Ewing v. UC Health
| Decision Date | 27 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | C-210390 |
| Citation | 193 N.E.3d 1132 |
| Parties | Toni EWING, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Shirley Ewing, and as Personal Representative of her Next of Kin and Beneficiaries, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UC HEALTH, and University of Cincinnati Medical Center, LLC, Defendants-Appellees, and John and/or Jane Doe #1, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Marlene Penny Manes, Cincinnati, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Frost Brown Todd, LLC, Bill J. Paliobeis, Cincinnati, and Douglas R. Dennis, for Defendants-Appellees.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Toni Ewing ("Ewing"), individually and as executrix of the estate of Shirley Ewing and as personal representative of her next of kin and beneficiaries, appeals the judgment of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings of defendants-appellees UC Health and University of Cincinnati Medical Center, LLC, (collectively "defendants"). For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part and reverse the judgment of the trial court in part and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the law.
{¶2} On April 16, 2018, Ewing, the adult daughter of Shirley Ewing, filed a complaint against defendants, among others, alleging three causes of action: a survivorship claim, a wrongful-death claim, and an "emotional harm" claim. The complaint asserted that the action was filed within 180 days of the written notice given to defendants pursuant to R.C. 2305.113, and asserted that the action was voluntarily dismissed in the case numbered A-1504406 on April 17, 2017, and was being refiled in the current action within one year of such dismissal. The claims were based on events alleged to have occurred during Shirley Ewing's inpatient stay at the University of Cincinnati Medical Center from February 18, 2014, to March 22, 2014. The complaint alleged:
there were deviations from accepted standards of care which resulted in harm and compensable damages to Shirley Ewing, in amounts later to be determined, including but not limited to a fracture of her leg
, failure to timely recognize said fracture, surgery, placement of a rod and pins, additional pain, suffering, mental anguish, emotional distress, additional expenses, * * * and shortening of life expectancy * * *.
{¶3} The complaint further asserted that Shirley passed away on March 25, 2014, and contended that her death was accelerated and wrongful as a result of such deviations in care. The "emotional harm" claim was brought by Ewing in her individual capacity and alleged that Ewing suffered "emotional harm" as the result of being the one who discovered her mother's broken leg
and "other damages" during the hospitalization.
{¶4} Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on May 8, 2019, arguing that Ewing's complaint was barred by the medical-claim statute of repose set forth in R.C. 2305.113(C). Defendants also subsequently asserted that the wrongful-death and emotional-harm claims failed as a matter of law. After responsive briefing between the parties and delays from awaiting the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Durrani , 164 Ohio St.3d 419, 2020-Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d 448, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on June 22, 2021, and dismissed Ewing's complaint in its entirety. In doing so, the trial court found that both the survivorship claim and the wrongful-death claim were "medical claims" under R.C. 2305.113(E) and were thus barred by the medical-claim statute of repose as the complaint was not filed until April of 2018. Additionally, the trial court found that the "emotional harm" claim, interpreted to be a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, failed as a matter of law.
{¶5} Ewing timely filed a notice of appeal on July 20, 2021. She now raises a single assignment of error for our review, arguing that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing all her claims.
{¶6} "Appellate review of a judgment on the pleadings involves only questions of law and is therefore de novo."
New Riegel Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Buehrer Group Architecture & Eng., Inc. , 157 Ohio St.3d 164, 2019-Ohio-2851, 133 N.E.3d 482, ¶ 8, citing Rayess v. Educational Comm. for Foreign Med. Graduates , 134 Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-5676, 983 N.E.2d 1267, ¶ 18. "Dismissal is appropriate under Civ.R. 12(C) when a court construes as true all material allegations in the complaint, along with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and finds, beyond doubt, that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief." Id. , citing State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious , 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996). "Similarly, questions of statutory construction constitute legal issues that we decide de novo." Id. , citing New York Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Bedford Hts. Income Tax Bd. of Rev. , 150 Ohio St.3d 386, 2016-Ohio-7582, 82 N.E.3d 1105, ¶ 8.
