Wissenberg v. Bradley
| Citation | 229 N.W. 205,209 Iowa 813 |
| Decision Date | 22 October 1929 |
| Docket Number | 39927 |
| Parties | NORMAN WISSENBURG, Petitioner, v. C. C. BRADLEY, Judge, Respondent |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED FEBRUARY 11, 1930.
Appeal from Cherokee District Court.--C. C. BRADLEY, Judge.
Proceedings in certiorari, brought in this court to review certain proceedings of the juvenile court of Cherokee County.--Writ dismissed; order affirmed.
Writ dismissed; order affirmed.
William Mulvaney and Claud M. Smith, for petitioner.
R. G Rodman, County Attorney, for respondent.
On April 9, 1929, the county attorney of Cherokee County filed an information in the district court of said county, charging that the petitioner herein is a minor, under eighteen years of age, a resident of Cherokee County, and is delinquent and incorrigible, and praying the court to make an order committing said petitioner to the Iowa Industrial School for Boys. On said day, a waiver of notice of said hearing was duly signed and filed in said action by the foster father of said petitioner, and on said 10th day of April, 1929, the petitioner appeared in person and by his attorney in said juvenile court. Both the foster parents of said petitioner also appeared with him at said time. The respondent at said time heard the evidence, under oath, of the foster parents and other witnesses, including the sheriff and the superintendent of schools, and also had a private interview with the petitioner. No order in relation to said matter was made at said time, and the respondent informed all parties present that the cause would stand continued, and would follow cases already assigned for trial in the district court. Thereafter, to wit, on April 16, 1929, all parties in interest were informed that said cause would come on for final hearing on April 17, 1929. On said date, the respondent, acting as judge of said juvenile court, signed an order appointing one Stiles as probation officer for said court, and thereafter, on said day, said hearing of said cause was resumed, at which time the petitioner appeared in person and by his attorney. The foster father of petitioner also appeared, and the probation officer was present.
It appears from the return of respondent herein that, previous to said time, and after the 10th day of April, the respondent had conferred with the party appointed probation officer, and had secured his consent to act as such probation officer, if so appointed, and, in anticipation of such formal appointment, at the request of the respondent, the said party had made an investigation in regard to the matters involved in the hearing. The probation officer made his report of his investigation to the respondent at the hearing on April 17th. Other witnesses who had previously testified were present at the hearing, and again testified. At said hearing, the respondent made an order finding the petitioner herein to be delinquent, incorrigible, and beyond the control of his foster parents, and sorely in need of training, discipline, and supervision, and ordered him committed to the Iowa Industrial School for Boys at Eldora, Iowa, until he should attain the age of twenty-one years. Thereafter, upon petition to one of the judges of this court, a writ of certiorari was issued, to review said proceedings.
I. The statutory provisions regarding juvenile courts in this state are found in Chapters 179 and 180 of the Code, 1927. The petitioner challenges the constitutionality of said chapters under both the Federal and state Constitutions.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is, in part, as follows:
"* * * nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Section 9, Article I, of the Constitution of Iowa is as follows:
"The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the general assembly may authorize trial by a jury of a less number than twelve men in inferior courts; but no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
The petitioner contends that the said constitutional provisions are violated by said chapters, for the reason that the said statutes make no provision for a trial by jury in proceedings authorized thereunder. Petitioner's contention is that he has been deprived of his liberty without due process of law, by reason of the fact that he was not tried to a jury. It has been frequently announced by this and many other courts that due process of law, within the meaning of both the Federal and state Constitutions, does not necessarily imply a trial by jury. McKeever v. Jenks, 59 Iowa 300, 13 N.W. 295; Yeomans v. Riddle, 84 Iowa 147, 50 N.W. 886; In re Bradley, 108 Iowa 476, 79 N.W. 280; Ross v. Board of Supervisors, 128 Iowa 427; Hunter v. Colfax Cons. Coal Co., 175 Iowa 245, 157 N.W. 145, 154 N.W. 1037.
