Ex Parte Bartee

• Decision Date: 03 March 1915
• Docket Number: (No. 3441.)
• Citation: 174 S.W. 1051
• Parties: Ex parte BARTEE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

174 S.W. 1051

Ex parte BARTEE.

(No. 3441.)

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 3, 1915.

Rehearing Denied March 31, 1915.

Appeal from Criminal District Court, Dallas County; Robert B. Seay, Judge.

Ex parte application by Sanford Bartee for a writ of habeas corpus. From a judgment denying the writ, he appeals. Affirmed.

Wills, Adams & Triplett and A. S. Baskett, all of Dallas, for appellant. C. C. McDonald, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HARPER, J.

Appellant was tried by the county court of Dallas county upon a complaint charging that he was a delinquent child, being under 17 years of age, in that he did steal an automobile. This complaint was filed on December 10, 1913. On this complaint appellant was tried as a delinquent child by the judge of the county court of Dallas county, adjudged a delinquent child under the age of 16 years, and he was committed to the State Institution for the Training of Juveniles for an indeterminate term of not less than two nor more than five years. Under this judgment relator was conveyed to the State Industrial School at Gatesville by R. L. Chick, assistant probation officer of the county of Dallas, on the 23d day of December, 1913, and there delivered to the superintendent of the State Industrial School for Boys. The record further discloses that relator escaped from the school about the 21st day of last July, and was not apprehended until in December of last year. When found he was taken charge of by W. K. Reynolds as an escape from the State Industrial School, who intended to convey him back to said school, and would have done so, only that relator sued out a writ of habeas corpus before Judge Seay. Upon hearing the case Judge Seay remanded relator to the custody of Mr. Reynolds, and from which judgment he prosecutes this appeal.

Appellant assigns many reasons why he should be discharged, and why the judgment of the district court should be reversed.

1. He alleges that the county court of Dallas county had no jurisdiction to try the case, he contending that it was a criminal action, and the jurisdiction of the county court had been transferred to the county court at law.

While it is true that the criminal jurisdiction of the county court had been vested in the county court at law, yet we do not think this is a criminal action, for the law provides that, if a criminal action is brought against a boy under 17 years of age, the court may, if he deems it for the best, order the criminal action dismissed, and have him tried under a new complaint as a delinquent child. And the law provides that one who is found to be a delinquent child shall suffer none of the penalties or disqualifications of one who is adjudged a criminal. Upon a trial to decide whether or not a child is a "delinquent," as defined by the statute, the law provides that the court may make such orders as he deems best for the interest of the child. The law is intended to prevent children, under improper environments, from so remaining, and to place them in such surroundings as to prevent them from becoming criminals. It is more in the nature of providing guardianship for the children, and to make it the duty of such guardian to see that the child is educated and properly trained. It is in no sense a criminal proceeding, and the county court of Dallas had jurisdiction specifically conferred on it by law to try such cases. The object and purpose of the school is stated to be:

"That it shall be the duty of said board and superintendent to arrange that each student of said training school shall receive a reasonable amount of instruction in the school of letters and industrial branch each year. Each inmate shall be given definite instruction and training in some useful occupation. Each inmate shall be given such moral training and discipline as he is capable of receiving. The prime end to be sought by said board is to reform, educate, and train the children committed to the institution into industrious and useful law-abiding citizens, strengthen their self-control, and place them in a moral environment that will build character and inculcate correct ideas of civic virtue and responsibility."

2. Relator's next contention is that, as the judgment ordered him carried to the "State Institution for the Training of Juveniles," the judgment is void, because no such institution is in existence. The law which changed the name of the institution from the "State Institution for the Training of Juveniles" to the name of the "State Juvenile Training School" specifically provides in section 8 (of chapter 6, Acts 33d Leg. 1st Called Session [Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 5228]) that all inmates sentenced to the State Institution for the Training of Juveniles shall only be required to serve out their unexpired terms in said institution, thus clearly evidencing that it was the intent of the Legislature, in changing the name of the institution, to continue it as it theretofore existed, with such modifications and changes as were provided for in the law.

