Ex parte Camara

• Decision Date: 01 December 1994
• Docket Number: Nos. 13-94-048-C,13-94-050-CR,s. 13-94-048-C
• Parties: Ex parte Maria Calderon CAMARA. Ex parte Jose Carlos CAMARA.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 553

893 S.W.2d 553

Ex parte Maria Calderon CAMARA.

Ex parte Jose Carlos CAMARA.

Nos. 13-94-048-CR, 13-94-050-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas Corpus Christi.

Dec. 1, 1994.

Rehearing Overruled Jan. 5, 1995.

L. Aron Pena, Francisco Gonzales, Jr., Edinburg, for appellant.

Rene Guerra, Dist. Atty., Theodore C. Hake, Rebecca Pool, Asst. Dist. Attys., Edinburg, for appellee.

Before SEERDEN, C.J., and FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA, Jr. and COLLEY ¹, JJ.

OPINION

SEERDEN, Chief Justice.

Appellants appeal the trial court's denial of their applications for writ of habeas corpus. In a single point of error, appellants assert the Double Jeopardy Clause ² prohibits the State from prosecuting them for their criminal conduct. Appellants contend the State already imposed "punishment" for their criminal conduct when the State obtained a forfeiture judgment against their property. We affirm the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief.

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellants Maria and Jose Camara, husband and wife, were each arrested and indicted on two counts: (1) for possessing nine hundred forty-one pounds of marihuana and (2) for failing to pay taxes on the marihuana. The State instituted a civil forfeiture proceeding against appellants' mobile home and lot pursuant to the contraband forfeiture statute, TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 59.01 et seq. (Vernon Supp.1994) ("Chapter 59 forfeiture"). ³ The trial court rendered judgment, forfeiting appellants' mobile home and lot to the State.

After the civil forfeiture proceeding, the State initiated criminal prosecution against appellants. Appellants, in turn, filed separate special pleas of double jeopardy; the trial court denied the pleas. Appellants then filed separate applications for writ of habeas corpus, again seeking relief on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied appellants' applications, and appellants jointly filed this appeal.

Issue

By their sole point of error, appellants contend the civil forfeiture of their property--their homestead--constituted "punishment" within the Double Jeopardy Clause's meaning of punishment. Appellants further contend that if they were to be criminally prosecuted, they would be subject to jeopardy a second time for the same offense. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, enforceable against states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees a trio of constitutional protections: (1) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) protection against a second prosecution for the same conviction, and (3) protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076-77, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).

This case involves the third protection. Here, the issue before us is whether appellants' forfeiture of their homestead under Chapter 59, constitutes "punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. This issue is not novel to the jurisprudence of this state; nevertheless, Texas intermediate appellate courts are not in accord. ⁴ Furthermore, this issue is not novel to federal courts. At least one federal circuit court concluded that the federal analog to Texas Chapter 59 forfeiture does not constitute "punishment" within the context of the Double Jeopardy Clause. ⁵ See United States v. A Parcel Of Land With A Building Thereon, 884 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1989).

Analysis

Chapter 59 forfeiture actions are generally regarded as civil proceedings. $22,922.00 v. State, 853 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Ex parte Rogers, 804 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1990, no pet.) (discussing the statutory precursor of Chapter 59 forfeiture). Forfeiture proceedings are regarded as civil because the civil rules of procedure govern, and the standard of proof is by a preponderance of evidence. Ward v. State, 870 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd); Ex parte Rogers, 804 S.W.2d at 948; Gonzales v. State, 832 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1992, no pet.).

Historically, the constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments was thought to arise only in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-49, 63 S.Ct. 379, 386-87, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (emphasizing that jeopardy attaches only to criminal punishment). Courts generally refused to figure civil penalties into the double jeopardy equation. See, e.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 150-51, 76 S.Ct. 219, 220-21, 100 L.Ed. 149 (1956); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 633, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938). Then, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), expanding the scope of double jeopardy "punishment" to include civil penalties.

