Ex parte Anonymous

Decision Date30 July 2001
PartiesEx parte ANONYMOUS, a minor. (In re In the matter of Anonymous, a minor).
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

HARWOOD, Justice.

S.R.J., an unemancipated 17-year-old, petitions this Court for review of the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court denying S.R.J.'s request for a waiver of parental consent to an abortion. The trial court found that S.R.J. is not sufficiently mature to obtain judicial permission to have an abortion without parental consent under Ala.Code 1975, § 26-21-1 et seq. S.R.J. filed her petition for a waiver of parental consent on June 29, 2001. On July 3, 2001, after conducting a hearing on S.R.J.'s petition the preceding day, the trial court entered an order denying the petition. In pertinent part, the order stated:

"The operative words setting the basis for the granting of the petition are:
"(1) That the minor is mature and well-informed enough to make the abortion decision on her own; or
"(2) That performance of the abortion would be in the best interest of the minor.
"An abortion is not in the petitioner's best interest. The risks attendant upon an abortion, physical and emotional, immediate and long-term, far outbalance her desire to escape from the predicament in which she finds herself, regardless of her willingness to assume those risks.
"Yet she has another alternative. Even if she cannot satisfy the Court that an abortion is in her best interest, she can obtain relief if she is `mature and well-informed enough to make the abortion decision on her own.' (Emphasis added [by trial court].)
"She must be mature and well-informed. The qualifiers are conjunctive, not alternative. The terms are not synonymous. S.R.J. has shown herself to be well-informed. She testified as to the abortion procedure itself. She is well-informed as to how it will be done, as to the risks involved, as to the alternatives to abortion. [Two pregnancy-counseling clinics] have given her that information and she can recite it back from the stand. She is well-informed enough to make the decision.
"But is she mature enough? The Court is not satisfied that she is mature enough. Knowledge is not maturity.
"She testifies that she has a sexually active older sister, 19 years old, on birth control pills, living in the family home (they share a telephone line). She could talk to her sister and she would talk to her if there were post-abortion problems, but she has not sought her advice.
"She testifies that her mother's best friend is available for consultation; a mature woman who has offered counseling to S.R.J. and her sister. She could talk to her and she could go to her for help if there were post-abortion problems, but she has not sought her advice.
"She has never talked with a woman who has lost a child. She has talked to a schoolmate who had an abortion but this was before she became sexually active herself. It is unlikely that that conversation has had any effect on this situation.
"Her most important previous decision was made about six months ago when she decided to engage in sexual intercourse with her 20-year-old boyfriend. She testified that she realized that there was a danger of pregnancy but seems to have been satisfied that condoms would eliminate that risk. In order to make a mature decision then, should she not have consulted with her sister as to why she was taking birth control pills?
"It is obvious that she simply does not want anyone to know of her situation.
"There is an intact family unit. Her parents are together. They would be disappointed but she believes that they would be supportive of her. She plans to marry the baby's father at some time in the future. They have been dating for 20 months. Her parents know that and have no problem with her choice of a husband.
"The baby's father will support her decision. He has a good job, making $13.00 per hour. She makes $7.00 per hour in her summer job. Finances are not a problem.
"The Court's decision cannot be based upon what the parents would say if she sought their permission but the Court ought to be able to consider her reasons for not wanting to tell her parents, as those reasons bear on her maturity.
"There is a mature woman available to S.R.J. who has faced the same situation, who loves her, and who wants the very best for her. That woman is her mother, who conceived and bore the older sister out of wedlock and then married that child's father. S.R.J. is the fruit of that marriage and that experience.
"Apparently, S.R.J. has talked only with [counselors at two pregnancy-counseling clinics] and her boyfriend. She simply does not want anyone else to know. If S.R.J. were mature enough to make this decision on her own, would she not have sought the counsel of her sister, or her mother's friend? Given the singular family history, would a mature 17-year-old have sought her mother's counsel rather than file this petition?
"It is the finding of this Court that S.R.J., while well-informed, is not mature enough to make this decision on her own nor is an abortion in her best interest."