3. The next contention is that there is no authority to order him placed in the training school until an indictment has been returned against him charging him with a crime. The acts of the Thirty-Third Legislature, regular session (chapter 112), and special session (chapter 6), authorize a child to be proceeded against upon complaint duly filed, and, if an indictment is returned, charging him with a criminal offense, for its dismissal, and proceedings to be had upon complaint charging him with being a delinquent child. The complaint was sufficient to charge relator with being a delinquent under the provisions of chapter 112, Acts of Regular Session of 33d Legislature.

4. That the judgment orders relator committed to the training school for an indeterminate period of not less than two nor more than five years, in accordance with the provisions of the old law, would not render it void. The present law provides for his detention for an indeterminate period of not more than five years, and the judgment should be read in the light of the law as it now exists, and, as it commits him for an indeterminate period that is now provided, it would be but an irregularity.

5. The judgment shows that the order was not suspended, and the contention that the commitment was suspended is not sustained by the record before us.

6. The next contention is that the entire acts are unconstitutional and violative of the provisions of the state and federal Constitutions. We do not think that an act of the Legislature, which provides that if a boy under 17 and a girl under 18 years of age shall commit an offense which is defined by the Criminal Code as an offense, upon making proof of their age, under an application to the court in which an indictment or information charging them with such an offense is pending, which provides that the judge of the court may order the criminal case dismissed, if he deems it advisable, and have such person placed where they will be properly reared and trained, is violative of any provision of the federal or state Constitutions. The law does not seek to give the district and county courts concurrent jurisdiction over crimes of the grade of felonies and misdemeanors. Of course, the county court could not be given jurisdiction over a felony charge under our Constitution. The offense relator is alleged to have committed is not a felony. Sparks v. State, 174 S. W. 351, decided at this term of the court. But, if it were a felony, the law provides for the dismissal of any charge of felony or misdemeanor, and for a complaint charging those things which would show that relator was a delinquent child. The law can provide, before conviction, for a district judge or any other officer to excuse or relieve one from the penalty assessed for a violation of the law of the grade declared to be a felony. It is only after conviction that such authority is given to the Governor alone by the Constitution.

7. Appellant was not prosecuted for a criminal offense, and therefore the act is not in contravention of articles 1 and 3, tit. 1, of the Penal Code. Appellant was only tried to determine whether or not he was such a child, and his environments such that the circumstances required that the state interpose and he be given an opportunity to become a law-abiding and useful citizen upon reaching manhood's estate.

Our able Assistant Attorney General has exhaustively reviewed the authorities in briefing many of the questions raised by relator, and we take the liberty of copying the following excerpts therefrom:

"The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case of Lindsay et al. v. Lindsay et al. [257 Ill. 328, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 908, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1222] 100 N. E. 892, in a most able opinion rendered by Justice Farmer on February 20, 1913, uses the following striking language: `It is said by the editor of the eleventh and latest edition of Wharton's Criminal Law' that the Juvenile Court Act passed by the Legislature of the state of Illinois in 1899 is `the first juvenile court act, as such acts are now generally known, adopted by any state. Similar acts have since been adopted by several other states, and have been uniformly sustained as valid legislation, except in the state of Michigan, where the acts held invalid were subject to objections not found in the Illinois statute' — and I respectfully submit to this court that these objections are not found in our statute. `Our statute and those of similar character treat children coming within their provisions as wards of the state to be protected, rather than as criminals to be punished, and their purpose is to save them from the possible effects of delinquency and neglect liable to result in their leading a criminal career. The purpose of such legislation is, we think, rightfully claimed to be unquestionably in advance of previous legislation dealing with children as criminals.'

"Plaintiffs in error contended, among...