Appellants primarily rely on Halper and two other cases--Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994) and Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993)--to support their claim that Chapter 59 forfeiture constitutes "punishment." Although we find the standards set forth in Halper instructive, appellants' reliance on Halper, Kurth Ranch, and Austin for support is misplaced.

In Halper, the Court considered the issue of whether, and under what circumstances, a civil sanction may constitute "punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. Halper, 490 U.S. at 446, 109 S.Ct. at 1900-01. Halper, the defendant, submitted sixty-five false Medicare claims, overcharging the Federal Government a total of $585. Id. at 437, 109 S.Ct. at 1895-96. Under the criminal false claims statute, 18 U.S.C. § 287, the government convicted and sentenced Halper to two years in prison and imposed a $5000 fine. Id. The government then pursued civil action against Halper for his same fraudulent conduct, assessing a civil penalty in excess of $130,000 under the civil false claims statute, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731. ⁶ Id. at 438, 109 S.Ct. at 1896.

The trial court estimated the government spent no more than $16,000 in investigating and prosecuting Halper. United States v. Halper, 660 F.Supp. 531, 534 (S.D.N.Y.1987). Finding a tremendous disparity between the government's approximated expenses of $16,000 and Halper's liability in excess of $130,000, the trial court declared, "[T]he total amount necessary to make the Government whole bears no rational relation to the $130,000 penalty the Government seeks." Id. at 533. The trial court then concluded that imposing such a civil penalty in addition to the criminal conviction would violate Halper's constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Id.

The United States Supreme Court agreed, holding that the disparity between the government's approximated expenses of $16,000 and Halper's liability of $130,000 is sufficiently disproportionate such that the civil penalty constitutes a second punishment in violation of double jeopardy. Halper, 490 U.S. at 452, 109 S.Ct. at 1903-04. And, in the interest of justice, the Court remanded the case to permit the government to demonstrate its actual damages. Id.

Halper, therefore, teaches us that a defendant punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional sanction, even though civil, if the sanction is actually punitive in character. Id. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02. A civil sanction will be considered punishment to the extent that it serves the purposes of retribution and deterrence, as opposed to furthering a nonpunitive remedial objective. Id. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02. Thus, if the sanction is remedial in character, double jeopardy is not an issue. Id. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02.

In determining whether a penalty is punitive or remedial, the Halper Court deemed it necessary to assess the purpose of the penalty. Id. at 447, 109 S.Ct. at 1901. The Court then set forth several guiding principles to assist courts in assessing whether the purpose of a penalty is remedial or punitive. Id. at 447-48, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02. First, the Court opined that the legislative labels of "criminal" or "civil" are insignificant because civil penalties are known to advance remedial as well as punitive goals. Id. at 447, 109 S.Ct. at 1901. Then, the Court defined remedial as opposed to punitive penalties: A remedial penalty is one which merely reimburses the government for its actual damages arising from a defendant's conduct. Id. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. Actual damages may include monies expended on investigating, apprehending, prosecuting, and obtaining forfeiture against the defendant. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1948; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237, 93 S.Ct. 489, 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972); Ex parte Rogers, 804 S.W.2d at 950. The government is also entitled to remuneration for injury and loss suffered by the acts upon which forfeiture is predicated. ⁷ See A Parcel Of Land, 884 F.2d at 44 (explaining that the government is entitled to recover the costs from the ravages of drugs, such as drug-related crimes, drug-abuse treatment, rehabilitation, and prevention).

It may be difficult, if not impossible, in many cases for a court to determine the precise dollar figure for which a civil penalty accomplishes its remedial purpose, but beyond which the penalty takes on the character of punishment. Id., 490 U.S. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. Thus, the process of affixing a penalty to compensate the government for all of its costs inevitably involves an element of rough remedial justice. Id.

Whereas remedial sanctions serve to compensate the government, the Halper Court explained that punitive sanctions serve the traditional dual aims of retribution and deterrence. Id. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02. Any penalty that is not remotely approximated to the government's actual damages, but rather is exponentially greater, qualifies as punishment. Id. at 445-46,...