"Emotional Harm" Claim
{¶7} "[A] cause of action for the negligent infliction of serious emotional distress may be stated where the plaintiff-bystander reasonably appreciated the peril which took place, whether or not the victim suffered actual physical harm, and, * * * as a result of this cognizance or fear of peril, the plaintiff suffered serious emotional distress." Paugh v. Hanks , 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983), paragraph four of the syllabus. The element of "seriousness" is a necessary component required for a plaintiff-bystander to sufficiently state a claim for relief when the plaintiff did not suffer a contemporaneous physical injury. Id. at 78, 451 N.E.2d 759 ; see Binns v. Fredendall , 32 Ohio St.3d 244, 513 N.E.2d 278 (1987). "Serious" emotional distress must be "beyond trifling mental disturbance" or "mere upset or hurt feelings." Paugh at 78, 451 N.E.2d 759. It must be "emotional injury which is both severe and debilitating." Id. "Thus, serious emotional distress may be found where a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the case." Id. "A court may decide whether a plaintiff-bystander has stated a cause of action by ruling on whether the emotional distress alleged is serious as a matter of law." Id.
{¶8} Here, Ewing's claim merely alleges "emotional harm." Emotional harm is insufficient to establish severe and debilitating emotional distress. Thus, the allegations in the complaint fail as a matter of law to assert the level of harm required to sustain a cause of action for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress. Therefore, the trial court properly granted judgment in favor of defendants and dismissed this claim. Accordingly, we overrule this part of the assignment of error as to this cause of action.
{¶9} Ewing does not contest that her survivorship claim is a "medical claim" under R.C. 2305.113(E). Instead, she argues that the trial court erred by "retroactively" applying R.C. 2305.113(C), the medical-claim statute of repose, to refiled cases and failing to recognize that savings statutes convey vested rights to plaintiffs to refile their claims, which cannot constitutionally be extinguished by such retroactive application.
{¶10} Section I, Article 16 of the Ohio Constitution provides, "All courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay." Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 16. "A plain reading of Article 1, Section 16 reveals that it does not provide for remedies without limitation or for any perceived injury." Ruther v. Kaiser , 134 Ohio St.3d 408, 2012-Ohio-5686, 983 N.E.2d 291, ¶ 12. "Rather, the right-to-remedy clause provides that the court shall be open for those to seek remedy ‘by due course of law. " (Emphasis sic.) Id. " Article 1, Section 16 does not prevent the General Assembly from defining a cause of action." Id.
{¶11} Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that "a party need not be granted an unlimited amount of time to bring a vested cause of action, but must receive only a ‘reasonable’ amount of time in order for a law to pass constitutional muster." (Citations omitted.) Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found. , 148 Ohio St.3d 483, 2016-Ohio-7432, 71 N.E.3d 974, ¶ 27. Further, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the statute of repose, "in compliance with the right-to-remedy clause, does not ‘completely foreclose a cause of action for injured plaintiffs or otherwise eliminate their ability to receive a meaningful remedy.’ " Id. at ¶ 29, quoting Flagstar Bank, F.S.B. v. Airline Union's Mtge. Co. , 128 Ohio St.3d 529, 2011-Ohio-1961, 947 N.E.2d 672, ¶ 29. Accordingly, it held that the medical-claim statute of repose is constitutional "both when it extinguishes a vested and a nonvested cause of action." Id. Thus, the statute of repose is a "true statute of repose that applies to both vested and nonvested claims." Id. at ¶ 35 ; see Wilson , 164 Ohio St.3d 419, 2020-Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d 448, at ¶ 16. Therefore, even if Ewing had a vested right under the saving statute as she asserts, it was not unconstitutional for her claim to be extinguished by the statute of repose as she was provided with a reasonable amount of time within which to bring her claim.
{¶12} Because R.C. 2305.113 —which relocated the medical-claim statute of repose from R.C. 2305.11(B) —was enacted in 2002, well before the hospitalization in question and well before Ewing brought her claims, we interpret Ewing's retroactive application argument to be that the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Wilson should not be...
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