Ex parte Canary

• Citation: 200 P. 307,116 Wash. 569
• Decision Date: 18 August 1921
• Docket Number: 16522.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Parties: Ex parte CANARY.

200 P. 307

116 Wash. 569

Ex parte CANARY.

No. 16522.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

August 18, 1921

Petition by Auttie Canary for writ of habeas corpus. Denied.

Beeler & Sullivan, of Seattle, for plaintiff.

Lindsay L. Thompson, of Olympia, for defendant.

FULLERTON J.

This is an original application made to this court for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner alleges in her petition that she entered a plea of guilty to an information filed against her in the superior court of Spokane county, charging her with the crime of grand larceny; that upon her plea of guilty she was adjudged guilty by the court, and was thereupon committed to the institution known as the women's industrial home and clinic; and that on March 28 1921, she was transferred by the officers of that institution to the state penitentiary, where she is now confined. As causes for granting the writ, she makes the general allegation that the transfer was without authority of law and against her will. In the argument at bar, the more specific objections were made: (1) That the directors of the institution were without power to make the transfer; and (2) that, conceding that the directors had such power, they wrongfully exercised the power.

With reference to the first objection, it is provided in the act authorizing the creation of the institution known as the women's industrial home and clinic (Laws of 1919, c. 186 § 13):

'The board of directors may transfer to the state prison any inmate of said institution who shall appear to said board to be incorrigible, or whose presence in said institution may be seriously detrimental to its well-being.'

Obviously the Legislature, by this provision of the statute attempted to confer power on the board of directors to make the transfer, and unless it is to be held that the Legislature was in itself without power so to do, there is warrant for the act of the board of directors. But we see no valid objection that can be based upon this ground. The crime of which the petitioner was adjudged guilty is a felony. It is a crime long recognized as punishable in a penal institution and it is solely for the Legislature to prescribe the character of that institution. They could have provided directly for her punishment by confinement in the state prison, and no logical or sound reason can exist why that body may not provide that a convicted person be first confined in some other institution,...