It has been the uniform holding, under similar statutes providing for a juvenile court, with the power of commitment of delinquent and incorrigible juveniles, with no provision for a trial by jury, that such statutes are not within the constitutional prohibition. The cases are collected in 35 Corpus Juris 195, Section 100, and 12 Corpus Juris 1210, Section 986.
The appellant in the instant case is not being tried in this proceeding for any crime. The action is, in a sense, a special proceeding provided by statute, wherein the state, by virtue of its authority as parens patriae, takes jurisdiction of the incorrigible child, and commits it, not to jail for punishment, but to a reformatory, for its care, education, and training. That such a statute and such a proceeding, without a trial by jury, does not violate either the Federal or the state constitutional provisions, has been repeatedly held.
Appellant places great reliance upon the language of the Supreme Court of the United States in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (24 L.Ed. 77). The case involved a statute fixing the maximum charges for the storage of grain in a warehouse. There is an interesting discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment in the case, but nothing said therein in any way controverts the proposition of the power of the state to commit a delinquent or incorrigible child to a reformatory for education and training without a jury trial.
Many of the states have statutes similar to the one involved in this appeal, providing for the commitment of delinquent or incorrigible children to reformatories or houses of correction without any right reserved to a trial by jury under the terms of the statute. The universal holding is that such statutes are constitutional, and that they do not contravene the provisions of either Federal or state Constitutions, and do not deprive such a child of his liberty without due process of law. Of course, appellant is a citizen of the United States, and is not to be deprived of his liberty without due process of law; but due process of law does not require that, in this kind of a proceeding, and for the purposes of the statute in question, there shall be a trial by jury. Statutes of this general character have been characterized by the courts as progressive and humanitarian. State ex rel. Cave v. Tincher, 258 Mo. 1 (166 S.W. 1028). Some courts refer to them as paternal and benevolent. In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120 (96 P. 563); In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115 (145 P. 871); State v. Eisen, 53 Ore. 297 (99 P. 282); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48 (62 A. 198). Such statutes are not criminal or penal. They are not intended as a punishment, but are calculated to save the child from becoming a criminal.
"The whole and only object of such laws is to provide the child with an environment such as will save him to the state and society as a useful and law-abiding citizen, and to give him the educational requirements necessary to attain that end." Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473 (88 P. 609).
See also, State ex rel. Miller v. Bryant, 94 Neb. 754 (144 N.W. 804); In re Alley, 174 Wis. 85 (182 N.W. 360); Commonwealth v. Fisher, supra; In re Hook, 95 Vt. 497 (115 A. 730); In re Sharp, supra; Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 106 (133 S.W. 1137); In re Turner, supra; State ex rel. Raddue v. Superior Court for King County, 106 Wash. 619 (180 P. 875). The statute not being criminal in its nature, nor designed for punishment, and the commitment being for the benefit of the child and for its education and reformation, and to an industrial school or similar institution, the due process of law clause does not, in such a case, require a jury trial. State v. Scholl, 167 Wis. 504 (167 N.W. 830); Wisconsin Ind. Sch. for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651 (79 N.W. 422); Commonwealth v. Fisher, supra; Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203 (6 N.E. 830); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328 (100 N.E. 892); Ex parte King, 141 Ark. 213 (217 S.W. 465); Dinson v. Drosta, 39 Ind.App. 432 (80 N.E. 32); State ex rel. Olson v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353 (52 N.W. 935); State v. Burnett, 179 N.C. 735 (102 S.E. 711); Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 151 Mich. 315 (115 N.W. 682); Roth v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329; Ex parte Ah Peen, 51 Cal. 280; In re Brodie, 33 Cal.App. 751 (166 P. 605); Ex parte Bartee, 76 Tex.Crim. 285 (174 S.W. 1051); Childress v. State, 133 Tenn. 121 (179 S.W. 643); Reynolds v. Howe, 51 Conn. 472; Taylor v. Means, 139 Ga. 578 (77 S.E. 373); Wilkison v. Board of Children's Guardians, 158 Ind. 1 (62 N.E. 481); State ex rel. Spritka v. Parsons, 153 Wis. 20 (139 N.W. 825); Cincinnati House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio St. 197; Milwaukee Ind. Sch. v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wis. 328; Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398 ...
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