The trial court's order contains no finding concerning, and does not otherwise reference in any way, S.R.J.'s demeanor during the hearing.

The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court without an opinion, citing this Court's opinion in Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So.2d 542 (Ala. 2001). Presiding Judge Yates dissented. In re Anonymous, 810 So.2d 784 (Ala.Civ. App.2001).

S.R.J. presents three issues for this Court's review: (1) whether the trial court erred by holding that the abortion was not in her best interest; (2) whether the trial court's finding that S.R.J. was not mature enough to satisfy § 26-21-4 is reversible error, in light of the evidence presented; and (3) whether the trial court violated S.R.J.'s constitutional rights by appointing a lawyer to represent the fetus.

In addition to the facts noted by the trial court in its order, the record discloses the following facts. S.R.J. will be a senior in high school in the coming school year and she made A's and one B in her junior year. S.R.J. has a full-time summer job, and she plans to work part-time during the coming school year. She stated that she maintains a checking account and that she pays for personal expenses such as telephone bills, fuel for her automobile, and clothing. She stated that she was five and one-half weeks pregnant at the time of the hearing. She had discussed her pregnancy with her boyfriend and they had decided that they were not prepared to have and to rear a child. She stated that she was aware of the stigma that attended young women when they attempted to complete school while they were pregnant, and she believed most young women in that situation simply dropped out of school. S.R.J. also stated that she did not believe that her parents would consent to an abortion. After discussing the medical procedures involved in an abortion and the alternative resources available if she chose to have the baby, S.R.J. stated:

"I'm not financially ready to have a baby. I'm not emotionally ready to have a baby. I don't think that if I had a baby 24 hours a day that—I'm just not ready to have a baby 24 hours a day. I'm not married. I'm still in school, and I want to go to college and do what I've always wanted to do."

S.R.J. also explained that she was hypoglycemic and that her health was "not really good." She testified that she attended church regularly, that she had prayed about her decision to seek an abortion, and that she was satisfied that she was doing the right thing.

Before the hearing, the trial judge appointed a guardian ad litem to represent S.R.J.'s fetus. In his comments at the beginning of the hearing, the trial judge stated:

"I don't know anything about the case or anything about you, but I sympathize with the situation that you find yourself. And what we have to do today is not for the purpose of embarrassing you, hurting your feelings, putting you through some big rigmarole, something like that. But what you have asked the Court to allow you to do is something that is extremely serious and fatal for your child. And it has been my practice for three years now when I'm faced with these cases to not only have a lawyer for you but to have a lawyer to represent the interest of the unborn child."

The lawyer appointed for the fetus, described in the record as a guardian ad litem, subjected S.R.J. to a probing cross-examination concerning her knowledge of the negative consequences of undergoing an abortion and the possible consequences, including depression, sterility, and death. The appointed lawyer's cross-examination also explored at some length S.R.J.'s knowledge of the alternatives to abortion, including having her family help raise the baby or placing the baby for adoption. S.R.J. testified that she did not want to impose on her family the expenses and work of rearing her child and that she was not satisfied that, if adopted, the baby would not be abused. The attorney for the fetus also cross-examined S.R.J. concerning the fact that her mother had become pregnant with her older sister before her mother married. She explained that her mother's situation was different from hers because when her mother became pregnant she had graduated from college and was working full-time. S.R.J.'s first two arguments—that the trial court erred in finding that an abortion would not be in her best interest and that the trial court erred in finding that she was not sufficiently mature to make the decision to obtain an abortion on her own—both challenge the findings of the trial court. For that reason, we consider those arguments together. The standard of review we apply to a trial court's findings of fact in a case such as this is set out in Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So.2d 542 (Ala.2001) ("Ex parte Anonymous I"). In the opinion in that case this Court overruled previous precedent concerning the application of...

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