Huron, 328 Mich. 99, 43 N.W.2d 77.

Is appellant's property exempt under the category provided by the first sentence of paragraph 'Fourth' exempting the following:

'Such real estate as shall be owned and occupied by library, benevolent, charitable, educational or scientific institutions and memorial homes of world war veterans incorporated under the laws of this state with the buildings and other property thereon while occupied by them solely for the purposes for which they were incorporated?'

Appellant did not claim the right of exemption under the provisions referring to charitable, benevolent or educational institutions at the hearing before the board of review or the State tax commission.

Appellant matched the legislature's 1960 amendment granting young men's Christian associations exemption on 400 acres of land if 50% of the membership are residents of the State, by executing (November 30, 1960) an amendment to its articles of incorporation and filing a certificate of same with the Michigan corporation and securities commission disclosing:

'The qualifications required of officers and members are as follows:--That they be members in good standing of the Y.M.C.A. of Evanston, Illinois, provided, at least 50% of such members shall be residents of the State of Michigan.'

We quote with approval the following from appellee's brief:

'The argument of appellant that the general benevolent, charitable and educational exemption is applicable to it is untenable. Such an argument gives no effect whatsoever to the restrictive language added to paragraph Fourth by PA 1960, No 155, which amendatory language specifically provides that only those Y.M.C.A. organizations that meet the resident membership requirement therein set forth are entitled to the property tax exemption therein granted. Such an argument gives no effect to the specific...

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